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Summary
“Freemium” (free + premium) has become a workhorse pricing model in the digital
economy: A basic version of a product or service, e.g., mobile applications (“apps”),
can be used for free in perpetuity and premium upgrades are available against pay-
ment of a fee. Consumers downloaded apps 194 billion times in 2018 and spent $101
billion on in-app purchases in the same time period. Accounting for almost 80% of
that revenue, gaming in particular has seen an unparalleled expansion of demand.
It is estimated that 50% of mobile app users play games regularly and that a global
total of 2.4 billion people will play mobile games in 2019.
The core thesis of this dissertation is that promotions are essential to the marketing
of freemium goods such as mobile apps and games. While freemium already repre-
sents a promotional pricing tactic in using a zero price for free sampling, the author
conjectures that firms can operate their freemium offerings more profitably by using
further promotional tactics, especially targeted and personalized promotions, to sell
premium upgrades. The author also argues (and shows) that widespread concerns
around the use of promotions, particularly developed in the setting of consumer
packaged goods, do not apply in the same way in this setting. This thinking is
qualified and developed across four chapters that represent individual papers after
providing an introduction to the work in the first chapter.
The work is empirical in nature and applies advanced analytics, in particular field
experimentation and machine learning, in collaboration with firms. As representa-
tive of the freemium app economy, the collaborating firms observe dense user data
that enable the author to both derive insights on consumer behavior that extend
existing conceptual thinking in the field of marketing and to devise decision support
and expert systems that allow firms to operate more profitably in this setting.

Zusammenfassung
“Freemium” (Free + Premium) hat sich zu einem führenden Preismodell für digitale
Güter entwickelt. Dabei kann die Basisversion eines Produkts, z.B. von Handy-
Applikationen (“Apps”), unbegrenzt kostenlos genutzt werden und Firmen bieten
Premium-Erweiterungen gegen Bezahlung an. Konsumenten haben in 2018 194
Milliarden mal Apps heruntergeladen und 101 Milliarden US-Dollar für In-App-
Einkäufe ausgegeben. Beinahe 80% des Umsatzes auf App-Stores wird dabei durch
Handyspiele generiert. 2,4 Milliarden Menschen haben in 2019 Handyspiele gespielt,
was der Hälfte aller App-Nutzer im gleichen Zeitraum entspricht.
Die Hauptthese dieser Dissertation ist, dass preisreduzierende Sonderangebote von
großer Wichtigkeit für das Vermarkten von Freemium-Gütern sind: Obwohl Freemium
bereits eine extreme Preis-Reduktion darstellt, indem es ein Produkt Konsumenten
kostenlos zum Ausprobieren zur Verfügung stellt, können demnach Firmen durch
die Nutzung weiterer Sonderangebotstaktiken höhere Profite generieren. Die Arbeit
postuliert weiter (und beweist dies empirisch), dass lange angenommene Risiken
in der Nutzung von Sonderangeboten, die vor allem bei klassischen Konsumgütern
etabliert wurden, im Freemium-Bereich in dieser Form nicht zutreffen. Diese Per-
spektive entwickelt und vertieft der Autor über vier individuelle Papiere, die zusam-
men mit einer einleitenden Zusammenfassung die fünf Kapitel dieser Dissertation
ausmachen.
Die vorliegende Arbeit ist empirischer Natur und wendet “Advanced Analytics”, ins-
besondere Feldexperimente und maschinelles Lernen, in Zusammenarbeit mit Fir-
men an. Als repräsentativer Forschungsgrund dienen dabei Freemium-Handyspiele,
in denen Firmen detaillierte Daten über Interaktionen mit Kunden sammeln. An-
hand dieser Daten leitet der Autor neue Kenntnisse über Kundenverhalten ab und
entwickelt Entscheidungsunterstützungssysteme, die es Firmen ermöglichen, höhere
Gewinne beim Verkauf von Freemium-Gütern zu erzielen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Freemium” (free + premium) has become a workhorse pricing model in the digital
economy (Gu et al. 2018): A basic version of a product or service, e.g., mobile
applications (“apps”), websites or streaming of music and video, can be used for
free in perpetuity and premium upgrades are available against payment of a fee.
Such premium upgrades are offered either in one-off purchases or in subscriptions.
Examples for the latter are The New York Times or many other news websites,
health and lifestyle apps such as Calm or Runtastic, streaming services such as
Spotify, Soundcloud or Hulu, networking platforms such as LinkedIn, dating services
such as Tinder, Bumble or Hinge, or online games such as Fortnite or Roblox (Levitt
et al. 2016) to name but a few. One-off purchases are particularly common in online
mobile games such as Candy Crush Saga or Clash of Clans. Many mobile games also
offer a combination of subscription and one-off purchase options, as does the dating
app Tinder that was the leading non-gaming app in the App Store top grossing
charts in 2019 (Perez 2019).
Consumers downloaded apps 194 billion times in 2018 and spent $101 billion on
in-app purchases in the same time period (App Annie 2018). Accounting for almost
80% of that revenue, gaming in particular has seen an unparalleled expansion of
demand, additionally fueled by online social networks that facilitate viral sharing
and network effects (Alsén et al. 2016; Sensortower 2019a). It is estimated that
50% of mobile app users play games regularly and that a global total of 2.4 billion
people will play mobile games in 2019 (Kaplan 2019). This explosive growth has not
only given rise to a large mobile gaming industry that is estimated to drive 60% of
overall revenue in the gaming vertical in 2019 (App Annie 2018, p. 20), but to the
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
prevalence of new types of consumer-firm interactions (Einav et al. 2014; De Haan
et al. 2018; Tong et al. 2020).
The core thesis of this dissertation is that promotions are essential to the mar-
keting of freemium goods such as mobile apps and games. While freemium already
represents a promotional pricing tactic in using a zero price for free sampling (Bawa
and Shoemaker 2004), I conjecture that firms can operate their freemium offerings
more profitably by using further promotional tactics, especially targeted and per-
sonalized promotions, to sell premium upgrades. I also argue (and will show) that
widespread concerns around the use of promotions, particularly developed in the
setting of consumer packaged goods (Mela et al. 1997; Jedidi et al. 1999; Anderson
and Simester 2004; Günter and Klapper 2007), do not apply in the same way in
this setting. I qualify and develop this thinking across four chapters that repre-
sent individual papers that are introduced in more detail below and summarized in
Table 1.1.
The work is empirical in nature and applies advanced analytics in freemium
gaming apps in collaboration with firms. Building on (Bose 2009, p. 1), I define
advanced analytics as the tools “used to direct, optimize, and automate [firms’]
decision making to successfully achieve their organizational goals.” The importance
of advanced analytics for industry is closely interwoven with the ascent of “big data,”
i.e., the availability and storability of vast amounts of data in digital settings (Barton
and Court 2012). In the app economy (Arora et al. 2017), firms can observe dense
behavioral data describing every interaction of a user with an app in addition to
meta data such as mobile device characteristics and geolocation information (Sifa
et al. 2018). This pool of data provides the empirical study ground for development
of this thesis. Methodologically, I use field experimentation and machine learning to
both derive insights on consumer behavior that extend existing conceptual thinking
in the field of marketing and to devise decision support and expert systems that



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In the setting of freemium mobile gaming apps, a number of conceptual argu-
ments support the postulated importance of promotions:
1. The consumption of digital content, especially online play, is strongly habit-
forming (Eyal 2014): Several sources assert that online games spur strong
consumption habits (Chen and Leung 2016; Kwon et al. 2016; Nevskaya and
Albuquerque 2019; Jo et al. 2020). A long stream of economic and marketing
literature posits that promotional approaches can sustainably increase demand
for addictive goods (Becker and Murphy 1988; Becker et al. 1991; Katz and
Lavack 2002; Chen et al. 2009; Gordon and Sun 2015). In this framing, promo-
tions are helpful in the sale of freemium goods as they can serve as a gateway
to more intense use and purchasing.
2. Zero-price inertia: While freemium’s zero-price point effectively attracts users
to adopt a product or service, e.g., to download an app, it has been shown
that consumers exhibit strong inertia around a zero-price (Shampanier et al.
2007; often termed “penny gap,” e.g. Carter 2019). An attractive promotional
offer is likely to be more effective in removing users from free use of the app
and enticing them to spend money.
3. Reduced time to process information and increased search cost: The attention
a product can garner is an essential factor in consumers’ decision to purchase
it (Bettman 1979; Chandon et al. 2009). Sessions in freemium apps are short;
Gameanalytics (2019) reports that users spend an average of ten minutes (me-
dian: six) in a mobile game before moving on to another activity or app
(Yeykelis et al. 2014, 2018; De Haan et al. 2018). Additionally, users may
not be aware of premium upgrade options and mobile phone screens are small
leading to increased search cost (Ghose et al. 2013). This combination of short
attention spans and increased search cost calls for the use of promotions to di-
rect consumers’ attention to premium upgrades and their purchase (Bemmaor
and Mouchoux 1991).
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4. Uncertainty about quality: Freemium games monetize by selling virtual goods
such as boosts, avatars or virtual currency in premium upgrades (Lehdonvirta
2009). Virtual goods and in-app purchases more generally are a new product
category that may be unfamiliar to consumers (Hamari and Keronen 2017),
a promotional approach can hence entice users to try out this new product
category and reduce their uncertainty about it (Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2016).
Speaking to this reasoning, the first paper of this thesis (with Jonathan Levav and
Harikesh Nair)1 presents evidence from a large-scale field experiment that random-
izes close to one million new app adopters in three promotional treatment conditions
and a holdout group without any promotions. Results show that regular price pro-
motions can substantially increase primary demand in the freemium setting of online
games. The authors allude to a particular complementarity between (free) use of
the product and the premium experience and users’ related inability to sufficiently
control their consumption that can help explain this strong increase in longer-term
demand without signs of cannibalizing effects on future revenue from current low
prices. Evidence further does not suggest that regular promotions serve as an ad-
verse quality signal. These findings are novel in light of a long stream of literature
cautioning against the use of low-price approaches due to adverse long-term conse-
quences (Mela et al. 1997; Jedidi et al. 1999; Anderson and Simester 2004; Günter
and Klapper 2007). It is further foundational to the validation and development of
the main thesis of this dissertation.
The second paper (with Peng Gao, Florent Garcin and Boi Faltings)2 builds
on the first paper’s findings by investigating the effectiveness of a free promotional
bundle targeted to high-value freemium users at risk of disengaging (Ascarza 2018;
1An earlier but highly similar version of the paper is available as a Stanford Graduate School
of Business Working Paper which this work references as Runge et al. (2019).
2An earlier version of this paper was presented at and published in the proceedings of the
Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG) conference 2014. It won the conference’s runner-up
best paper award. The present work references that earlier version of the paper as Runge et al.
(2014).
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Ascarza et al. 2018). The aim of targeting the promotion is to increase users’
retention by affording them a free premium experience that they have a preference
for based on their purchasing history in the app. Several algorithms are compared
in their ability to identify users at risk of churning in two freemium gaming apps,
and the best performing algorithm is then used in an online experiment that targets
a promotional offer to high-value potential churners in one of the apps. While the
predictive system is effective in reaching users who are more responsive to the firm’s
outreach effort, the promotion is not able to meaningfully increase users’ retention
with the product (Ascarza et al. 2016). It seems that a promotion at such a late
stage in users’ lifecycles may be unable to change their choices pertaining to the
focal product as users have irreversibly lost interest in it. Cross-promotion to other
products in the firm’s portfolio or to other companies (through advertising) may be
superior treatments, and promotions in the focal product may need to be targeted
earlier in users’ lifecycles.
Speaking to the second paper’s concluding conjecture, the third paper (with
Rafet Sifa and Christian Bauckhage)3 assesses if the firm can use the data com-
monly available to firms in this setting to identify high-value users early after their
adoption of the app: The authors apply various learners, particularly emphasizing
the benefits of neural networks (West et al. 1997) and synthetic oversampling (Weiss
2004), to predict future premium demand of new app adopters. While far from per-
fect, device, geolocation and early app use information associate significantly with
different expectations of users’ spending on premium goods, suggesting that different
segments of recent app adopters (as identified from available data) may be receptive
to different promotional offers due to heterogeneous valuations for premium experi-
ences (Rossi et al. 1996; Acquisti and Varian 2005). The neural network predictor
further achieves best performance in comparison to random forest and linear regres-
3An earlier version of this paper, focusing on the implementation and benefits of synthetic over-
sampling, was presented at and published in the proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference
on System Sciences (HICSS) 2018. It is referenced here as Sifa et al. (2018).
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sion. It can be applied by firms to support decisions of their marketing managers,
for example in customer acquisition (Blattberg and Deighton 1996; Seufert 2013).
The fourth paper builds on the proposition that early app data associate with
users’ expected spending and evaluates different pricing tactics for a promotion
targeted to new app adopters. It focuses on profitably personalizing such tactics
using the available data and bandit-based experimentation (Li et al. 2010; Schwartz
et al. 2017; Bietti et al. 2018; Misra et al. 2019). Results obtained in six large-
scale field experiments suggest that price and promotion personalization in freemium
settings can be highly profitable, and that it has potential to increase engagement
with content through increased access to premium upgrades. The paper further
presents results from a survey with 54 freemium practitioners that indicates that
current managerial practice excessively favors low-price approaches and likely harms
realized profits.
Analyses in different apps and in collaboration with different companies show
that firms not using promotions to market their freemium apps are likely to forego
20 or more percent in revenue (which translates to profit as marginal cost to produce
and distribute freemium virtual goods is zero – Anderson 2009; Lambrecht et al.
2014), substantiating that promotions and their targeting are indeed essential to
the marketing of freemium goods; in particular to support revenue generation from
users with lower, and safeguard the beliefs and monetization behaviors of users with
higher willingness-to-pay. While analyses take the perspective of a profit-maximizing
firm, wider societal implications are also considered, especially in the fourth paper
that speaks to issues of data-driven optimization and fairness. The paper devises a
price personalization approach that increases purchases of premium experiences by
26%. While this result is highly desirable to the firm, it does not solely benefit the
firm but also consumers who would not have obtained access to premium experiences
without the personalization. Price discrimination will usually tend to charge higher
prices to consumers with higher willingness-to-pay. To the extent that such higher
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
willingness-to-pay derives from higher income and wealth, price discrimination can
have a desirable redistributive effect. In the case of online games, high willingness-to-
pay may however often derive from addictive tendencies (Kwon et al. 2016; Nevskaya
and Albuquerque 2019; Jo et al. 2020) rather than be reflective of personal wealth.
Proactive regulation of data-driven price personalization and optimization could
hence be well advised in this setting, particularly to ensure healthy habits in the
consumption of online games (Hahn et al. 2010; Nevskaya and Albuquerque 2019).
Summarizing, this dissertation presents novel, rigorous and generalizable applica-
tions of advanced analytics to the promotion of freemium goods, providing guidance
to firms how they can direct, optimize, and automate their decision making to more
successfully achieve their organizational goals in this setting. In particular, the work
shows how firms can more profitably target and price promotions of freemium goods
in mobile games. Its findings can be expected to generalize to gamified apps such as
Tinder and freemium offerings more widely, e.g., to the promotion of subscriptions
on a news website or in a music streaming app. The work further contributes to lit-
erature on pricing (Pigou 2017; Shapiro 1983; Acquisti and Varian 2005; Nair 2007;
Dubé and Misra 2017; Dubé et al. 2017a; Shiller 2020), promotion (Mela et al. 1997;
Jedidi et al. 1999; Anderson and Simester 2004; Günter and Klapper 2007), churn
prediction and prevention (Ascarza et al. 2016; Ascarza 2018; Ascarza et al. 2018)
and algorithmic demand forecasting (West et al. 1997; Berger and Nasr 1998; Fader
et al. 2005). The individual papers discuss these contributions in more detail.
Chapter 2
Price Promotions in Freemium
Settings1
Julian Runge
Jonathan Levav (Stanford University)
Harikesh Nair (Stanford University)
Abstract
The freemium pricing model for digital goods involves selling a base version of the product
for free, and making premium product features available to users only on payment. The
success of the model is predicated on the ability to profitably convert free users to paying
ones. Price promotions (or “sales”) are often used in freemium to induce the conversion.
However, the causal effect of exposing consumers to such intertemporal price variation is
unclear. While sales can generate beneficial short-run conversion, they may be harmful in
the long-run if consumers intertemporally substitute purchases to periods with low prices,
or use them as signals of low product quality. These long-run concerns may be accentu-
ated in freemium, where the base version is sold for free, so that sales form extreme price
cuts on the overall product combination. We work with the seller of a free-to-play gaming
app to randomize entering cohorts of users into treatment and control conditions in which
promotions for in-app purchases are turned on or off. We observe complete user behavior
for half a year, including purchases and consumption of in-game premium goods, which
– in contrast to much of the extant literature – enables us to assess possible substitution
over time in consumption directly. We find that conversion and revenue improve in the
treatment group; and detect no evidence of harmful intertemporal substitution or negative
inferences about quality from exposure to price variation, suggesting that promotions are
profitable. We conjecture that the zero price of the base product that makes its consump-
tion virtually costless, combined with the complementarity between the base product and
premium features can help explain this. To the extent that this holds across freemium
contexts, the positive effects of promotions documented here will hold more generally.
1An earlier but similar version of this chapter is available as a Stanford Graduate School of
Business Working Paper referenced here as Runge et al. (2019).
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2.1 Introduction
Freemium is a popular pricing model for digital goods (Shapiro and Varian 1998;
Shampanier et al. 2007; Kumar 2014; Lambrecht et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2017). In
it, firms offer a version of their product or service for free to acquire and engage
with consumers, and then upsell premium upgrades that require payment. Exam-
ples include: news content (The New York Times), music (Spotify, SoundCloud),
file storage and collaboration (Dropbox, Slack), communication (Skype), dating and
networking (Tinder, LinkedIn) and digital games (Candy Crush Saga, Farmville).
Pricing of premium features takes two common forms. In simple, two-tiered sub-
scription-based freemium, consumers pay in installments to maintain access to a full
bundle of premium features. For example, in Spotify, a monthly payment removes
advertising and allows for multi-device usage. In Dropbox, upgrading to a premium
plan provides expanded storage space. In the New York Times, subscribing to the
paid digital version removes the limit on articles and allows customization. In more
complex multi-tiered versions of freemium, increasingly attractive tiers of premium
features are made available to users as they pay more. Most freemium games (com-
monly termed “free-to-play” games) use this model: Users pay by purchasing in-game
goods in variable quantities, which can be used to unlock a desired level of upgrades
or to proceed to more advanced levels of the game. This paper pertains to this type
of freemium.
Pricing in a freemium model involves complex issues of how to designate product
features into paid and unpaid sets; how to set the prices of the features; and whether
and how to dynamically adjust those prices over time. Empirical work on freemium
pricing is limited, and many of the key issues are still not well understood in the
context of digital goods. In this paper we investigate one aspect of freemium pricing:
the effect of dynamic pricing over time. We implement a field experiment for a digital
freemium product − a free-to-play gaming app − and investigate the causal effects
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for the seller of introducing price variation in the form of periodic promotions or
“sales.”
This question is interesting in freemium settings, as the success of the freemium
model relies on the efficiency with which free users are converted to paying ones.
Sales help conversion by bridging the so-called “penny gap” in freemium − a col-
loquial term to describe a commonly held belief in the start-up community that
it is harder to convince a customer to pay the first penny than to induce him to
pay more once initial payment has been made (Anderson 2009; Shmilovici 2011;
Carter 2019). The difficulty of converting free users to paying ones could arise from
a fixed cost to the user of setting up payment (e.g., the customer has to enter his
credit card details and get verified) or by the special significance of a “zero price”
in consumers’ minds (Heyman and Ariely 2004; Shampanier et al. 2007; Ascarza
et al. 2012). Apart from improving free to pay conversion, sales can also increase
repeat purchases of in-game goods, facilitating unlocking of premium features that
improve user experience and increase future retention and gameplay. As such, they
are common in free-to-play games, and the conventional wisdom is that sales are
beneficial for the seller; a decrease in price increases demand.2
On the other hand, there are some reasons to question the conventional wisdom.
While short-run conversion is likely increased during promotions, the long-term con-
sequences of periodic sales is far from obvious. The concern is that in situations with
repeat purchase and in which consumers have price knowledge, systemic price varia-
tion can cause consumer behavior to adjust so as to “game the system.” For instance,
consumers who anticipate the promotion cycle can time their purchases, delaying
current purchases and pulling forward future purchases to low price sales periods.
Sales can thus become expensive giveaways, essentially serving to generate unprof-
itable intertemporal demand substitution, moving a purchase that would otherwise
2In-game purchases in free-to-play games accounted for 82% of worldwide digital games revenue
in 2017 (Gough 2018). The market for mobile in-game consumer spending alone makes up close
to 80% of $101 billion in-app revenue in 2018 (App Annie 2018).
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have occurred at a high-price future or past to a low-price present featuring a sale.
Indeed, for this reason a body of work in the academic literature has warned that
the conventional wisdom about the advantage of promotions must be evaluated with
caution (Mela et al. 1997; Nijs et al. 2001; Erdem et al. 2003; Hendel and Nevo 2003;
Anderson and Simester 2004; Neslin and van Heerde 2009; Anderson and Simester
2010; Elberg et al. 2019; Nair et al. 2017). Further, in situations where products
are “experience goods” and consumers are uncertain about their match-value with
the product, a separate literature has warned that consumers can use low prices as
a signal of low quality (Gerstner 1985; Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Rao and Monroe
1989; Erdem et al. 2008; Dubé et al. 2017b). If this occurs, exposure to sales can
reduce user satisfaction and product usage, harming the seller. The concern about
sales signaling quality may be accentuated in a freemium setting where the base ver-
sion is already being provided for free, so additional price cuts on premium features
may be viewed as extreme price cuts on the product.
The research that casts doubt on the long-term value of sales draws its con-
clusions from studies of non-digital storable, consumer packaged goods (e.g., paper
towels, potato chips, coffee, etc.). The purchase of such goods is typically separated
from their consumption – a consumer that purchases three bags of chips on sale is
highly unlikely to eat them all during the store visit – so that stocking up and pur-
chase planning are a viable alternative response to a sale. In addition, the quality
of these goods’ consumption is unaffected by the decision to purchase multiple units
– the quality of a potato chip is invariant to the number of bags of chips purchased.
In contrast, digital freemium goods differ from typical durable or consumer pack-
aged goods in several respects. First, the base product and premium features tend
to be complements to each other. Higher consumption of the base product makes
it more likely that premium features are added-on; and higher consumption of pre-
mium features likely makes the base product more attractive. Second, consumption
of the base product is available to the user for free given its zero price. Upgrades to
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digital freemium products are ordinarily executed in the course of the base product’s
consumption, as a result of an immediate need to enhance the base product or due
to an impulse, which may make immediate consumption of the purchased add-on
more likely. These aspects may conspire sufficiently to make saving currently pur-
chased premium features for the future less likely or unattractive. Consequently, the
interplay of price variation and stockpiling behavior that occurs in digital freemium
goods is an empirical question.
We collaborate with a video game company to implement a field experiment to
assess the impact more formally. The game chosen for the field experiment combines
a puzzle with a city building component and is representative of the free-to-play
game genre. It is published on Google’s, Apple’s and Facebook’s app marketplaces
and has been downloaded by more than 50 million players as of October 2017, when
the experiment ended. The base version of the game is free to play to all users.
Users can buy in-game currency using real money, which they can use to unlock
a variety of game features. The question of pricing pertains to the exchange rate
between in-game currency and real money. Price variation is induced when the
exchange rate for in-game currency is discounted via periodic promotions. Starting
mid-December 2016, we randomize cohorts of consumers who download the game
app, into treatment and control conditions in which their exposure to price variation
is randomly switched on or off. The treated group is exposed to a fixed schedule
of periodic promotions. The schedule features “Hi-Lo” pricing analogous to sales in
CPG settings (Hoch et al. 1994; Bell and Lattin 1998; Ho et al. 1998; Ellickson and
Misra 2008; Ellickson et al. 2012 – specific details are described later in the paper).
The control group sees a constant price with no promotions. Individual-level data
on game usage and spending for the users are tracked for half a year (180 days) post
app download.
Analyzing the data, we find that exposure to the promotion sequence generates
large benefits to the firm: Relative to the control group, conversion increases by
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37.1%; purchases of in-game currencies increase by 27.2%; and revenue from pre-
mium features increase by 23.6%. We detect no evidence of harmful intertemporal
substitution of demand for in-game currency: Average outcomes in pre-and post
promotion cycles are statistically indistinguishable between the treated and control
groups. Thus, it appears that almost all the lift observed during promotion cycles
represents incremental expansion of demand and increased consumption of pur-
chased goods. We also see little evidence of prices adversely signaling quality: Login
behavior of users remains unchanged between the treated and control group. We
further observe usage and spending in two other games in the company’s portfolio
for a subset of users – which are not different between treated and control conditions
– suggesting that regular promotions indeed lead to a substantial increase in primary
demand in this setting. Finally, we observe a small and statistically only marginally
significant decrease in usage in the promotional treatment condition. This result in-
dicates that promotions do not serve as a strong quality signal that would lead users
to abandon the app. The authors propose that the significant increase in demand
from regular price promotions derives from the strength and immediacy of the com-
plementarity of the free and premium version in freemium products: As users cash
in on the deal offered in a promotion, i.e., use the purchased premium feature, their
utility derived from time spent using the product experiences a boost. The imme-
diacy of this gain in utility may habituate them towards future purchases, reducing
users’ ability to regulate their consumption and effectively lowering cannibalizing
effects on future purchasing.
To the extent that this complementarity between the base and premium product
and the immediacy of utility increases from deal purchases apply in other freemium
environments, price variation in the form of sales will be a profitable policy more
widely. The complementarity plausibly exists in many freemium contexts. For
instance, in Dropbox, additional collaboration opportunities (a premium feature)
may make the storage space available in the base version more valuable, and vice
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versa, albeit in a more paced manner. Immediate increases in utility from deal
purchases seem plausible for gamified products such as Tinder and strongly habit-
forming products more generally, possibly reducing consumers’ ability to regulate
their consumption.
Relationship to the literature. On the data side, the digital app-based environ-
ment facilitates some novel aspects of this study: (a) inducing randomization and
controlling experiences at the user-level, which improves statistical power, and fa-
cilitates exploration of heterogeneity in user-level response; (b) sustaining a control
group with no promotions for a long period of time (180 days), which has typically
been difficult in many settings due to the costs of such experimentation and the
inability to closely control user experiences; and (c) observation of consumption and
purchases over time at the user-level, which directly facilitates users’ substitution
of goods over time. While past papers have leveraged these aspects in isolation,
none have brought all three aspects together in a study of pricing to our knowl-
edge. To the best of our knowledge, this is also the first paper that has presented
an evaluation of sales in a digital, freemium setting using a randomized controlled
trial. Further, we observe consumption, enabling a direct assessment of intertem-
poral demand substitution. This direct assessment is novel compared to the past
literature on storable goods, which has typically observed purchases but not con-
sumption, and has therefore relied on indirect assessments. The paper is related to
a subset of papers that randomize users cross-sectionally into different prices so as
to study static price discrimination, e.g., Levitt et al. (2016); Sahni et al. (2016);
Dubé et al. (2017a); Dubé and Misra (2017). Levitt et al. (2016), which involves
virtual goods in a video game and is closely related to this work, has this flavor. Our
study is distinct from this stream of papers as it focuses on measuring the causal
effect of sustained exposure to a sequence of prices over time to investigate its in-
tertemporal consequences for initial and repeat purchases. This paper is related to
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experimental studies by Hoch et al. (1994) and Elberg et al. (2019) who implement
store- or category-level randomization of pricing policies to study promotions in gro-
cery retail (comparing “Every Day Low Pricing” versus “Hi-Lo” promotions in Hoch
et al. (1994) and “Hi-Lo” promotions with deep versus shallow discounts in Elberg
et al. (2019)). Given the grocery store setting, these studies do not implement a
control group with “no promotions,” and are not specifically focused on the inter-
action of promotions with a tiered system of goods. In contrast, this study relates
to digital, freemium goods that comprise base and premium tiers; involves a control
group with no promotions (and hence is able to benchmark against a no-promotion
environment); and implements randomization at the individual level (which yields
individual-level data and more statistical power). Also closely related are field ex-
periments by Anderson and Simester (2004) and Anderson and Simester (2010),
which compare catalog purchases between individuals randomized into receiving a
catalog with deep or shallow discounts. Anderson and Simester (2004) and Anderson
and Simester (2010) find positive long-run impact from exposure to deep discounts
for new consumers, consistent with our findings for new users in the studied envi-
ronment. Our study is distinguished from their work by its focus on freemium; by
having access to a control condition with no discounts; and by its focus on studying
the treatment effect of a pricing policy that comprise a sequence of varying prices
over time, rather than a one-time reduction.
2.2 Empirical Setting and Field Experiment
2.2.1 Empirical setting
The video game on which the experiment is implemented can be described as involv-
ing “solving puzzles and building a city.”3 Within the game, the player confronts
3See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puzzle_video_game for descriptions of this genre.
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graphical puzzles that have to be solved while trying to build a city. The puz-
zles and the city the player is building are connected to an overarching storyline and
metagame. This induces programmatic buildup and continued engagement as game-
play progresses. Free play is possible in perpetuity and the game can be completed
without a single purchase. However, if the player chooses to, he can purchase a va-
riety of in-game premium goods to enhance gameplay. Examples include additional
energy to extend a game session or decorations that beautify the city the player
is building. To purchase in-game goods, the player exchanges real money for two
types of in-game currencies. The in-game currencies are sold within the game sep-
arately or in bundles. The in-game currencies do not expire, and are exchangeable
for in-game goods at rates determined by the game seller.
Users are also sometimes shown in-game ads, typically video-ads by other third-
party apps. Users who watch the video-ads are rewarded a small amount of in-game
currency. On seeing the ad, they are shown a still-screen with a link to the app
store.
Advertising makes up only a small percentage of the revenue from the product
(<10%); the bulk of the revenue is from purchase of in-game currency. This mon-
etization model is common in the free-to-play gaming industry (see Figure 2.10 on
page 37 in the Appendix for an example).4
2.2.2 Experimental design
To implement the experiment, we isolated a sub-population of new users who down-
loaded the game application from Google’s Playstore to their Android smartphone
or tablet between December 15, 2016 and February 21, 2017. On download, we
randomized them to a treatment group and a control group as follows.
4This is also representative of the “app economy” where advertising only drives a small share of
revenue (Ghose and Han 2014).
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Figure 2.1: Promotion schedule in treatment group: example for 14-day period from
January 6, 2017 to January 20, 2017
Notes: The promotion sequence that treated users are exposed to involves “Hi-Lo” pricing: In
non-promotional periods, the in-game currency is sold at a fixed base price. Every second Friday,
a discounted bundle is shown to the user. The specific bundle picked depends on the user’s past
buying history. The discount offer is also personalized to the user − it ranges from 55% for users
who purchased in the past (promotionally or not) to 85% for users who never made a past purchase.
The promotion lasts for 3-5 days. A user can only make one promotional purchase per cycle, and
the length of the promotional cycle is fixed across all users.
Treatment group:
• Each user in the treatment group is exposed to a sequence of promotions for
half a year (180 days) from the time she downloads the game.
• The promotions pertain to a bundle of in-game currencies offered to the user
within the game.
• The promotion plan is as follows: In non-promotional periods, all in-game
currencies are sold at a fixed base prices in a game store accessible within
the video game. Every second Friday, the user is shown a specific in-game
currency bundle. The bundle represents a discount on the component in-game
currencies relative to buying them separately in the game store. The specific
bundle the user is shown, and the extent to which it is discounted during
the sale is personalized to the user (on the basis of the recency, frequency
and monetary value of his past purchases). Broadly speaking, larger currency
bundles are shown to users with more past purchases and larger percentage
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discounts are offered to non-buyers than buyers. The bundle prices range from
$1.99 to $99.99, and the discounts range from 55% for users who purchased
in the past (promotionally or not) to 85% for users who never made a past
purchase. The discounting lasts for three to five days. A user can only make
one promotional purchase per cycle, and the length of the promotional cycle
is common across all users. Apart from offering the bundle, no other price
reductions of the in-game currencies are offered.
• When the promotion is active, it is advertised to the user with an in-app
“pop-up.” The user can choose to purchase the bundle offer by clicking on
the pop-up or send it to the background. If sent to the background, it will
remain as an icon on the game app’s main screen until purchase or the end
of the promotional cycle. Once a purchase occurs or the cycle ends, the icon
disappears from the user’s screen. Figure (2.1) presents an illustration of the
sequence using the 14-day period from January 6, 2017 to January 20, 2017
as an example.
Control group:
• Users in the control group are not exposed to promotions. They see the in-
game currencies within the game store at the same fixed base price as the
treatment group. Everything else is held the same between the treatment and
control groups.
Randomization is persistent: i.e., once a user is allocated into a group, he stays
in that group for the next 180 days. The behavioral targeting rule and the exact
length of the promotional cycle each active Friday is picked by the firm, and not
controlled by us. The firm determined this particular behavioral targeting rule and
discounting percentages based on heuristics it developed from past experience, and
was unwilling to allow us to vary these aspects.
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2.2.2.1 Improving statistical efficiency
User attrition for free-to-play games is high, and a large proportion of users tend
to drop off after initial trial. The attrition has the potential to induce significant
noise into the statistical analysis, reducing precision.5 To address this, we built in
the following guardrail into the experimental design. The game has 90 levels. User
attrition is highest prior to reaching level one. Therefore, we expose users in the
treated group to the promotion cycle only after they reach level one in the game.
Figure 2.2 shows this pictorially.
In Figure 2.2, a user i in the treated group reaches level one in τi days, so is
exposed to the treatment for di = 180 − τi days. We compare the behavior of all
users in the treatment and control groups who have crossed level one. Since users
are not exposed to any promotions before they reach level one, the set of users who
reach level one in the treatment and control group remain balanced. Figure 2.11 on
page 38 in the Appendix presents a quantile-quantile plot of the distribution of di
in the treatment and control groups and shows they are the same, confirming this.
2.2.2.2 Sub-treatment conditions
Due to business and technological constraints, randomization of the characteristics
of the promotion sequence (e.g., base price, discount depth), was infeasible. Never-
theless, the firm allowed us to vary the timing of exposure of users to promotions.
The treatment group described previously is thus created by randomizing users into
three sub-groups based on when they start seeing the promotion sequence after
download:
1. Immediate Treatment Group: This group is exposed to promotions once they
cross level one.
5A treated user is exposed to the treatment for 180 days. A user who drops off is exposed to
the treatment for ≤ 180 days. Thus, the intensity of treatment is lesser for the attrited group.
We measure an intent-to-treat effect (ITT), comparing all users who were randomized into treated
versus control groups (including those that drop off). The noise in the ITT is higher the higher
the number of users who drop off.
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Figure 2.2: Experimental setup
Notes: To improve statistical efficiency, users in the treatment group have to complete level one
before they are exposed to the promotional schedule, and analysis is based on all users who cross
level one. Since users are not exposed to any promotions before they reach level one, the set of
users who reach level one in the treatment and control group remain balanced. A user i in the
treated group reaches level one in τi days, so is exposed to the treatment for di = 180 − τi days.
Figure 2.11 on page 38 in the Appendix shows that the distribution of di in the treatment and
control groups is balanced.
2. 25-day Delayed Treatment Group: This group is exposed to promotions once
they cross level one and it has been at least 25 days since they downloaded
the game.
3. 50-day Delayed Treatment Group: This group is exposed to promotions once
they cross level one and it has been at least 50 days since they downloaded
the game.
Once a user is in a sub-group, he remains in that group for the duration of the
experiment.
For most of the initial analysis below, we pool data across the sub-groups to im-
prove statistical efficiency, comparing the treatment group overall, which is exposed
to promotions, to the control group which is not. We use comparisons of behavior
across the three groups as a way to assess the in how far price serves as a signal
of quality. The idea is that under price signaling, users who are exposed to price
discounts earlier may have a stronger propensity to infer that the game is of low
quality ceteris paribus. So evidence of reduced logins to the app when exposure to
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promotion is earlier is one indication of signaling effects. We want to emphasize
that a more direct test of price signaling would be to randomize the magnitude of
the price discounts which, unfortunately, was not possible.
2.3 Analysis
A total 160,582 users reach level one across treatment and control groups and remain
after data cleaning.6 The treatment group sizes were decided in collaboration with
the firm who had a managerial prior in favor of higher exposure to price promotions.
26,521 users are assigned to the control and 134,061 to the treatment conditions,
with 54,883 users allotted to the “immediate” treatment sub-group; 52,652 to the
“25-day delayed” treatment sub-group; and 26,526 to the “50-day delayed” treatment
sub-group. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 on page 39 in the Appendix report tests of balance
across the groups and show that randomization is induced properly.
2.3.1 Overall treatment effects
Table 2.1 on page 24 reports on the differences in means between treatment and
control groups for user free to pay conversion (i.e., indicator for purchase of in-game
currency over the duration of the experiment); purchases (total number of orders
of in-game currency over the duration of the experiment); revenue from premium
upgrades (total money spent on in-game currency over the duration of the experi-
ment); ad revenue and usage (total time spent in app in hours over the duration of
the experiment). The main findings are summarized below:
6The following filters are applied for data cleaning. Data are observed at the device level. About
50% of devices are connected to one or more Facebook accounts. We disregard all devices that
are connected to more than one Facebook account as this indicates that the game was played by
more than one user. We further disregard devices that are connected to Facebook accounts that
previously played the game on other platforms, and we disregard devices with Facebook accounts
that were connected to multiple devices during the experiment. The remaining sample contains
devices for which we can reasonably assume that only one user played the game. This data was
further cleaned for duplicate and obviously broken log entries and for devices that experienced
technical difficulties or where the user “hacked” the app during the experimental period.
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• Free to pay conversion increases by 37.1% (p = 0.000), from 4.3% in the control
group without price promotions to 6% in the promotional treatment group.
• Purchases of and revenue from premium features increases by 27.2% (p =
0.000), and 23.6% (p = 0.026), respectively, from an average of 0.29 purchases
and $3.53 in the control group, to 0.37 purchases and $4.36 in the treatment
group.
• Advertising revenue falls by – 11.7% (p = 0.000) from $0.29 in the control
group to $0.26 in the treatment group.
• Overall revenue (sum of revenue from premium features and advertising) in-
creases by 20.9% (p = 0.033) from $3.82 in the control group to $4.62 in the
treatment group.
• Game usage (measured as total time spent on the app in hours) falls in the
treatment group, but the effect is not statistically significant at the 95% level.
• Use and spending in other portfolio games of the data sponsor are not different
between treated and non-treated users. As only about 8% of the 160,582 users
considered in experiment analysis used a portfolio game during the experiment
period, this result should not be regarded as conclusive.
These results present an unexpectedly favorable picture of promotions. Exposure to
promotions improves conversion and revenue, with little detectible negative effects
on usage and engagement. Even though advertising revenue falls in response to
treatment, advertising revenue only makes up about 8% of overall revenue (using
values from the control condition); so overall revenue improves from exposure to
treatment due to the increased take-up of in-game purchases.
2.3.2 Assessing intertemporal substitution
To assess the extent of intertemporal substitution, Figure 2.3 displays a time series
over the calendar days of the experiment, of the difference in mean per-day revenues
and purchases between the treated and control groups. The calendar days corre-
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Table 2.1: Comparing user behavior in the treatment and control groups
Treatment: Control: Difference p-value
Promotions No promotions (T−C) of Difference
N = 134,061 N = 26,521
Mean SD Mean SD
Conversion (indicator for in-game purchase) 0.059 0.236 0.043 0.204 0.016 *** 0.000
Purchases (no. of orders) 0.37 3.20 0.29 3.09 0.078 *** 0.000
Revenue from premium upgrades (A = a1 + a2) 4.33 57.12 3.53 55.32 0.807 ** 0.031
Revenue from non-promoted upgrades (a1) 3.20 45.59 3.53 55.32 −0.329 0.363
Revenue from promoted upgrades (a2) 1.14 15.49 0 0 1.14 –
Advertising revenue (B) 0.255 0.845 0.29 0.921 −0.034 *** 0.000
Overall revenue = A + B 4.59 57.12 3.82 55.32 0.773 ** 0.039
Usage (total time spent in app in hours) 179.0 409.5 184.3 419.9 −5.27 * 0.061
Revenue in other portfolio games 0.136 10.10 0.121 4.35 −0.015 0.690
Sessions in other portfolio games 6.43 57.94 6.64 66.64 −0.204 0.6412
Notes: The table presents means and standard deviations, intent-to-treat effects and p-values
for conversion, purchases, revenue and usage. Statistical significance reported using t-tests with
unequal variance for binary outcomes; *** significant at the 1%-level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
sponding to a promotion cycle are indicated with grey diamonds on the date axis.
The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the difference in means each
day. To see the effects visually, we plot this for active users each day, i.e., those who
log in to the app on a given day.7
Looking at Figure 2.3, we see pronounced regular spikes in both revenue and
purchases that coincide with promotional cycles. There is little evidence of reduc-
tion prior to a promotion cycle or after one, which would suggest intertemporal
substitution. Rather, it seems the spikes reflect expansion in primary demand for
in-game currency. Figures 2.14 and 2.15 on page 42 in the Appendix show the same
plots separately for the treatment and control groups. Eyeballing these, we can see
there is no evidence of systematic demand spikes during the promotional days in
the control group, unlike the treatment group.
To hone in on the days before and after promotions, Figure 2.4 pools all the
promotion cycles together and displays the mean revenues in treatment and control
groups during and around the days of the promotional cycles. The “dashed line”
presents the mean in the treatment condition, while the solid line represents the
7Figures 2.12 and 2.13 on page 41 in the Appendix document that there is no difference in
users’ propensity to log in by treatment versus control group.
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Figure 2.3: Mean difference in per-day revenues and purchases between the treated
and control groups
Notes: Mean difference in revenue and purchases per day with 95% confidence band over calendar
days between control and promotional treatment groups. Grey diamonds on the date axis indicate
days when promotions were active.
mean in the control condition, and the dotted intervals represent 95% confidence
intervals. Looking at Figure 2.4, we see there is little difference between the two
groups before or after the promotion cycle, suggesting no detectable intertemporal
substitution.
2.3.3 Digging deeper: Why no intertemporal substitution?
What could explain these results? Answering this credibly is difficult as our ex-
periment was not explicitly designed to test between competing mechanisms, so we
cannot convincingly rule out one explanation versus another with our data. We
offer some conjectures of mechanisms that we believe can plausibly explain our data
along with informal empirical support.
One possibility is that two aspects that distinguish digital freemium goods −
complementarity between base and premium features and free consumption of the
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Figure 2.4: Mean per-day purchases and revenue in the treated and control groups
during and around promotional cycles
Notes: Purchases (no. of orders) and revenue (in $) per user per day during and around promotional
cycles with 95% confidence band for control (solid line) and promotional treatment (dotted line)
groups. More user-day observations are behind the data point for “All other days,” hence the
confidence band is more narrow there.
base good − make it difficult for users to regulate their consumption sufficiently to
generate the kind of intertemporal substitution required for sales to be unprofitable.
In non-promoted periods, users may find it hard to regulate their consumption of
in-game goods (and postpone them to future low-price periods) because the base
version is available for free and its consumption enhances the value of the premium
upgrades. In promoted periods, users may again find it hard to regulate their con-
sumption of in-game goods (and stockpile for future high-price periods) because the
base version is again available for free and its consumption enhances the value of
the premium upgrades. Further, consumption of the premium upgrades, which are
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then available for low prices, enhances the value of consuming the base good, feeding
the cycle. These features are implied by the “addictive” nature of gaming, and may
be especially salient for the subset of “hardcore gamers” that pay substantially for
games.
We assess support for users’ lack of consumption regulation in our data in two
ways. Our first assessment is exploratory, testing whether “heavy users” − who
value the game more and may derive more immediate utility from premium feature
consumption − are the ones who buy more promoted goods. We proxy for heavy
users using the time taken to reach level one in the game. Heavier users are expected
to reach level one faster. Since randomization into experimental groups is done only
after users reach level one (as explained in more detail below), this forms a valid
pre-experimental baseline characteristic on the basis of which to explore subsequent
purchase behavior.
Figure 2.5a presents plots of the probability of spending money on a promotion
during the experiment as a function of the time taken to reach level one. Figure 2.5b
shows the same plot for the amount of money spent on promotions for those who
purchased something on promotion during the experiment (i.e., spend|spend> 0).
Both are found to be higher for those who reached level one faster.
Our second assessment is more direct, and leverages the fact that we can observe
consumption directly in our data as we can track the consumption of the in-game
currencies purchased by users. To assess self-regulation, we test whether users spend
the in-game currency in the same period as they purchase it, or whether spending
occurs later. This test is complicated by the way in which in-game currencies are
used in the game. The game has three types of in-game currencies: cash, coins
and energy. The promotions offered comprise bundles of the three currencies. Cash
is more valuable than coins or energy as it can be used to enhance gameplay, ad-
vance to higher levels, and also to acquire coins. Also, cash is never earned nor
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Figure 2.5: Promotional spending as a function of time needed to reach level one
(a) Extensive Margin
(b) Intensive Margin
Notes: The figures present the probability of spending money on promotions during the experiment
(top), and the amount of money spent on promotions conditional on non-zero promotional spending
during the experiment (bottom) on the y-axes, as a function of the time (in days) time to reach
level one on the x-axes. Days needed to reach level one are grouped into similarly sized buckets
and the x-axis lists the upper inclusive threshold of a bucket. E.g., users in the first bucket reached
level one on the day of app download (0), users in the second bucket reached level one within > 0
and <= 1 days after app download and users in the last bucket reached level one within > 24 and
<= 180 days after app download.
replenished by gameplay and has to be purchased using real money.8 We observe
the redemptions of cash and coins during gameplay as well as the stock of energy
available. The interpretation of the redemption of coins is ambiguous as it is not
clear whether the coins redeemed were actually purchased (because coins can also
be earned from gameplay); or whether it indirectly reflects the redemption of cash
8All users start with an initial endowment of cash, coins and energy. Coins are used to en-
hance gameplay while energy is required to continue gameplay. Coins and energy can be earned
through gameplay and are replenished often (with the difference that coins are earned by “ad-
vanced” gameplay, and energy can be earned by “typical” gameplay). Such configurations are
typical for the puzzle game genre (e.g., see https://www.gamesparks.com/blog/looking-at-
in-game-currencies/, accessed February 21, 2019).
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Figure 2.6: Difference in cash bought and redeemed between treated and control
groups
Notes: The figures presents the difference in mean cash bought (top) and cash redeemed (bottom)
between experimental groups. Grey diamonds on the date axis indicate days when promotions
were active.
(because cash can be used to obtain coins). The interpretation of the redemption of
cash is cleaner as additional cash can only be obtained through real-money in-app
purchases. Therefore, we focus on patterns of redemption of cash by users.
Figure 2.6 shows the difference in means for the cash bought and cash redeemed
between the two experimental groups. Looking at the top panel in Figure 2.6, the
cash bought is seen to spike during the promotional periods in the treated group
relative to the control. The bottom panel of Figure 2.6 shows a similar pattern in
the cash redeemed, though it is less pronounced. We maintain the same scale on
the y-axis to make this difference apparent.
To hone in on the days before and after promotions, we create an analogous
plot to Figure 2.4 which pools all the promotion cycles together and displays the
mean difference between treatment and control groups in cash bought and redeemed
during and around the days of the promotional cycles. This is shown in Figure 2.7.
Looking at Figure 2.7, we see that cash spent in the treated group rises statistically
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Figure 2.7: Difference in cash bought and redeemed between treated and control
groups during and around promotional cycles
Notes: The figures presents the difference in mean cash bought (top) and cash redeemed (bottom)
between experimental groups, aggregated for days around promotional cycles. More user-day
observations are behind the data point for “All other days,” hence the confidence band is more
narrow there.
significantly above that in the control group during the days of the promotion cy-
cle, similar to the pattern for cash bought, suggesting that a large subset of users
spends the cash bought during promotions almost immediately. The immediate
consumption suggests low regulation. Again, we reiterate that we offer these only
as simple explanations that can explain our results; testing more formal theories of
consumption in freemium is beyond the scope of this paper.
Another possible explanation is that the results simply reflect lack of awareness
amongst users about promotions. Towards the end of the paper, we discuss why
this may be less likely given the wide publicity of the sales policy of this game on
online gaming forums that are frequented by gamers that purchase in-game goods.
2.3.4 Assessing price as a quality signal
To assess whether promotions serve as signals of quality, we compare game usage,
measured as time spent in the app. If users perceive the game has lower quality in
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Figure 2.8: Empirical CDFs of hours spent in the app by treatment sub-group
Notes: The plot shows the empirical CDF of total hours spent in the app for the three promotional
sub-groups. All three CDFs are plotted, but are visually indistinguishable from each other in the
figure.
response to seeing it frequently discounted, we expect they may reduce usage or stop
playing the game. This would be reflected in the observed time spent by users in the
treatment and control groups. Table 2.1 on page 24 already noted that there is no
statistically significant difference in mean time spent between treated and control
groups. Figure 2.8 plots the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the time spent in the app for the three sub-treatments of the treated group, in which
the onset time of promotions was varied (as described in Section 2.2.2.2 on page 20).
There is no discernible difference in time spent across the three sub-groups. If users
who are exposed to promotions sooner and more would take this as a signal of low
quality, we would expect their propensity to log into the app and to spend time in
the app to go down – neither is the case as shown in Figure 2.8 for time spent and
in Figures 2.12 and 2.13 on page 41 in the Appendix for login behavior.
For added confirmation, Figure 2.9 looks at conversion, purchases, revenue and
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Figure 2.9: Impact of different promotion onset times on monetization outcomes
Notes: The charts show the mean with 95% confidence interval for key monetization outcomes
(noted on the y-axes) across promotional sub-treatments that vary the onset time of price promo-
tions after users’ adoption of the app, and for the control condition.
ad revenue across the three sub-groups. Generally, the patterns go in the opposite
direction of an adverse quality signaling story: Conversion and purchases over the
long-run are higher the earlier promotions begin.9 Overall therefore, these results
do not provide compelling evidence for meaningful harmful consequences of sales to
induce negative inferences about game quality.
9We also see in Figure 2.9 that advertising revenue is lower when price promotions begin earlier.
Given the patterns in Figure 2.8, this is not driven by a mechanical linkage of advertising exposure
and advertising revenue to time spent in the app. The fact that early onset of promotions reduces
advertising revenue without changing time spent in the app significantly, suggests that promotions
and advertising are substitutes from the perspective of users. This can occur for instance, because
both provide ways to obtain in-game currencies, or because both compete for scarce user attention.
There is some evidence in the literature that promotions can serve as advertising (e.g., Sahni et al.
2016 and the literature cited there), so it is possible that promotions tend to deplete a “mental
account” associated with attention to advertising.
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2.3.5 Is the positive effect of promotions driven by heavy
users?
In terms of treatment effect heterogeneity, we wish to deepen two aspects of the
analysis:
1. It could be argued that the surprising effectiveness of regular price promotions
is driven by the segment of “hardcore” and possibly addicted gamers.
2. Figure 2.9 shows that, while purchases and conversion are highest in the im-
mediate promotion onset condition, revenue in this condition is lower than in
the condition where promotions start with a 25-day delay. It could be hy-
pothesized that this result may be driven by an adverse effect of the firm’s
behavioral targeting rule that offers a low-price promotion with 85% discount
to users who have not yet made a purchase. High-value users complete level
one more quickly (see Figure 2.5 on page 28) – they may hence be exposed
to the low-price high-discount promotional offer before they have a “chance”
to make a possibly larger and non-discounted purchase, adversely impacting
their price beliefs and future purchasing behavior.
To assess the merits of these two perspectives, we leverage the fact that device-
related exogenous covariates that we observe strongly associate with expected heavy
spending on the game. The memory of the user’s device and the width of the device
screen correlate most strongly with users’ overall spending, as observed in the control
condition without promotions. A regression of overall revenue per user on both
covariates suggests that the width of the device screen more strongly associates with
high expected spending in the control group (0.2 $-cents more revenue per additional
pixel, p = 0.0308, versus 0.03 $-cents more revenue per additional megabyte memory,
p = 0.4669; N=26,521).
Table 2.2 shows results of a regression of overall revenue per user on treatment
indicators and users’ device screen width. Model M2.1 confirms results of mean
comparisons in Table 2.1 on page 24 and Figure 2.9 on page 32: Overall revenue
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is only statistically significantly different from the control condition in the 25-day
delay sub-treatment group. Users in this condition spend $1.06 more within 180
days after app download than users in the control condition without any promotions
(p = 0.0132). Users in the immediate promotion onset sub-treatment spend $0.71
more than users in the control in the same time period; this result is only marginally
significant with p = 0.0943. Both models M2.2 and M2.3 confirm a strong main effect
of user device screen width on the degree of spending. Speaking to perspective (2)
above, they further indicate that a possibly adverse effect of immediate versus 25-day
delayed promotion onset is not driven by a negative impact of immediate promotions
on high-value users’ spending habits or price beliefs – interaction terms both with
continuous screen width in pixels and with a high-low indicator based on a median
split are negative. Speaking to perspective (1) above, they further suggest that
the strong positive overall effect of regular price promotions is not driven by heavy
(“hardcore”) users.
We take the assertion that the effectiveness of price promotions in this setting
is not driven by a factor specific to games, e.g., addictive consumption patterns
(Nevskaya and Albuquerque 2019; Jo et al. 2020), and applies to freemium settings
more widely to a further empirical test. We run a regression of overall revenue on
a pre-treatment indicator of user engagement, i.e., how fast users completed level
one, and a binary treatment indicator. Being in the top 50% of pre-treatment
engagement has a strong main effect (+$1.39, p = 0.0466), but the interaction with
the treatment indicator is not significant (+$1.11, p = 0.2447), suggesting that the
effectiveness of promotions is not disproportionately driven by heavy game users.
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, experimental results paint an attractive picture for the use of promotions in
freemium settings: Conversion, purchases, and revenue increase with little reduction
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Table 2.2: Treatment effect heterogeneity in expected user spending









Control condition excluded as a reference
Immediate promotion onset 0.7110 * 1.5416 1.1233 *
(0.0943) (0.3165) (0.0421)
25-day delayed promotion onset 1.0600 ** 0.5471 1.2364 **
(0.0132) (0.7243) (0.0266)
50-day delayed promotion onset 0.3297 2.5475 0.9762
(0.5041) (0.1543) (0.1283)
Screen width – 0.0027 *** 2.4935 ***
(0.0018) (0.0004)
Interactions
Immediate * Screen width – −0.0006 −0.9765
(0.5791) (0.2586)
25-day delay * Screen width – 0.0004 −0.4380
(0.7349) (0.6144)
50-day delay * Screen width – −0.0015 −1.5642
(0.1973) (0.1191)
Intercept 3.8168 *** 0.0058 2.7919 ***
(0.0000) (0.9964) (0.0000)
N 160,582 160,582 160,582
Notes: Regression of overall revenue per user on treatment indicators and strongest exogenous
indicator of expected user spending (screen width of mobile device); *** significant at the 1%-
level, ** 5%-level, * 10%-level.
in usage. While advertising revenue is reduced, in this setting, advertising forms a
small component of overall revenue, so its economic significance is limited. However,
if advertising takes a higher stake in overall monetization, this effect may dominate
economically, and therefore, we think this finding is of separate interest.
A simple explanation for the observed lack of intertemporal demand substitution
is that users are unaware that promotions will be offered bi-weekly and hence unable
to plan ahead. While this is plausible, we find this explanation less compelling for
this context. The company has been running bi-weekly sales on the game for a
long period prior to the experiment. Engaged players discuss details of the game’s
economy and sales in online forums (see Figure 2.16 on page 43 in the Appendix).
It is hence likely that they are aware of the regular bi-weekly occurrence of sales.
In the introduction, we conjectured that the zero price of the base product that
makes its consumption virtually costless, combined with the complementarity be-
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tween the base product and premium features and the immediacy of its effect can
help explain the behavior. In gaming in particular, such complementarities may be
strong due to the “addictive” nature of the gameplay, and this effect may be espe-
cially salient for the subset of hardcore gamers that pay substantially for games.
While we present evidence that the positive effect of promotions is not driven by
hardcore gamers (see Section 2.3.5), and while it is not unreasonable that most
freemium base and premium goods are complements, the quantitative significance
of such complementarities in other settings is an empirical question. It warrants
further, careful empirical testing before further conclusions can be drawn or gener-
alized. Also valuable would be experiments that vary the characteristics of the sales
strategy (depth, frequency, items), which would enable studying the empirical con-
sequences of these more deeply and help in the formulation of better policies. The
role of addiction and self-control for such goods and their implications for pricing
strategy would also be interesting areas of future study to extend current literature
considering usage restrictions (Nevskaya and Albuquerque 2019; Jo et al. 2020).
Speaking to the effect of the immediacy of the utility gain from the base and
premium complementarity, the results of this study may have normative implica-
tions for the design of freemium experiences similar to suggestions by managerial
work (Eyal 2014; Alter 2017): Managers can create and reinforce the conjectured
complementarity by ensuring that users experience a strong increase in utility im-
mediately after they make a premium purchase. This can be achieved, e.g., by
progressing users substantially through a level (games), matching them with much
better mates (dating) or professional connections (networking), or substantially in-
creasing the curation and recommendation quality of content (music, movies, news)
immediately after a purchase. The stronger the complementarity between free and
premium experience and the more immediate the gain in utility from adoption of
premium content, the more effectively can regular promotional activity be expected
to increase overall demand.
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2.5 Appendix
In-game currency and sales in Candy Crush Saga
Figure 2.10: Examples of in-game currency and sales in the popular video game
Candy Crush Saga
(a) In-game currency
(b) Sale of in-game currency
Notes: The top panel shows a screen shot of “gold bars,” the in-game currency available for purchase
in the popular game Candy Crush Saga. The user can buy the bars in various bundles. The lower
panel shows a promotion run in the game for a bundle of in game currencies and other in-game
features.
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Days in app is balanced between treatment and control groups
Figure 2.11: Q-Q plot of days to complete level one in treated and control groups
Notes: Users in the treatment group have to complete level one before they are exposed to the
promotional schedule. Since users are not exposed to any promotions before they reach level one,
the set of users who reach level one in the treatment and control group remain balanced. Suppose
a user i in the treated group reaches level one in τi days, so is exposed to the treatment for
di = 180 − τi days. The figure presents a quantile-quantile plot of the distribution of di in the
treatment (y-axis) and control (x-axis) groups to check balance. The distribution of di in the
treatment and control groups is seen to be balanced.
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Balance tests: Treatment vs. control groups
Table 2.3: Pre-treatment tests of balance for treatment and control groups
Treatment: Control:
Promotions (T) No promotions (C)
N = 134, 061 N = 26, 521
Mean SD Mean SD p-value
Days to complete level one 9.88 (22.42) 9.84 (22.43) 0.771
Hours spent in app 8.47 (20.82) 8.52 (21.16) 0.756
Conversion 0.006 (0.078) 0.006 (0.074) 0.256
Purchases 0.008 (0.128) 0.007 (0.121) 0.192
Revenue 0.072 (1.38) 0.064 (1.35) 0.391
Connected to Facebook 0.295 (0.456) 0.300 (0.458) 0.131
Device memory 1,860.3 (869.5) 1,862.4 (869.3) 0.718
Device DPI (dots-per-inch) 303.6 (120.6) 303.3 (120.2) 0.701
Downloaded game in the US 0.32 (0.466) 0.32 (0.466) 0.92
Downloaded game in the UK 0.050 (0.218) 0.049 (0.217) 0.751
Downloaded game in Germany 0.153 (0.360) 0.154 (0.361) 0.728
Downloaded game in France 0.106 (0.307) 0.106 (0.308) 0.738
Notes: Pre-treatment indicators that are observed during users’ play of level one of the game for
control and treatment groups with p-values of t-test for difference.
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Balance tests: Three treatment sub-groups
Table 2.4: Pre-treatment tests of balance for treatment sub-groups
Treatment: Treatment: Treatment:
Immediate 25 Day 50 Day
Promotions Delay Delay
(T0) (T25) (T50)
N = 54, 883 N = 52, 652 N = 26, 526
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD p-value
Days to complete level one 9.83 (22.32) 9.90 (22.33) 9.95 (22.80) 0.773
Hours spent in app 8.55 (21.17) 8.49 (20.31) 8.26 (21.08) 0.172
Conversion 0.007 (0.081) 0.006 (0.077) 0.006 (0.074) 0.167
Purchases 0.009 (0.144) 0.008 (0.120) 0.007 (0.110) 0.034
Revenue 0.078 (1.51) 0.070 (1.33) 0.061 (1.16) 0.233
Connected to Facebook 0.296 (0.456) 0.295 (0.456) 0.295 (0.456) 0.973
Device memory 1,855.1 (871.0) 1,862.6 (866.5) 1,866.5 (872.6) 0.159
Device DPI (dots-per-inch) 302.5 (120.4) 304.4 (120.7) 304.2 (120.8) 0.025
Download in US 0.320 (0.466) 0.321 (0.467) 0.320 (0.467) 0.900
Download in UK 0.049 (0.215) 0.052 (0.221) 0.050 (0.217) 0.063
Download in Germany 0.156 (0.362) 0.151 (0.358) 0.151 (0.358) 0.090
Download in France 0.104 (0.306) 0.107 (0.309) 0.106 (0.308) 0.396
Notes: Pre-treatment indicators that are observed during users’ play of level one of the game for
all treatment sub-groups. p-values are derived from a three-way ANOVA test for differences.
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Figure 2.12: Number of users logging into game by day split by group
Notes: App use propensity is not affected by promotions: The number of users logging into the
app remains virtually the same in treatment and control group (users in treatment group shown
against the left, and users in the control group shown against the right y-axis).
Figure 2.13: Q-Q plot of days a user is active in the app split by group
Notes: Days active is defined as the number of days (out of 180) that a user logged into the game.
This Q-Q plot shows that the distribution of login propensity is the same across the treatment and
control group.
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Figure 2.14: Per-day purchases for treated and control groups
Notes: Purchases per user per day with 95% confidence band over calendar days, for the control
(upper panel) and the treatment group (lower panel). Grey diamonds on the date axis indicate
days when promotions were active.
Figure 2.15: Per-day revenues for treated and control groups
Notes: Revenue per user per day with 95% confidence band over calendar days, for the control
(upper panel) and the treatment group (lower panel). Grey diamonds on the date axis indicate
days when promotions were active.
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Information about sales is widely discussed on online forums
Figure 2.16: Screen shots from a gaming forum
(a) Sales Discussion 1
(b) Sales Discussion 2
(c) Sales Discussion 3
Notes: Screen shots from an online forum where information about sales in the video game is
discussed before the experiment underlying this study was run. Identifying words are blacked out
at the request of the data sponsor.
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Abstract
Predicting when users will leave an app creates a unique opportunity to increase their life-
time and revenue contribution. This paper focuses on predicting churn of high-value users
and evaluates the ability of free premium goods to prevent churn in a field experiment.
Offline evaluation compares the prediction performance of four common classification al-
gorithms on datasets from two freemium gaming apps, each with millions of users. Fur-
thermore, the authors implement a Hidden Markov Model to explicitly address temporal
dynamics. Results indicate that a neural network achieves best prediction performance in
terms of area under the receiver operating characteristic curve. The authors then conduct
a field experiment with the neural network churn predictor in one of the apps to evaluate
the impact of a free bundle of premium goods targeted to churning users: In a predictive
treatment condition, users identified by the neural network predictor are targeted; in a
heuristic treatment condition, all users who have not been active for 14 days are targeted;
and in a control condition, no target offers are sent to users. Results from the experiment
show that contacting users shortly before the predicted churn event substantially improves
the effectiveness of communication with users. They further indicate that giving out free
premium goods does not significantly impact the churn rate or future monetization of
high-value users – suggesting that users can only be retained by remarkably changing their
experience ahead of the churn event and that cross-linking or advertising may be more
effective measures to deal with churning users in freemium apps.
1An earlier version of this paper was presented at and published in the proceedings of the
Computational Intelligence and Games (CIG) conference 2014 which the present work references
as Runge et al. (2014).
46 CHAPTER 3. CHURN PREDICTION IN FREEMIUM APPS
3.1 Introduction
The app economy has evolved to be a bustling marketplace where millions of firms vie
for smartphone users’ attention and wallets (Einav et al. 2014; Han et al. 2015; Arora
et al. 2017). Most apps can be downloaded and used for free and premium upgrades
are offered in in-app purchases – an extreme form of penetration pricing termed
“freemium” (Niculescu and Wu 2014; Bapna et al. 2017; Gu et al. 2018). While
many users only sample apps for minutes, hours or days, a few engage sustainably
(Ghose et al. 2013; Hong and Pavlou 2014; Ross 2018). A subset of these sustainably
engaged users goes on to spend substantial amounts of money on in-app purchases
(Perez 2019; Sifa et al. 2018). Particularly games have been successful in adopting
freemium pricing (often called “free-to-play” in that setting) and integrating with
online social networks to reach and bind mobile users to their content offering (Alsén
et al. 2016): Gaming apps do not only account for the majority of close to 200 billion
app downloads in 2018 but also for three quarters of the revenue obtained on app
stores (App Annie 2018; Sensortower 2019b).
Due to their disproportionately high contribution to value generation and profits,
firms have major interest to retain sustainably engaged and monetizing users (Ross
2018; Sifa et al. 2018; Appel et al. 2019). The ability to predict when such a user
will leave an app opens up an opportunity to adjust their experience to extend the
lifetime in the app or to suggest another app to the user in hopes to “ignite” a new
lifetime (Milošević et al. 2017). To achieve this, users can be incentivized to stick
with an app, cross-linked to another app in the company’s portfolio or cross-sold to
other companies through advertising. In this paper, the authors design, implement
and evaluate a churn prediction model for high-value users based on users’ activity
data in two very large gaming apps and test incentivization with free premium goods
as a method to retain churning high-value users in one of the apps.
After defining the high-value user segment and the churn event for the two apps
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under study, we formalize churn prediction as a binary classification problem. We
then compare the prediction performance of four classification algorithms and ex-
plore the temporal dynamics of time series data using a Hidden Markov Model
(HMM). In order to evaluate the impact that can be derived from targeting a free
bundle of premium goods to churning users of an app, we design and implement
a field experiment in one of the apps: In a predictive treatment condition users
identified by the neural network predictor are targeted; in a heuristic treatment
condition, serving as a naive comparison benchmark, all users who have not been
active for 14 days are targeted; and in a control condition, no target offers are sent
to users. Results indicate that contacting users shortly before the predicted churn
event substantially improves the effectiveness of communication with users. They
further show that giving out free premium goods does not significantly impact the
churn rate or future monetization of app users – suggesting that users can only be
retained by remarkably changing their experience ahead of the churn event and that
cross-linking or advertising may be more effective measures to deal with churn of
high-value users in freemium apps.
3.2 Conceptual Background
Two streams of literature are relevant to the present work: literature on the mon-
etization of freemium goods and literature on consumer churn prediction and pre-
vention. We will present a concise review of select papers from each in the following
paragraphs.
Speaking to the first body of literature, Bapna and Umyarov (2015) and Bapna
et al. (2017) present empirical studies that focus on social interaction as a central
element of users’ purchase intentions. Lambrecht and Misra (2016) study engage-
ment as a key antecedent of users’ purchasing of premium upgrades. Analytical
accounts (Halbheer et al. 2014; Appel et al. 2019) emphasize how firms have to
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trade off advertising and premium purchasing in light of user behavior dynamics.
Runge et al. (2019) focus on the effect of regular promotions for the monetization of
freemium offerings and find that promotions can lead to strong increases in primary
demand. These studies highlight two factors in particular that make the monetiza-
tion of freemium products challenging for firms: (1) Users tend to sample many free
apps and only retain with a few, see also Ross (2018); (2) uncertainty about quality
is high, making it difficult to entice consumers to open their wallets (e.g., Foubert
and Gijsbrechts 2016; Appel et al. 2019). Our study speaks to this literature in
studying churn prediction in a freemium setting and attempting to extend users’
lifetime with an app by means of a free promotional bundle of premium goods as
a retention incentive. The analysis focuses on high-value users who have produced
substantial revenue for the firm as firm profitability in this setting hinges on the
retention of such users due to their disproportionately high revenue contribution
(Sifa et al. 2018). Premium goods should be well suited as an incentive for these
users as they have previously revealed their preference for such goods by purchasing
them.
Another longstanding stream of literature that is relevant to the present work
concerns consumer churn and its prevention (Lemmens and Gupta 2020). The pre-
diction of churn has been studied in various settings: e.g., see Burez and Van den
Poel (2007) for the case of a television company, Ascarza et al. (2016) and Ascarza
2018 for the case of wireless communications and a special interest organization,
Baumann et al. (2015) and Coussement et al. (2017) for the case of telecommuni-
cations, Coussement and Van den Poel (2008) for subscription services, Xie et al.
(2009) for the case of banks, Hadiji et al. (2014); Rothenbuehler et al. (2015); Per-
iáñez et al. (2016); Milošević et al. (2017); Banerjee et al. (2019) for the case of
online games. The presented list is far from exhaustive – Ascarza et al. 2018 present
a recent overview of and outlook for churn management research. The present paper
addresses this literature in being the first to study churn prevention for engaged users
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in the app economy (Han et al. 2015; Arora et al. 2017; Milošević et al. 2017) using
an incentive that is uniquely suited to prevent churn in this setting. Methodologi-
cally, the authors focus on the application of machine learning techniques that have
been reported as effective for churn prediction specifically (Burez and Van den Poel
2007; Coussement and Van den Poel 2008; Glady et al. 2009; Burez and Van den
Poel 2009; Chen et al. 2012; Rothenbuehler et al. 2015; Milošević et al. 2017) and
consumer behavior prediction more widely (West et al. 1997; Lemmens and Croux
2006; Briesch and Rajagopal 2010; Sifa et al. 2018). This aspect will receive further
attention in Sections 3.3.4 and 3.4.4 later in the text.
Summarizing, the questions guiding this study are: How can firms producing and
marketing freemium apps identify high-value users at risk of churning? Can they
retain such at-risk users by means of data-driven churn management? Are premium
goods an effective incentive towards preventing churn? What can we infer as to
good treatments to prevent consumer disengagement in this setting more generally?
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Empirical setting
The two gaming apps made available by the data sponsor for this study are published
on the Apple App Store and the Facebook Appstore. The first app (called App 1
henceforth) is a puzzle game, like Tetris or Bejeweled, on mobile devices. The
player has to clear gems of the same color as quickly as possible in a specified time
in order to achieve a high score. Cleared gems are replaced from the top. There
are also several power-ups or boosts present in the game that can make clearing
the gems faster, so users can obtain a higher score and have a more exciting game
experience. The second app (called App 2 henceforth) is a farming game which
simulates the economics of running a highly personalized farm. The user plants
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Figure 3.1: Revenue and activity distributions in the studied apps
Notes: The upper panel shows the contribution of the top x% of users to overall revenue (left
y-axis) and the corresponding revenue threshold (right y-axis, normalized at the request of the
data sponsor for confidentiality reasons). The lower panel shows what number (left y-axis) and
cumulative share (right y-axis) of users is still active after x days of inactivity; the cumulative curve
flattens post 14 days of inactivity, i.e., after 14 days of inactivity only 2% of users ever become
active again.
and harvests crops to obtain coins and other in-game currency. As the users climb
through various levels, they have the opportunity to extend and beautify their farm,
and unlock new game features. Unlike App 1, App 2 is driven by missions that the
players are asked to complete, requiring more regular interaction and engagement
from users.
3.3.2 Definitions
The term “high-value users” is a rather vague term. In order to pin down a more
precise definition for high-value users, we consider the contribution of top percentile
paying users to the total revenue for the apps as shown in the top panel of Fig-
ure 3.1. The top 7% of paying users contribute around 50% of the total revenue.
The minimum revenue threshold – the minimum revenue generated by a user in
order to make it to the top percentile – starts to flatten out below the top 10% of
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paying users. The top 10% seem to catch all users with an exceptionally high value
which leads us to adopt the following definition:
Definition 1. A high-value user in the app on day t = 0 (the observation
time) is a user that ranks in the top 10% of all paying users sorted in
decreasing order of revenue generated by each user between days t = −90
and t = −1.
Since the aim is to reach users before they churn from the app, the prediction should
be targeting active high-value users. We therefore define active high-value users as
follows:
Definition 2. An active high-value player on day t = 0 is a high-value
player who has played the game at least once between days t = −14 and
t = −1.
The term “churn” is intended to capture that a user has permanently left the
app. This decision may be conscious or not, driven by external or internal reasons.
In practice, we need a threshold value for days of inactivity that we can use to
clearly define the churn of a user. To this avail, we consider the distribution of
days of inactivity between logins for high-value users in the apps. For example, if
a high-value user played the game on day t = 1 and day t = 3, then again on day
t = 7, this yields two samples of the days of inactivity: one is 3− 1− 1 = 1 and the
other is 7− 3− 1 = 3. The bottom panel of Figure 3.1 shows the histogram of the
distribution and cumulative distribution curve of days of inactivity. Less than 2%
of high-value users stay away from the app for more than 14 days. Hence, 14 days
of inactivity is a good indicator of churn. With this definition, 98% of the users
defined as churners truly permanently disengage from the app.
Definition 3. An active high-value user is said to be churning on day
t = 0 if she starts a period of 14 consecutive days of inactivity on any of
the days between day t = 0 and day t = 6.
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3.3.3 Problem statement
We model the churn prediction problem as a binary classification task where the goal
is to assign a label “churn” or “no churn” to each user. We train various classifiers on
labelled data of previously observed player behavior up to a given day, and predict
whether a player will churn or not within the week following that day. We use ROC-
AUC (short: AUC), i.e., the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve, for performance comparison because it allows to compare models across all
possible classification thresholds. ROC curves are commonly depicted in a chart
with the false positive rate (FPR) on the x- and the true positive rate (TPR) on
the y-axis. Classifier performance can be compared for different combinations of
TPR and FPR and hence for different threshold choices. As AUC is the area under
the ROC curve, when it is one, the classifier performs perfectly and the ROC curve
follows the left and top border of the chart. Regardless of the threshold, the TPR of
the classification then is one and the FPR is zero. When the ROC curve is a diagonal
from the lower left to the top right, AUC is 0.5 which reflects the case of random
classification. Summarizing, our problem is to find the classifier that most correctly
assigns the churn label to players across all possible classification thresholds and
hence maximizes AUC.
Formally, with the above definitions, we can state the high-value user churn
prediction problem as follows. Given all available historical tracking data of high-
value users of an app, a training dataset D can be constructed in the following way:
D = {(Xi, ci)|i = 1, 2, . . . , n} where n is the number of users, each Xi in the dataset
is a data instance vector consisting of historical activity data for an active high-value
user up until a certain observation day, and ci is a binary label indicating whether
the high-value user is churning on the observation date. On this background, we can
now formulate the churn prediction problem as a binary classification problem where
we aim to find the binary classifier f(x), trained by D, such that for an unlabeled
dataset Xnew:
f(x) = argmax{E[AUC(f(Xnew))]} (3.1)
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3.3.4 Predictor selection
The churn classification problem that we formalized in Section 3.3.3 lends itself
to the application of supervised learning algorithms whose ability to predict con-
sumer behavior has been previously documented. Logistic regression (Logistic) is a
workhorse model in the literature to predict binary choice (McFadden 1973). Sim-
ilarly, neural networks (NNs) and decision trees (DTs) have been reported to work
well for consumer behavior prediction in various settings (West et al. 1997; Lem-
mens and Croux 2006; Lessmann et al. 2015) and in this specific setting (Sifa et al.
2015; Hadiji et al. 2014; Milošević et al. 2017; Sifa et al. 2018). Finally, we include
support vector machines (SVM) for their reported strength in churn classification
problems (Coussement and Van den Poel 2008; Lessmann and Voß 2009; Chen et al.
2012). We apply all of these algorithms to approximate the unknown function f(x)
in equation (1) while maximizing predictions’ AUC on holdout datasets through
10-fold cross-validation. In an attempt to better understand if latent temporal dy-
namics preceding the churn event can help predict it, we also implement a HMM
to capture hidden user states (Burez and Van den Poel 2007; Netzer et al. 2008).
We do not use these states for prediction directly (Rothenbuehler et al. 2015), but
include them as features in the binary classification task described above (Burez and
Van den Poel 2007).
3.4 Offline Evaluation: Predicting Churn of High-
Value Users
3.4.1 Data preparation
For both apps, we extract the relevant historical tracking data of high-value users
for two randomly chosen observation days, July 1st and August 1st of a recent
year. We then construct two labeled datasets to build the churn prediction model.
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Table 3.1: Offline datasets used for predictor evaluation
Number Number Churners Number of
of of over all features in
users churners users raw dataset Final feature set
App 1 10,736 1,821 16.96% 516
Daily time series of rounds played,
play accuracy, invites sent; days in
game, last purchase, days since last
purchase
App 2 7,709 352 4.57% 699
Daily time series of logins, level;
in-game currency 1 balance,
in-game currency 2 balance
Notes: App 2 has a substantially lower churn rate as users retain longer on average; for both apps,
the final datasets after feature selection contain usage- and purchase-related features.
Table 3.1 shows a summary of the dataset. There are three main categories of data:
first, in-app activity tracking data such as a time series of logins per day or a time
series of play accuracy; second, revenue-related tracking data, such as a time series
of revenues generated or in-game currency balances held by users; third, user profile
data, such as how long the user has been using the app and which country the user
is from. We process the data to alleviate high positive skewness of the datasets
by applying a Box-Cox transformation. Since the selected prediction algorithms
usually expect standardized input data, we further center and scale the data during
the data preparation phase.
The prepared datasets include more than several hundred attributes, and not
all of them are likely to be informative for making predictions. To identify the
set of attributes to be used for prediction, we perform a series of feature selection
procedures. We use logistic regression with 10-fold cross validation to estimate the
AUC performance of different feature sets. We experiment with the length of time
series, eliminate time series that are highly correlated with others, and apply forward
feature selection. The last column of Table 3.1 summarizes the feature sets retained
the final models. Empirical experiments on offline data further suggest that using
the last 14 days of historical data prior to the churn event yields the best prediction
performance in terms of AUC.
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Table 3.2: Mean AUC achieved by prediction algorithms
Support
Neural Logistic Decision vector
network regression tree machine
App 1 0.815 0.814 0.732 0.850
App 2 0.930 0.924 0.850 0.903
Notes: All algorithms achieve substantially higher prediction performance for App 2 than for App
1; a neural network predictor achieves best performance on both apps’ datasets.
3.4.2 Offline evaluation of prediction algorithms
Prior to implementing an online churn prediction system, we compare the prediction
performance of our selected algorithms. For the SVM, we use the radial basis func-
tion kernel and apply a parameter grid search to tune the hyper-parameters with
10-fold cross-validation. We experiment with 100 combinations of C (ranging from
0 to 5) and gamma (ranging from 0.2 to 5) with quadratic step size. The NN has a
simple one-hidden layer network topology. The number of hidden nodes is set to be
equal to the sum of the number of attributes and classes divided by two plus one.
Also for the NN, we use a parameter grid search with 10-fold cross-validation and
try 100 combinations of learning rate and momentum (both from 0.51 to 0.510).
Table 3.2 reports average AUC performance of different algorithms over the two
datasets. Figure 3.2 shows the ROC curves for the four prediction algorithms on the
two apps’ datasets. Results are consistent over the two datasets. The performance
of NN and logistic regression tracks closely, but the NN is slightly better based on
mean AUC. The performance of SVM and DT falls behind logistic regression and
NN. SVM performs better for low FPRs and DT performs better for FPRs higher
than 25%. In application of a churn prediction system, a low FPR is more important
because accidentally treating non-churning users can be more costly than missing
some of the churners. This is so because non-churners have a higher expected future
revenue contribution than churning users – whose future value is by definition zero.
Hence, the SVM would be preferred to the DT. Also in terms of AUC the SVM
outperforms the decision tree.
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Figure 3.2: ROC curves of the four selected prediction algorithms for both apps
Notes: App 1 on the left, App 2 on the right; neural network and logistic regression track closely
and outperform both the SVM and the decision tree predictor.
3.4.3 Prediction performance across the two apps
The previous section established that the ranking of prediction algorithms in terms
of AUC is the same across both apps – the NN provides best performance in terms
of mean AUC. To understand how prediction performance compares between the
two apps, Figure 3.3 shows a comparison of the ROC curves for a NN on App 1’s
versus App 2’s dataset. The same prediction modeling technique performs much
better for App 2 than for App 1. More specifically, if we fix the FPR – that is the
percentage of actually non-churning users we include in the predicted list of churns
– at 5%, we achieve a TPR higher than 70% for App 2. Hence, we reach more than
70% of truly churning users, while for App 1, we only reach 35% of truly churning
users for the same FPR.
An intuitive explanation for this difference is that the nature of the apps differs
as discussed in Section 3.3.1. App 2, though being a freemium game as App 1,
requires more constant interaction from users and is characterized by higher and
more constant engagement. It offers many additional experiences on top of the
core farming mechanic. Among these are crafting and selling products, lotteries,
an underwater garden and deep social features like visiting friends’ farms. App 1
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Figure 3.3: ROC curve of neural network predictor for both apps
Notes: A neural network predictor performs best for both apps as shown in Figure 3.2; its prediction
performance is much stronger for App 2 than for App 1.
on the other hand fully focuses on timed rounds of the same core mechanic. It
does not require a high level of commitment from users and allows for more casual
interactions. Logins per user per day are substantially lower in App 1 than in App
2 and times between sessions for one user can span several days.
3.4.4 Combining neural network and HMM
Though the modeling techniques discussed thusfar already deliver good prediction
performance, one common issue with all the techniques considered is that they do not
take the temporal dynamics of the time series attributes into consideration explicitly.
If we switched the order of the data points in the time series, the resulting prediction
would not be affected since (time-wise) ordering of attributes is not accounted for by
these algorithms. There are high quality historical tracking data dating back months
and years available in the data sponsor’s databases. In order to better leverage the
information potentially present in these data, we turn our focus to HMMs: We
include the results obtained from a HMM in the neural network to further improve
the prediction performance. We focus on App 2’s dataset to further develop this
line of thinking as predictors achieve better baseline performance on it compared to
App 1’s dataset.
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The data under study are all instances of the logins per day time series for App
2 after the data cleaning step but without data transformation. This is because the
data transformation alters the data in a way that makes them unusable for fitting
a HMM. The training data for the HMM can be denoted as a vector
L = [L1, L2, . . . , Ln]
T (3.2)
where each Li = [Li(−60), Li(−59), . . . , Li(−1)] is the time series of logins per day
for a user between day t = −60 and t = −1 and n is the number of instances in the
dataset.
We make the following assumptions regarding the model:
• The instances of the logins time series are mutually independent which is a
valid assumption since each instance is an observation of a certain different
user.
• All instances of the logins time series are generated from one single underlying
hidden Markov process. We hence assume that the HMM portrays an average
user’s stochastic behavior.
• The emission distribution of the HMM follows a Poisson distribution. Each
value in the logins time series is a non-negative integer that records the number
of login events.
Essentially the model setup reflects that the actual logins of a user on a certain
date depend on the states of all users on that date, and that the state process – which
is hidden and unobservable – is a Markov chain process. The actual observed values
of logins follow a Poisson distribution, where the mean of the Poisson distribution
depends on the state of a user on each date.
With the HMM, we leverage more historical data and take temporal dynamics
explicitly into consideration. However, the HMM setup is hard to reconcile with our
definition of churn and cannot be used directly for making predictions. In order to
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make use of the HMM that we devise, we use it to extract new features to be added
to the NN predictor. The idea is that this will enhance the prediction performance.
We follow the approach of Burez and Van den Poel (2007) who incorporate features
extracted from a Markov chain model into a NN to improve prediction performance.
Through the HMM we calculate the following probabilities for each instance i in D
as new features to add to the neural network:
pi = [p0, p1, . . . , p13] (3.3)
where pk = Prob(Li(k) = 0|Li = li). Essentially, pi is a vector with element pk
being the probability of user i not using the app on date t = k given the observed
sequence of L up to t = −1.




where α denotes the forward probabilities of the HMM at t = −1, Γ is the transition
matrix of the HMM, and P (0) is a diagonal matrix where the m-th diagonal element
is the probability of observing a 0, given the hidden state is m. Detailed mathematic
proof of the above equation can be found in Zucchini et al. (2017).
We then add the new features, pi, into App 2’s dataset after transformation
and apply the neural network modeling on top of the new feature set. The AUC
value of the model with the new feature set is 0.923, which degrades the prediction
performance compared to the 0.930 achieved with the feature set not including the
users’ hidden state. Only using the HMM features for prediction yields a mean AUC
across 10 cross-validation runs of 0.915. Inclusion of the HMM features hence does
not appear to add incremental prediction performance and we do not include HMM
results in our final prediction model for the online experiment described in the next
section.
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3.5 Online Experiment: Targeting Free Premium
Goods to Churning Users
Now that we identified a well performing churn prediction model, we can apply it
online to identify churning users and try to prevent their disengagement from the
app. As prediction performance is substantially better for App 2 compared to App
1, the data sponsor encouraged us to use App 2 for an online application of the
predictive churn system. Prior to describing the experimental design, we introduce
the treatment to prevent churn in more detail.
3.5.1 Experiment design
Freemium apps monetize through the sale of premium upgrades through in-app pur-
chases. The goods sold in such purchases generally complement and enhance the free
product experience, e.g., by providing game enhancements, extended functionality
or more exciting experiences (Hamari and Keronen 2017; Hamari et al. 2020). Much
of the user experience in freemium apps is structured around such purchases and
intends to create need and desire on the user’s part to make a purchase (Lehdonvirta
2009; Hamari et al. 2020). It hence seems that the premium goods sold should make
for a good incentive to retain users. This is expected to be particularly true when
targeting high-value users – as in this study – because these users have previously
revealed their preference for such goods by purchasing them in large amounts. In
collaboration with the data sponsor, the authors hence devised a free bundle of pre-
mium in-game goods, worth more than $10 and hence more than three times the
average daily spend of high-value users, as an incentive to retain high-value churners
in App 2.
The online experiment has three main goals: (1) Apply the churn prediction
model identified in offline evaluation in the field, (2) assess the effectiveness of the
free premium goods incentive, (3) assess the value of a machine learning-based ex-
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pert system over a simple heuristic implementation that managers could implement
without predictive analytics. To achieve all these goals, we design an experiment
with two treatment conditions and a control condition. Users in condition A are
treated with the incentive using a simple heuristic based on definitions 2 and 3
in Section 3.3.2 that managers could implement without data scientists’ help: All
high-value users who have been inactive for 14 days are contacted with a Facebook
application notification and an e-mail offering the free bundle of premium goods.
Users in condition B are treated using a machine learning-based expert system: All
high-value users who are predicted by our neural network predictor to churn within
the next week (see definition 3 in Section 3.3.2) receive the free bundle of premium
in-game goods. Condition C finally serves as the control condition: High-value users
in this condition are not treated.
We use the following metrics to evaluate the impact of our treatments on high-
value users:
Definition 4. Churn Rate (CR) CR = 1 – (# active high-value users) /
(# high-value users)
Definition 5. Daily Revenues (DR) DR = total revenues from users in a
group during a day
Definition 6. Email Click Through Rate (CTR) CTR = (# gifts claimed
by email) / (# emails delivered)
Definition 7. Facebook Click To Impression Rate (CTI) CTI = (# gifts
claimed by notification) / (# notifications seen by users)
Towards an evaluation of our treatment conditions’ impact on these metrics, we
randomize high-value users in App 2 into the different conditions. 40% of users go to
condition A and B respectively, the remaining 20% receive no tratment and establish
the control condition. The experiment comprises all users meeting the definitions
put forth in Section 3.3.2 between mid-January to mid-February of a recent year.
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Table 3.3: High-value user disengagement behavior throughout the experiment





Number of high-value users 1,717 1,607 789
Active 1,583 1,472 744
Churn rate 7.8% 8.4% 6.8%
End of
experiment
Number of high-value users 2,034 1,896 933
Active 1,809 1,680 837
Churn rate 11.1% 11.4% 10.3%
Differential
Number of high-value users 317 289 135
Active 226 208 93
Churn rate 3.3% 3.0% 3.5%
Notes: The number of high-value users is increasing in each condition as is their churn rate. In line
with expectations, the churn rate increases least in the predictive targeting condition and most in
the condition where no retention incentive is targeted.
Table 3.3 shows how many users are in each treatment condition at the beginning
and at the end of the experiment.
3.5.2 Results: Churn and monetization
Table 3.3 shows the number of treated users and churn rate of high-value users in
different experimental conditions, observed at the beginning and the end of the ex-
periment. As can be seen, churn rates of high-value users increased throughout the
experiment duration for all three experimental conditions. This result is expected
as churn dynamics change, e.g., over the lifecycle of an app, due to seasonality,
changing user preferences and depending on the competitive landscape. Rather
than absolute churn rate at the beginning or the end of the experiment, we focus
on the differential between end and start for each condition as this number directly
reflects the effectiveness of the different treatments in lowering churn: A more effec-
tive treatment should lead to a lower increase or a stronger decrease in churn over
time. The last row of Table 3.3 shows that churn increased least in the predictive
treatment condition B (+3.0%), followed by the heuristic treatment condition A
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Table 3.4: Statistical significance of differences between conditions
Metric Churn rate Norm. daily revenue E-mail Notification
(differential) (t-test) CTR CTI
Comparison A vs. C B vs. C A vs. C B vs. C A vs. B A vs. B
Test statistic 0.2636 0.4282 1.0067 0.7767 4.5569 24.1018
p-value 0.6077 0.5145 0.2909 0.4407 0.0328 0.0000
Notes: Pairwise comparison of outcomes in treatment conditions: Churn and revenue are not
significantly lifted under either churn treatment compared to the holdout condition; communica-
tion effectiveness, as measured by e-mail CTR and notification CTI, is significantly lifted in the
predictive compared to the heuristic treatment condition.
(+3.3%) and the holdout condition C directionally saw the strongest increase in
high-value user churn (+3.5%). This ranking is in line with the expectation that a
churn prediction expert system is best at administering an “anti-churn” incentive.
Based on the assumption that user churn is a Bernoulli random variable we apply
a Chi-square test to assess whether differences between conditions are statistically
significant. As shown in column two and three in Table 3.4, differences are not
statistically significant. Results hence only provide indicative directional evidence
for the effectiveness of our predictive churn prevention treatment.
Historically, for the app under study, the normalized daily revenue follows a
Gaussian distribution and has close to equal variance. Based on these characteristics,
we perform a two-sample t-test to assess whether there is a significant difference in
daily revenue between different experimental groups. The null hypotheses are that
the means of the normalized daily revenues are equal between condition A and C
and between condition B and C. Results are shown in Table 3.4. Since the p-values
are again both substantially greater than 0.05, we are not able to reject the null
hypothesis of equal means. Hence, there is no statistically significant evidence that
daily revenue is affected by the different churn management policies.
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3.5.3 Results: Communication effectiveness
While effects on churn and monetization are small or not detectable, Figure 3.4
shows that communication effectiveness is much higher in the predictive than in
the heuristic treatment group (there was no communication to users in the control
condition). In the heuristic condition (Group A), the CTR of the e-mail campaign
is 2.4%. In the treatment condition using the churn prediction system (Group B),
the same value is 11.9%. Table 3.4 shows Chi-square test results for comparing
the e-mail CTR between Group A and Group B. The p-value of 0.0328 (< 0.05)
indicates that with the prediction model, we are improving the effectiveness of e-
mail marketing and seizing the opportunity to reach high-value users while they are
still interested in the app. To further compare the funnel of the e-mail campaign
of Group A and Group B, Figure 3.4 illustrates the difference between the groups.
The top of the funnel notes the overall e-mails that were sent out. On the next step,
in the delivery phase, the e-mail funnel in the top panel of Figure 3.4 loses about
10% of users for both groups since only about 90% of recorded e-mail addresses are
valid. For the next step, ‘Opened,’ a clear difference in the opening rate becomes
apparent. Finally, the predictive treatment group exhibits more than five times the
CTR compared to the heuristic treatment group, and four times more users claim
the gift links under the predictive churn management policy.
Similarly, the Facebook notifications CTI is 8.7% for the heuristic Group A while
it is 31.5% for the predictive Group B. The p-value of a Chi-square test on the two
groups is approximately 0 and therefore the predictive churn management system
performs statistically significantly better in reaching users. The bottom panel of
Figure 3.4 illustrates a comparison of the Facebook notifications funnel between
Group A and Group B. The first step summarizes all users to whom the system sent
out notifications via Facebook. For the next step, there is a difference in the delivery
rate since we are not able to deliver notifications to users who have uninstalled the
app. On the next level, ‘Published,’ further users are lost; the reason for this is
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Figure 3.4: Communication effectiveness in the heuristic (A) versus the predictive
(B) treatment condition
Notes: The firm’s communication efforts reach users much more effectively in the predictive than
in the heuristic treatment condition. E-mail funnel in the top, Facebook application notification
funnel in the bottom panel. Group A received the heuristic, Group B the predictive targeting
approach.
that if the user has blocked the app’s notifications, Facebook will not publish any
notifications to the user. For Group A and Group B, the percentage loss at this
step is approximately equal. At the impression level, for Group A, only 46.9/72.0 =
65.1% of the published notifications are seen by users while for the predictive Group
B, 56.7/78.5 = 72.3% published notifications are seen by users. In the final step, we
witness a sizable improvement in the click rate of notifications under predictive churn
management. Notifications are more than four times more likely to be claimed in the
predictive churn management policy Group B compared to the heuristic treatment
in Group A.
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3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Merits of the predictive churn management system
Our field experiment presents directional evidence that proactive outreach to at-
risk users with a meaningful incentive can lower churn rates of these users: The
churn rate in the predictive treatment group increases 14.3% less compared to the
increase in the control condition (+3.0% versus +3.5%, see Table 3.3 on page 62)
from beginning to end of the experiment.2 This difference in increase is however not
statistically significant (p = 0.5145, see Table 3.4 on page 63). There are further no
detectable effects on monetization of app users from either heuristic or predictive
churn management vis-a-vis the control condition.
While effects on churn and monetization are limited, the predictive churn man-
agement strongly (by factor four to five) increases effectiveness of communication
with users. As shown in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.4, effects are both substantively
large and statistically significant. A reasonable criticism of these results is that the
good CTR achieved for the predictive group might be driven by false positives, i.e.,
users who are not about to churn but are predicted to do so. When training and
testing our algorithm, we consistently achieved a precision of better than 40% for
repeated and out-of-sample testing. Assuming the same precision for the prediction
used in the field experiment, up to 60% of contacted high-value users may have been
actual non-churners. In previous e-mail gift campaigns with high-value users for the
same app, the firm observed CTRs of around 10%. Assuming a similar CTR for the
false positives among the predicted churners, the true positives – i.e., users who are
actually about to churn – have approximately the same CTR, since the overall CTR
is above 10%. Hence, contacting high-value users shortly before they churn appears
to be as efficient as contacting them earlier in their lifetime when they are still far
2Note that churn rates across all treatment conditions increased throughout the experiment du-
ration of one month due to extraneous factors such as changing consumer preferences, competitive
environment and seasonality.
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away from churning. It further is much more efficient than contacting users after
their churn event as implemented in the heuristic treatment condition – where we
observe a CTR of around 2% (see Figure 3.4).
The value of the presented churn management system therefore lies in enabling
the firm to contact users just before the end of their lifetime in the app when they
are still fully responsive to the firm’s communication efforts. While this is a valuable
use case, results further indicate that a more meaningful incentive may be necessary
to entice high-value users to change their behavior and “reignite” their interest in
the app – or a different treatment altogether. We will address this line of enquiry
in the next section.
3.6.2 How to treat churning users in freemium apps?
From a conceptual perspective, the incentive chosen by the authors – free premium
goods worth more than three time the daily average spending of the targeted users
– seems well suited: Freemium apps tend to be organized around the creation of in-
terest in premium upgrades (Sifa et al. 2015; Levitt et al. 2016; Hamari and Keronen
2017; Runge et al. 2019) and, in financially successful apps, such premium upgrades
usually present a noticeable improvement to the user experience (Lehdonvirta 2009;
Perez 2019). Further all targeted users have made purchases of the premium goods
in the past, meaning these goods provide(d) utility to them.
An argument explaining why the incentive is not more effective in retaining
users lies in its explicit and extrinsic nature: Users have to consciously claim the
free promotional bundle of premium goods. Doing so requires cognitive attention
and the exertion of effort – open the e-mail/notification, process information, click
to claim the bundle. Extrinsic incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation (Deci
et al. 1999). To the extent that users’ engagement with the app derives from intrinsiv
motivations, an increase in intrinsic usage incentives may be a more effective way to
prevent churn. The firm could, e.g., automatically add the free premium goods to
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users’ accounts and notify them of the gift. Generally, incentives that are automatic
and intrinsic may be more effective in this setting as users are intrinsically motivated
to use an app (Deci et al. 1999; Lewis et al. 2012; Eyal 2014). Along these lines,
other promising incentives might be to enhance the app experience without notifying
the user well ahead of the churn event until the user is fully “hooked” and motivated
to use the app again (Deci et al. 1999; Eyal 2014).
Another explanation for the limited effectiveness of the chosen incentive to retain
users is that users just do not obtain utility from the premium goods any longer and
that their preferences have irreversebly changed. Following this line of thinking,
more promising approaches to deal with churning users are to suggest another app
to them. Most firms in the app economy own and market more than one app (Han
et al. 2015). The firm can hence crosslink a user to another app in its portfolio when
the user is predicted to disengage from the focal app. Crosslinking users who are at
the end of their lifetime and would leave the focal app anyway comes at virtually
no cost. Finally, if the firm has no (suited) further apps in its portfolio, it can sell
churning users to other firms via in-app advertising as a last resort (Halbheer et al.
2014; Appel et al. 2019). Future research can fruitfully address these questions and
refine churn treatment policies through further analysis and experimentation.
3.6.3 Limitations and future research
The authors wish to end by naming relevant limitations and avenues for future
research. A limiting element of the present study’s offline evaluation is that it con-
siders mean AUC without deriving confidence intervals. While confidence intervals
will not change which predictor is selected for the online experiment, they would
be insightful in establishing if differences between predictors are statistically sig-
nificant or not. A further limitation is that features are selected based on AUC
achieved with logistic regression. To the extent that other algorithms, e.g., DT, NN
or SVM, might have benefitted more from certain attributes than logistic regression,
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this could lower the performance achieved with these other predictors (Crone et al.
2006; Coussement et al. 2017). The main result, i.e., that a neural network is best
able to predict churn in terms of AUC, is however robust to this limitation as more
tailored feature selection would only improve (and not lower) the NN predictor’s
performance. Future research could address these limitations.
Further avenues for future research are to extend the present study’s findings to
more apps and other freemium offerings (e.g., news websites) and to refine churn
treatment policies through further analysis and experimentation. When doing so,
researchers might benefit from predicting the effectiveness of different incentives
and treatments directly (Ascarza et al. 2016; Ascarza 2018). Different treatments
may be most effective for different sub-segments of churning users and evaluating
their effectiveness directly could identify more optimal churn management policies
(Ascarza et al. 2018). Methodologically, reinforcement learning-based approaches
(Rana and Oliveira 2015; Aboussalah and Lee 2020), e.g., contextual bandits (Li
et al. 2010; Bietti et al. 2018), could assist with this identification by automatically
learning targeted treatment assignment policies while maximizing a pre-specified
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Abstract
In freemium marketplaces, a small share of paying users drives firms’ revenue. Marketers
wish to identify such premium users early on to ensure their experience is rewarding and to
direct advertising spend towards channels that yield promising users. This identification
is complicated by the relative rarity of premium users and the fact that future “free” and
paying users can display similar app use behavior, creating various non-linear associations
in consumer behavior. The present study shows that synthetic oversampling of the minority
class of premium users can help various learners in identifying such users. Further, neural
networks should be particularly well suited for this prediction as they can fit most classes
of linear and non-linear functions to arbitrary precision, especially when their architecture
is “deep,” i.e., has several hidden layers. Indeed, a neural network with four hidden layers
– trained on oversampled data – surfaces as the best detector of future paying customers
from app users’ digital footprint. The presented methodology promises to have valuable
applications for the identification of high-type users, particularly when samples are large,
input data diverse, choice paths varied and imbalance in behavioral outcomes high.
1An earlier version of this paper, focusing on the implementation and benefits of synthetic over-
sampling, was presented at and published in the proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference
on System Sciences (HICSS) 2018. It is referenced here as Sifa et al. (2018).
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4.1 Introduction
Freemium has become a widespread pricing model for digital consumer goods: A
basic version of the product or service can be used for free and premium upgrades are
available against payment of a fee (Pauwels and Weiss 2008; Gu et al. 2018; Shi et al.
2019). It comes in two key flavors: Contractual and non-contractual. The former
are subscription-based and used by, e.g., Dropbox, Spotify and many providers
of digital news such as the New York Times or the Economist. Here, consumers
upgrade a single time to a premium plan and then pay in monthly installments
(Lee et al. 2017). Some firms have moved to hybrid models that extend contractual
with non-contractual premium upgrade options; Tinder for example offers a ‘Gold’
subscription and numerous non-contractual upgrades such as additional ‘Likes’ and
other virtual goods (Lehdonvirta 2009).
Non-contractual freemium pricing models are common in interactive online en-
vironments where users sample many products and only stick with a few. The app
economy – a $143 billion industry with 12 million competing app developers ac-
cording to 2016 figures (Arora et al. 2017) – is a good example, with the largest
part of adopters disengaging within a week (see Figure 4.1).2 In such environments,
premium upgrades are usually offered in in-app purchases that tend to be repeated
manifold by engaged users who drive the largest share of firms’ revenue (Ghose and
Han 2014) and finance the free provision of the product or service for the rest of
users (Bapna et al. 2017). Managers strive to provide the best possible experience
to these users (Berger and Nasr 1998; Malthouse and Blattberg 2005). In light of
the short user lifecycles in freemium settings (Figure 4.1), early experiences can
have crucial impact on consumers’ adoption decision and marketers wish to iden-
tify paying prospects early on to take suited action to foster their retention and
monetization.
2Note that our use of the term “retention” refers to app use after app download regardless if
the user made a purchase or not. This use is in line with nascent literature on the app economy
(Appel et al. 2019) and routed in the managerial use of the term (Ross 2018).
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Figure 4.1: Retention and conversion in freemium mobile apps
Notes: Average share of a user cohort retained (i.e., still actively using the app either paid or for
free, top panel) and average share of a user cohort that bought a premium upgrade (conversion,
bottom panel) over days after initial app download for select apps of the data sponsor. Retention
curves are representative of what has been reported for apps (Schonfeld 2009), many users only
sample apps for a few hours or days. Conversion curves display stronger between-app differences
than retention curves. The analysis in this paper is conducted on detailed data from the app with
the median conversion profile.
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To assist managers with this challenge, the present study zeroes in on the predic-
tion of consumers’ future premium demand from early behavioral traces as recorded
shortly after initial app download. Interactive digital products such as mobile apps
allow firms to log detailed records of consumer behavior in varied data formats sim-
ilar to the clickstream data produced on websites (Bucklin et al. 2002; Bucklin and
Sismeiro 2009). While this provides a rich dataset, prediction is complicated by
the fact that “free” users can display behavioral patterns that are highly similar to
the ones of (future) premium customers (Moe and Fader 2004; Shampanier et al.
2007). Figure 4.2 on page 76 shows behavioral traces during the first week after
app download for future free and premium users. While future premium users reg-
ister more sessions, rounds and days played and spend more time in the app on
average, distributions of app use behavior between future free and premium users
overlap substantially, suggesting the presence of decision rules of the form “I will
never spend anything on this app, regardless how much I use it.” Shampanier et al.
(2007) document the difficulty to remove consumers from a zero-price point which
manifests itself here in a “zero-lock-in” of users who appear behaviorally (in terms
of app use, see Figure 4.2) similar to premium customers.
When consumer behavior shows such non-linear associations that can, e.g., also
be caused by non-compensatory decision rules (Einhorn 1970), neural networks
(NNs) have been found to perform particularly well for choice prediction (West et al.
1997). Due to their universal approximation property, they can fit most classes of
linear and non-linear continuous functions to arbitrary precision (Hornik 1991), es-
pecially when their architecture is “deep,” i.e., has several hidden layers (LeCun et al.
2015). The present study considers NNs with one to four hidden layers – and hence
comprising both deep and non-deep topologies – to predict future premium demand
from early behavioral traces of mobile app users and compares their performance
to linear and random forest (RF) predictors. In doing so, the study is the first
to present a detailed application of deep learning to consumer behavior prediction
4.2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 75
and intends to help open marketing practice and research to this class of learning
algorithms that has achieved breakthrough success in other domains (LeCun et al.
2015). The presented methodology promises to have valuable applications beyond
freemium marketplaces, in the identification of high-type users on diverse behav-
ioral outcomes from consumers’ digital behavioral traces. It is likely particularly
useful when samples are large, input data formats diverse, choice paths varied and
imbalance in behavioral outcomes high.
The paper proceeds by presenting relevant conceptual background before provid-
ing details on the used methods and results. It closes with a concluding discussion
of findings.
4.2 Conceptual Background
4.2.1 Demand prediction in freemium settings
The prediction of future demand has received wide attention in marketing research.
In a number of settings, future demand can be captured in the notion of customer
lifetime value (Berger and Nasr 1998; Reinartz and Kumar 2003; Gupta et al. 2004)
and seminal studies have explored stochastic models of consumer behavior (Schmit-
tlein et al. 1987; Fader et al. 2005) or regression approaches (Malthouse and Blat-
tberg 2005; Donkers et al. 2007; Ekinci et al. 2014) for its prediction. Historically,
practitioners seem to have favored simple cross-tabulation and RFM-based (recen-
cy/frequency/monetary value) techniques (Verhoef et al. 2003). More recently, re-
ports by data scientists in electronic commerce propose RF algorithms as the method
of choice (Vanderveld et al. 2016; Chamberlain et al. 2017). Mobile app datasets
are similar to clickstream data commonly available in electronic commerce (Bucklin
and Sismeiro 2009) and RFs have indeed been successfully applied to the prediction
of purchase decisions in freemium mobile apps (Sifa et al. 2015). Their strong per-
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Figure 4.2: Behavioral similarity of future free and paying users
Notes: Distributions of user behaviors during the first week of app use after download, for future
free and premium users. Behavioral outcome level on the x-, probability density on the y-axis.
While future premium users are more engaged with the app on average, the distributions overlap
substantially.
formance in consumer behavior prediction more widely has also been shown, e.g.,
Lemmens and Croux (2006) or Coussement et al. (2017).
The mentioned applications of RFs (Lemmens and Croux 2006; Vanderveld et al.
2016; Chamberlain et al. 2017) follow an approach akin to a machine learning an-
gle that does not derive methods from explicit consideration of consumer behavior.
While less routed in behavioral axioms and oftentimes less effective at providing
conceptual insight, such an approach has merits in being agnostic to input data
format (Zhang et al. 1998) and assumptions on the data generating process. New
data sources that become available over time can be flexibly added to the models
(see Section 4.3.3) and predictions can be obtained from diverse sets of input data
that may include no or limited accounts of purchase behavior. This flexibility is ben-
eficial to demand prediction in mobile apps where categorical device information,
behavioral data from product use, and purchase information all help predict con-
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Figure 4.3: Importance of features/variables for prediction of future premium
demand
Notes: Variable importance visualization as derived from Random Forest predictor. See Sec-
tions 4.3.2, 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 for details.
sumer purchase behavior (Sifa et al. 2015; Runge et al. 2016; also see Figure 4.2). It
is further particularly useful in freemium settings more broadly where many future
purchasers have not made a purchase at time of prediction and the share of overall
premium purchasers is relatively small, leading to class imbalance.
The conversion profiles in Figure 4.1 highlight this: A week after app download
(which is the maximum amount of data we make available to predictors in this study,
see Section 4.3.3 for a more detailed outline of the underlying reasoning), only about
a third of the final share of premium purchasers – that the profile converges to – has
materialized. And the final share of premium purchasers is relatively rare with only
a low single digit percentage of initial adopters ever making a purchase. Figure 4.3
further shows variable importance as derived from the RF learner: Non-purchase
related variables surface close to the top, corroborating their value to the prediction
of future premium demand in freemium apps.
In summary, the prediction of future demand in freemium settings is complicated
by the following characteristics:
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1. Varied behavioral data, both purchase and non-purchase related, are relevant
to the prediction (Sifa et al. 2015, Figures 4.3 and 4.4 on the next two pages).
2. As commonly only a small share of users ever purchases a premium upgrade,
the prediction target is strongly imbalanced (Weiss 2004).
3. Behavioral outcomes are characterized by discontinuities, limiting the effec-
tiveness of linear learners (Dawes and Corrigan 1974).
4. For the concrete managerial problem studied here, as managers want predic-
tions as early as possible after users’ download of an app, purchase histories
are short or non-existent.
There however also are benefits to be considered towards a solution for the
identified managerial problem: Freemium models can commonly be found in digital
settings where firms can log users’ digital footprint in databases in a fully automated
fashion, providing a large amount of data for estimation. Together with recent
developments in computational power, this availability of labeled data makes the
application of a data-driven approach attractive. We turn to such an approach.
The remainder of this Section motivates our choice in more detail.
4.2.2 Neural networks and choice prediction
Artificial NNs are computing systems inspired by the structure of biological brains
(McCulloch and Pitts 1943; West et al. 1997). They are learning frameworks that can
accommodate diverse other learning techniques and connect a set of input nodes,
the input layer, to a set of output nodes, the output layer (Kumar et al. 1995;
Briesch and Rajagopal 2010; more on this in Section 4.3.4, also see Figure 4.6 on
page 89). Commonly, a simple NN will have one layer of “hidden” nodes between
the input and output layer (Hu and Tsoukalas 2003). Together with other key
properties of the NN, i.e., its connectivity (fully connected, feedforward, recurrent)
and its nodes’ activation function (hyperbolic tangent, logistic, sigmoid), these layers
(number of layers, number of nodes per layer) establish the network’s topology.
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Figure 4.4: Scatter plots of premium demand versus purchases and played game
rounds
Notes: Scatter plots of premium demand in USD (essentially overall spending of a user on in-app
purchases, for details see Section 4.3.1) versus purchases (top panels) and played game rounds
(bottom panels) over the whole observation period; full data on the left, zoomed in on users with
premium demand less than 900 USD (99th percentile) on the right. Each dot reflects a user. Many
different behavioral profiles lead to similar premium demand, and many similar behavioral profiles
lead to different premium demand, indicating diversity in choice paths and non-linear associations
in user behavior. A large part of users clustering around the y-axis in the bottom charts play
thousands of game rounds, but never make a purchase. Other users spend hundreds of dollars and
only play a few hundred rounds.
Deep-NNs are networks with several hidden layers (LeCun et al. 2015). The high
flexibility of NNs’, particularly deep ones’, structure is what awards them with the
universal approximation property, i.e., their ability to approximate most classes
of linear and non-linear continuous functions to arbitrary precision (Hornik 1991).
This property in turn enables them to predict consumer behavior outcomes that
show discontinuities for similar levels of certain predictor variables (West et al.
1997, Figures 4.2 and 4.4).
Interestingly, while NNs have found wide application to forecasting more broadly
(Zhang et al. 1998; Lessmann et al. 2015), applications of NNs to the prediction of fu-
ture demand in marketing are somewhat sparse to date (Müller-Navarra et al. 2015),
and applications of deep learning are virtually non-existent. Hu and Tsoukalas
(2003) consider a simple NN topology with one hidden layer to investigate con-
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sumers’ choice of communication modes in telephony. Kim et al. (2005) apply NNs
in combination with genetic algorithms to the prediction of auto insurance demand
and find the NN approach to be beneficial when managers have clear decision crite-
ria. Glady et al. 2009 find cost-sensitive classification techniques to be more profit-
optimal for the prediction of churn via customer lifetime value and use a NN as part
of their benchmarking methods. Their NN’s architecture however does not receive
explicit attention and is not “deep,” i.e., it does not have several hidden layers. Bri-
esch and Rajagopal (2010) consider applications of NNs in consumer research. The
network in their regression tasks has one hidden layer with three nodes (note that
the final network of the present study has four hidden layers with hundreds of nodes,
see Figure 4.6 for details). The network in their non-linear principal components
analysis application is a rare exploration of a deep architecture, however applied to
the identification of behavioral constructs rather than future demand. Moro et al.
(2015) explicitly consider NNs to predict the demand for long-term bank deposits.
Their NN has one hidden layer and is hence not deep either. One reason for the
scarcity of deep learning-related studies is deep-NNs’ high need for computational
resources and large samples. This limitation has however been alleviated in recent
years due to advances in computation (LeCun et al. 2015) and digitization enabling
the collection and storage of large and dense labeled datasets (Lambrecht et al.
2014).
Kumar et al. 1995 compare NNs and logistic regression for the prediction of
managerial choices and highlight both advantages and challenges. West et al. (1997)
study NNs in the context of consumer choice prediction and find them to be par-
ticularly useful for their ability to capture non-linearities in consumer behavior.
Figure 4.2 shows that many consumers in freemium settings use a product to a
similar extent as a future paying user, but never make a purchase. This suggests
that they use decision rules where no price can entice them to purchase a premium
upgrade even if the expected complementarity from said upgrade is large as they
use the product a lot.
4.2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 81
To leverage the availability of dense records of consumers’ digital footprints,
and to overcome complications 1, 3 and 4 mentioned in the previous Section 4.2.1,
the present study applies a NN approach to the prediction of future demand in a
freemium mobile app. Over and above extant literature, the NN topology considers
several hidden layers (and is hence “deep”) to maximize flexibility in learning dis-
continuous outcomes from consumer choices. The study further exposes both the
learning process – an extensive hyper parameter grid search as described in Sec-
tion 4.3.4 – and the final network’s topology in detail. The best performing NN has
four hidden layers, for a total of six layers with input and output layer. The authors
additionally introduce a synthetic oversampling technique, speaking to complica-
tion 2 in Section 4.2.1, and further aiding the NN’s performance. The next section
provides background on this technique.
4.2.3 Synthetic oversampling
Relevant behavioral prediction targets in clickstream datasets are often character-
ized by class imbalance (Lessmann 2004; Weiss 2004), e.g., the share of converting
users is small compared to all users exploring an electronic commerce website (Moe
2003; Moe and Fader 2004). This imbalance is mostly caused by rare classes rather
than rare events (Weiss 2004) as the number of observed entities is usually large.
Commonly, correct prediction of rare entities entails the higher value proposition.
This is certainly the case for premium users in freemium settings, but also for conver-
sions on a website or an ad, and the prediction of user disengagement (Coussement
et al. 2017). Conventional supervised machine learning methods tend to lean to-
wards the majority class especially when dealing with highly unbalanced datasets
(Weiss 2004). The dataset used here is highly unbalanced as is representative of
freemium datasets more broadly: Premium users commonly only make up a low sin-
gle digit percent of the overall user base (Lee et al. 2017; Runge et al. 2014, 2016).
In the dataset used in this study, the share of premium users amounts to 2.1% at
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the end of the 360-day observation period. It is generated by the app that is behind
the median conversion profile in Figure 4.1 on page 73.
To aid NNs in not overfitting, we choose a synthetic oversampling technique
(SMOTE) proposed by Chawla et al. (2002). SMOTE augments datasets in a self-
reliant manner and can be adapted to behavioral datasets (Sifa et al. 2015, 2018).
During the training phase, it creates synthetic instances that are random convex
mixings of actual instances in the minority class (Chawla et al. 2002) to regularize
the prediction models to avoid overfitting and to enable learning of structures repre-
senting minority entities. In some ways, SMOTE resembles distortion-based model
regularization techniques (Bishop 1995; Vincent et al. 2008).
In the studied freemium setting, it generates additional synthetic premium users
from actual premium users’ data records by randomly mixing a user’s count and
numeric features with these of one of its k nearest neighbors and inheriting the
original user’s categorical features.3 By oversampling the class of premium users
who spend money and have non-zero future premium demand, it reinforces the signal
contained in these app users’ “touchstream” data. This enables models to pick up
on choice paths and behavioral profiles relevant to the generation of the prediction
target. At the same time, the convex mixing of actual users’ behavioral profiles
does not just duplicate existing information, but adds noise, too. This added noise
supports NNs in avoiding overfitting to spurious associations in the data (Bishop
1995; Vincent et al. 2008).
4.2.4 Conceptual expectations
Before formally presenting the prediction problem, the data, and our estimation
approach, we wish to summarize our expectations towards the empirical analysis
based on the background provided in the previous sections: First, we expect the
3We refer the interested reader to Sifa et al. (2018) who present a detailed exposition of SMOTE
and how it can be adapted to behavioral data. We use their implementation in our analysis.
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search across different network topologies to yield a deep architecture for the best
performing NN. Second, as both NNs and RFs are able to learn non-linearities, we
expect them to outperform linear regression (LR) when it comes to making actual
zero predictions for users who use the app, but end up never making a purchase.
Third, we expect learners to be better able to identify future premium customers
when oversampling is applied. Fourth, as the dataset is large and we do not consider
computational constraints, we expect NNs to ultimately be best able to detect future
premium customers, particularly when combined with synthetic oversampling.
4.3 Method
4.3.1 The prediction problem
We define overall premium demand as the cumulative gross amount spent by a user
until day 360 (about a year) after adoption of the app. This approach is in line with
current managerial practice in the app economy (Seufert 2013). We focus on users’
spending on in-app purchases (IAPs) as advertising revenue is of low relevance in the
studied setting (Ghose and Han 2014) and the studied freemium app did not include
advertising at the time of data collection. We further disregard cost as it is virtually
zero at the margin (Lambrecht et al. 2014) and, in line with marketing practice in
this environment, we do not apply discounting (Seufert 2013). To have a consistent
prediction target outside the input data range (see Section 4.3.3), we aim to predict
users’ premium demand between day eight and 360 after product adoption. Denoting
cumulative spend on IAPs of a user along days after app download as yday j, we can
formalize the prediction problem as:
IAPfuture,i = yday 360,i − yday 7,i = f(Xt,i) (4.1)
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IAPfuture,i hence represents the total amount spent on IAPs by user i between
day eight and 360 after their respective app download. A user’s overall premium
demand is given by the sum of IAPfuture,i and yday 7,i. Xt,i captures all available click-
stream data for user i at the time of prediction t, with t ∈ {app download, one day,
three days, one week} as described in Section 4.3.3 and shown in Table 4.1. Finally,
f is the function that we want to approximate with our learners to yield user-level
predictions of future premium demand from the various input datasets – similar in
spirit to Malthouse and Blattberg (2005). We will approximate it using a NN, RF






(ŷday8−day360,i − yday8−day360,i)2 (4.2)
We choose RMSE over other error measures as it is commonly applied and has the
property to weigh larger deviations more strongly, i.e., it penalizes wrong predictions
for higher premium demand relatively more. We further choose to measure premium
demand as a continuous USD amount rather than as a binary indicator to keep
granularity high and enable learners, particularly the NN, to observe diverse choice
paths leading to differing outcomes. In a binary classification framing, the breadth of
possible outcomes would be drastically reduced, rendering the application of learners
that can discern various decision rules and paths less attractive.
4.3.2 Sample
The sample used in analysis comprises detailed tracking logs of 197,665 adopters of a
freemium mobile gaming app. Because of the sensitive revenue data made available
for this study, the data sponsor chose to remain anonymous. The app builds on
game levels that consist of visual puzzles and are arranged on a map where players
have to solve a level to access higher levels – representative of freemium gaming apps
such as Candy Crush Saga (Levitt et al. 2016). Users can make premium purchases
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Table 4.1: Overview of input data
Data layer Notation Contained input variables / features
Background Xt with
t ∈ {app download}
Country segment, device type, operating system,




t ∈ {one day,
threedays, oneweek}
Number of sessions, number of rounds, number of
active days, number of purchases, total purchase





Total score, number of lives, amount of game
currency, number of cleared puzzle elements, difficulty
level, game type, moves count, level outcome, skill
measure I, skill measure II, skill measure III
Temporal
Total inter-session time, total inter-round time, time
between daily first and last session, inter-day time
distribution, inter-session time distribution
Composite
For per-day and per-session behavioral features:
Correlation coefficients over time; first order trends;
maximum, mean, median and deviation over time
Per game type and difficulty level: Activity ratios
and entropy
Notes: Background data are available right at app download, behavioral data accumulate as users
use the app after download. Temporal and Composite features/variables are engineered to enhance
the data’s predictive power.
via IAPs that afford them with in-game currency that can then be used to enhance
gameplay and unlock paywalls (Runge et al. 2016). It had been played by close to
100 million users across Apple’s, Google’s and Facebook’s app marketplaces as of
January 2018. The data at use here originate from users on Apple’s distribution
platform.
4.3.3 Datasets
Managers’ goal is to have estimates of users’ future premium demand early on, to
take informed action as soon as possible after users’ adoption of the freemium prod-
uct or service (Malthouse and Blattberg 2005; Seufert 2013). The earliest point in
time when user data for a prediction are available to app publishers is at app down-
load – this is when categorical background data in the form of geolocation and device
information are collected (Bucklin and Sismeiro 2009). Such predictions can inform
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Figure 4.5: Future premium demand by device and country segments
Notes: Categorical meta data observed at app download (country and device characteristics) is
relevant to the prediction of premium demand: Average future premium demand in USD with 90%
confidence interval for device and country segments. Segment size noted above the x-axis.
marketers’ interaction with users right from their first moment of product/service
use.4
Behavioral data – e.g., logins to the app, played game rounds, purchases made
(see Figure 4.2 on page 76) – then are recorded in the company’s tracking logs as
consumers use the product, increasingly make choices and reveal their behavioral
patterns (Bucklin et al. 2002; Bucklin and Sismeiro 2009). Some users will disengage
early on, making future revenue contributions on their end highly unlikely while
other users will effectuate first premium purchases (Moe 2003; Moe and Fader 2004).
Similar in spirit to prior studies that assess the sensitivity of customer classifica-
tions to different amounts of data (Heilman et al. 2003), we predict future premium
demand from datasets that comprise different amounts of behavioral data and are
available at different points in time after product adoption. As behavioral data in
apps display a weekly periodicity (see Figure 4.1 on page 73), we opt for increments
in behavioral data up to a week (Heilman et al. 2003). This yields the following
datasets for prediction:
4To exemplify the predictive value of the geolocation and device information available at app
download, Figure 4.5 shows future premium demand for different device and country groups as
used by the marketing managers and analysts of the data sponsor.
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1. Background data only (Xapp download; see Table 4.1);
2. Background data and behavioral data from users’ first day (Xone day);
3. Background data and behavioral data from users’ first three days (Xthree days);
4. Background data and behavioral data from users’ first week in the product
(Xone week).
We include the complete digital footprint logged by the company’s databases in
the datasets used for prediction. Table 4.1 presents an overview of the variables
contained in these datasets. Before training prediction models, we enriched data
by adding two additional layers; a temporal layer that captures inter-event time
distributions and a composite layer that contains correlations, trends and deviations
of features over time.
We further apply synthetic oversampling. We rely on the adaptation of SMOTE
to behavioral datasets presented in Sifa et al. (2018). SMOTE is applied to datasets
2, 3 and 4 above that contain behavioral data, yielding a total of seven datasets.
We synthetically oversample the minority class of 2.1% premium users by factors of
5, 10 and 20 to generate shares of premium users close to 10, 20 and 30% which are
considered thresholds for (strong) imbalance in datasets (Weiss 2004). We find 5 to
provide the best results (note that oversampling is only applied on training and not
on testing data). The oversampled datasets that we use to train models hence have
a share of 9.5% premium users instead of the 2.1% in the baseline dataset.
4.3.4 Estimation and learner implementation
Marketing models are often estimated and evaluated based on a time-separated
holdout group (Fader et al. 2005; Dziurzynski et al. 2012). This approach is routed
in the firm’s problem to generate predictions about future behavior(s) of a set of
current customers at current time. In the estimation and evaluation of machine
learning models, researchers often apply cross-validation for estimation of the model
on the training sample (Angermueller et al. 2016; Yadav and Shukla 2016). K-fold
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cross-validation splits the sample into k random folds and uses k-1 for training and
one fold for testing until each fold has been used for testing. Another common
approach splits data into a training, validation and holdout set (Surrette 2019).
A random training sample is used to estimate the model, the – mostly small –
validation sample is used to validate the estimate and re-estimate the model if e.g.,
the difference in estimate between training and validation sample is large, and the
holdout sample is finally used to cleanly evaluate the overall model. We adopt this
approach for our grid search of the best hyper parameters.
We implement NNs as fully connected feed-forward multilayer perceptrons (Hornik
1991). The grid search spans between one to four hidden layers with 50 to 150 neu-
rons (in steps of 10) each and three different activation functions for neurons –
hyperbolic tangent (tanh), sigmoidal (LeCun et al. 1998) and rectified linear unit
(ReLU – Glorot et al. 2011), yielding a total of 4 x 11 x 3 = 132 hyper parameter
combinations to consider. We apply backpropagation based on a batched gradient
descent optimizer with an adaptive learning rate (Kingma and Ba 2014) to learn
the weights of neurons. We further apply dropout regularization (Srivastava et al.
2014) in addition to SMOTE to avoid overfitting and improve generalization (Bishop
1995; Vincent et al. 2008). Dropout regularization randomly blinds different por-
tions of the weights during training (Srivastava et al. 2014). Estimations for NNs
were implemented on TensorFlow using the Python library Keras. RF and LR were
implemented as available in the package Scikitlearn in the programming language
Python. SMOTE was adapted from Sifa et al. (2018). For RFs, we tested config-
urations with 50 to 250 trees. The only parameter tuned for LR is the intercept,
otherwise the resulting model coincides with the model identified on the full training
sample. Each individual learner is optimized by minimizing root mean squared error
(RMSE) of predictions (see Equation 4.2 on page 84). We choose RMSE over other
error measures to penalize large deviations.
It should be noted that our approach focuses on cross-sectional estimation and
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Figure 4.6: Visualization of the final network’s topology
Notes: Topology of the best performing NN as identified in a grid search on the most complete
dataset containing background data and a week of behavioral observations. Note the feedforward
structure where neurons in one layer have no lateral connections. Layers are fully connected and
neurons have a hyperbolic tangent activation function.
validation as mentioned above. To be effective for temporally separated use, i.e.,
estimation based on current users and prediction on future users, this approach
requires the assumption of stationarity of the data generating process over time. This
assumption is often reasonable and prediction models’ robustness can be increased
by either devising an explicit temporal validation of estimations or by continuously
retraining the model with newly arriving data and, e.g., overweighting more recent
observations in model estimation.
4.4 Results
We split the data 50/10/40, with 50% of data being used for training, 10% for
validation of model performance and 40% as a holdout sample. The 10% validation
sample is used to validate grid search results obtained on the 50% training sample
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and to tune hyper parameters until results on training and validation sample closely
coincide. Results presented in this section are obtained from ten draws without
replacement on the 40% holdout sample. These bootstraps are used to generate
confidence intervals around RMSE and hit rate results and provide an indication of
statistically significant differences between results.
We use and report RMSE mainly for diagnostic reasons. To evaluate the learners
as to their managerial usefulness, we focus on the different algorithms’ hit rates5 as
derived from a sorting of users by their demand prediction (Malthouse and Blattberg
2005; Lemmens and Gupta 2020). We sort users by their predicted future premium
demand and consider different ratios of the upper end of this ranking. The hit
rate then informs us how many actual premium users we correctly predict when
we consider these different ratios of the prediction-sorted sample (Malthouse and
Blattberg 2005).
The grid search – for details on the grid that we searched across see Section 4.3.4
– identified a NN topology as shown in Figure 4.6 as best performing in terms
of achieving lowest RMSE. The best performing NN has four hidden layers and a
hyperbolic tangent activation function (see Figure 4.6). This result speaks to our
first conceptual expectation formulated in Section 4.2.4: A deep-NN architecture
appears to outperform NNs with a lower number of hidden layers. In the following,
we first present what variables are relevant to the prediction based on the RF learner
and RMSE results before centering in on hit rates, i.e., how well different learners
do on different datasets in the identification of future paying customers.
4.4.1 Variable importance and RMSE
Figure 4.3 – in line with existing literature (Fader et al. 2005; Malthouse and Blat-
tberg 2005; Voigt and Hinz 2016) – shows that purchase-related variables surface
5We define hit rates equivalently to recall as the number of true positives (here: correctly
identified future paying customers) over the sum of true positives and false negatives (here: the
total number of future paying customers).
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as most important for prediction of premium demand, but usage-related features
such as number of rounds, inter-session time and measures of users’ skill also surface
as relevant predictors (Moe and Fader 2004; Sifa et al. 2015). Figure 4.7 depicts
average RMSE with 95% confidence intervals for all learners and five different input
datasets. Confidence intervals are obtained from ten draws without replacement
on the holdout sample. We report RMSE for two distinct user groups: All users
and premium users only. While these groups are not known at prediction time, the
ex-post segmentation allows us to understand how the relative performance of the
methods differs between non-paying and paying users.
The key difference that emerges between learners speaks to the second conceptual
expectation that we formulated in Section 4.2.4. LR underperforms for predictions
on the full user base (upper panel of Figure 4.7). The RMSE for LR spikes when
behavioral data are added compared to predicting only from categorical background
data, both with and without oversampling. This underperformance is driven by
LR’s inability to successfully learn the discontinuity that users display at the zero-
price point. It becomes salient when behavioral data are added as usage-related
data make premium and non-premium users look similar in a linear perspective as
illustrated in Figure 4.2. Figure 4.4 also depicts an angle to rationalize this: Many
non-premium users play just as many or more rounds than premium users. LR
cannot predict the discontinuity in consumer behavior resulting from a decision rule
of the sort “I will not spend money regardless how many rounds of this game I play.”
In the words of West et al. (1997), “neural network models can offer significant
improvement over traditional statistical methods because of their ability to capture
nonlinear relationships” (p. 1).
The lower panel of 4.7 further substantiates this insight. When we remove the
zero-point non-linearity and only consider RMSE in the segment of premium users,
the underperformance of LR disappears and all of LR, NN and RF perform similarly
well. LR’s underperformance is hence routed in non-zero predictions for actual zero
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Figure 4.7: RMSE results for different input datasets across for all users and for
premium users only
Notes: RMSE results (mean with 95% confidence interval) for different learners as obtained on
the holdout sample for three different datasets with and without synthetic oversampling. Note
that synthetic oversampling is only applied to behavioral datasets as described in Section 4.3.3.
The upper panel shows RMSE for all users, the lower panel for premium users. Results for LR are
highlighted in grey to emphasize how it underperforms for predictions across all users, but not when
only considering premium users. The reason for this is LR’s inability to learn the discontinuity at
the zero-price point: Some users will never spend money regardless how much they use the app, LR
cannot learn this non-linearity in consumer behavior while RF and deep-NN can (Einhorn 1970;
West et al. 1997).
premium demand users (that are no longer included in the results in the lower
panel). Figure 4.7 further suggests that RF can learn such nonlinearities in our
context similarly well as a deep-NN.
Overall, there are no differences in RMSE between RF and NN (upper panel),
but both perform better than LR. Mild improvements in RMSE become apparent
for an increasing amount of behavioral data, the application of oversampling, and
for the Deep-NN over the other learners when we consider premium users only and
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Table 4.2: Complete overview of hit rate results
Input data SMOTE Method Top 5% Top 10% Top 15% Top 20% Top 25% Top 30%
App
download No
LR 14.28% 26.51% 36.00% 46.11% 52.00% 56.77%
RF 14.19% 23.50% 34.95% 44.55% 50.03% 58.37%
Deep-NN 14.15% 25.43% 35.89% 45.56% 52.41% 56.89%
One day
No
LR 25.76% 41.50% 54.90% 64.14% 70.81% 75.50%
RF 18.45% 31.14% 40.64% 50.23% 57.31% 63.63%
Deep-NN 29.19% 44.01% 56.87% 65.31% 71.82% 76.73%
Yes
LR 28.23% 44.58% 56.97% 65.56% 72.73% 77.09%
RF 21.85% 34.28% 45.37% 56.33% 65.19% 71.14%
Deep-NN 29.84% 45.30% 56.99% 66.23% 72.47% 77.84%
Three days
No
LR 36.55% 50.63% 60.63% 68.31% 73.69% 77.54%
RF 28.62% 39.74% 49.48% 57.72% 63.98% 70.38%
Deep-NN 40.31% 54.05% 63.16% 70.62% 76.70% 80.84%
Yes
LR 36.48% 49.87% 59.61% 67.42% 74.20% 78.23%
RF 31.35% 42.73% 53.23% 62.64% 69.58% 75.04%
Deep-NN 40.78% 53.55% 63.39% 70.88% 77.16% 81.32%
One week
No
LR 40.94% 52.23% 61.10% 68.26% 72.86% 76.33%
RF 34.62% 45.14% 53.85% 60.42% 67.37% 75.45%
Deep-NN 43.22% 55.93% 64.80% 71.09% 75.91% 80.07%
Yes
LR 38.79% 52.09% 62.32% 69.06% 73.86% 78.91%
RF 37.56% 47.95% 56.51% 64.50% 71.14% 76.60%
Deep-NN 42.73% 56.20% 65.59% 72.46% 78.58% 83.24%
Notes: Mean hit rates for different ratios of the demand prediction-ranked sample and for the
different datasets as described in Section 4.3.3, obtained from ten random draws without replace-
ment on the 40% holdout sample. Reading help: The bottom entry in the last column tells us
that, when targeting the top 30% of the demand prediction-ranked sample, the deep-NN predictor
trained on synthetically oversampled data will reach 83.24% of future premium users. Deep-NN
results on oversampled data are highlighted through italics as they provide the overall best hit rate.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 visualize a subset of the results shown here to highlight the results’ sensitivity
to the size of the top x% considered for the hit rate and to the amount of behavioral data included
in the prediction.
move towards the right of the lower panel in Figure 4.7. Average future premium de-
mand is $1.17 across all users and $55.01 for premium users. The square percentage
error of predictions over actuals expressed as RMSE divided by actual future pre-
mium demand in the respective user segment is hence at around 2000% for all users
and 250% for premium users. These high error numbers suggest that mobile app
clickstream data only poorly capture the actual data generating process of (future)
premium demand in freemium settings which is in line with findings by Bucklin and
Sismeiro (2009) for clickstream data (more on this in Section 4.5).
4.4.2 Hit rates: Predicting future paying customers
In practice, marketers often rely on a sorting of users in terms of future value to
inform interactions with consumers (Malthouse and Blattberg 2005; Lemmens and
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Figure 4.8: Hit rates for different ratios of users sorted by demand predictions
Notes: Mean hit rates with 95% confidence intervals as obtained from ten random draws without
replacement on the 40% holdout sample. Synthetic oversampling was not applied to the background
data available at app download, hence the figure only shows results for non-oversampled data
there. Underlying values are listed in Table 4.2. Results for the deep-NN combined with synthetic
oversampling are highlighted in grey. It performs best on average and significantly so for larger
top x percentage shares of the prediction-ranked user list.
Gupta 2020) and the allocation of marketing budget to different channels where
channels with high shares of future premium customers may receive more resources
(Blattberg and Deighton 1996). To assess the effectiveness of the different learners in
providing this decision support, we sort users based on the individual-level demand
predictions from high to low. We use this sorted user list to analyze the hit rate (or
recall) for actual premium users along the obtained ranking.
Figure 4.8 presents these hit rates for different top ratios of the sorted list. As
we can see from a comparison of hit rates with and without synthetic oversampling,
all learners benefit from SMOTE on average. This insight speaks to our third
conceptual expectation formulated in Section 4.2.4: Learners are better able to
identify future premium customers when oversampling is applied. Figure 4.8 further
shows that, when a larger share of the user prediction-ranking is considered, and
particularly when synthetic oversampling is applied, the deep-NN outperforms the
other methods (as indicated by the 95% confidence intervals around the mean hit
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Figure 4.9: Hit rates for top 30% of users for different datasets with synthetic
oversampling
Notes: Mean hit rates with 95% confidence intervals as obtained from ten random draws without
replacement on the 40% holdout sample. Underlying values are listed in Table 4.2.
rate for different ratios). This confirms our fourth and last conceptual expectation in
Section 4.2.4 that a deep-NN will be best able to identify future premium customers
in this setting with diverse choice paths and non-linear decision rules.
With a week of behavioral data and oversampling, the deep-NN is able to iden-
tify 83.2% of actual future premium users when we consider the top 30% of the
prediction-ranked user list (see Table 4.2 that summarizes all hit rates underlying
Figures 4.8 and 4.9). The same figure is at 78.9% for LR and 76.6% for RF. This
difference is statistically significant per Figure 4.8. Using a deep-NN and SMOTE,
marketers are able to identify future premium users more accurately and can use
this information to inform interactions in customer relationship management. We
will discuss concrete examples in Section 4.5.1.
Figure 4.9 shows results on oversampled data for different amounts (from none to
a week) of behavioral data per the different input datasets described in Section 4.3.3.
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It corroborates that more behavioral data improve prediction performance for all
learners (Heilman et al. 2003). It further shows that the outperformance of the
deep-NN over the other learners materializes as more days of behavioral data are
added and hence more information describing consumer choices are made available
to learners. This observation seems sensible as the deep-NN is expected to more
fully develop its universal approximation property the more data are available to it
(West et al. 1997; LeCun et al. 2015). Table 4.2 summarizes all hit rates underlying
Figures 4.8 and 4.9.
4.5 Discussion
In freemium settings such as the app economy (Arora et al. 2017; Ghose and Han
2014), a small share of users drives revenue and co-finances free provision of the
product (and development of new products) for all users (Bapna et al. 2017). In
the app studied here, only 2.1% of users purchase a premium upgrade which is
representative of such settings (Shi et al. 2015; Lee et al. 2017; Gu et al. 2018). The
existence and retention of premium users is essential to firms’ survival (Shi et al.
2019). Marketers wish to identify these users early after their adoption of an app,
to tailor and target marketing initiatives for retention of existing and acquisition of
new users of this kind.
In speaking to this quantitative managerial problem, the present study leans into
deep learning that has achieved breakthrough success in other fields (LeCun et al.
2015; Angermueller et al. 2016). (Deep) NNs suggest themselves for application in
freemium settings as they can flexibly learn non-linear decision rules that cannot
be discerned by linear learners (West et al. 1997). Such decision rules originate
from the documented difficulty to remove certain consumers from a zero-price point
(Shampanier et al. 2007). While these consumers use a freemium product in a similar
way as a premium user (see Figures 4.2 and 4.4), they keep “sampling” for free and
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never spend money (Bawa and Shoemaker 2004). The authors compare a deep-
NN’s ability to identify future paying customers among app users to the ability of
a RF and a linear learner. They further present a synthetic oversampling approach
(Chawla et al. 2002) to reduce class imbalance that additionally has a regularization
effect (Bishop 1995; Vincent et al. 2008). Its application benefits all learners and
particularly the NN that emerges as a capable detector of future paying customers.
This section discusses how the presented methodology can assist marketers before
highlighting limitations of the presented work and pathways for future research.
4.5.1 Informing marketers’ interactions
If the firm was to blindly target users without data-driven decision support, it could
reach 30% of future premium users by targeting a random 30% of users. Our deep
learning-based approach can target 83.2% of actual future premium users by target-
ing the top 30% of prediction-sorted users (see Table 4.2 on page 93). This clearly
is an improvement (of 53.2 %-points) over the naive baseline, but also outperforms
both the linear and RF learners by more than four percentage points (see Table 4.2
on page 93 for details). Speaking to substantive applications, these results can be
leveraged to inform marketers’ interactions in several areas (Blattberg and Deighton
1996; Berger and Nasr 1998; Heilman et al. 2003):6
• Customer acquisition: Marketing managers like to evaluate newly acquired
users through digital display or search engine advertising (Zenetti et al. 2014;
Guhl et al. 2016) as to their expected revenue contribution (Seufert 2013). This
practice is used to ensure that advertising budget expensed on acquisition of
new users does not exceed these users’ expected future revenue contributions
(Blattberg and Deighton 1996; Seufert 2013).
• Customer service: Future paying customers can be prioritized in customer
6These examples are intended to illustrate possible applications. We however cannot and do
not intend to make statements as to the causal impact of the discussed applications. Identifying
these requires experimentation and/or further analysis.
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service. While the wider product may be operated using chat bots (Sivara-
makrishnan et al. 2007), high-value prospects can be contacted by a dedicated
human customer service agent. Concretely, marketers could decide to handle
requests from the top 20% of prediction-sorted users using human rather than
machine agents. This ensures that 72.5% of future paying customers receive
high-quality responses, but it will reduce workload for human agents by 80%
compared to handling all users’ requests (assuming requests come in equally
across users).
• In-app advertising: Many apps and digital news outlets monetize their user
base by exposing them to advertising (Lambrecht and Misra 2016; Halbheer
et al. 2014; Ghose and Han 2014). Marketers may choose not to expose future
paying customers to advertising to ensure a seamless product experience for
them (Calder et al. 2009). E.g., the firm can decide to not expose the top 30%
of the prediction-sorted user list to advertising – which ensures that 83.2% of
paying customers have a seamless product experience. At the same time, this
approach will remove 28.3% of non-paying users from advertising exposure.
So, if the firm deems advertising exposure of non-premium users important, it
may want to set a different cut-off to define premium customers and, e.g., only
consider the top 10% of the prediction-sorted user list as premium customers.
• Promotions and personalized pricing: Marketers are likely to benefit from ex-
tending targeted promotional offers that raise awareness for relevant premium
upgrades (Zhang and Wedel 2009). Our predictions can inform this targeting,
e.g., marketers can avoid giving small and/or low price point offers to high-
value prospects. Predictions can further be an input for price personalization
policies (Misra et al. 2019).
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4.5.2 Limitations and future research
The data at use in this study (see Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3) are representative of the
datasets generally available to vendors of mobile apps. RMSE results presented in
Section 4.4.1 indicate that, despite a large sample and dense behavioral observations,
the user-level data generating process is only poorly captured. Bucklin and Sismeiro
(2009) state that “to effectively use the information, clickstream data usually needs to
be augmented and matched with other sources within the firm” (p. 46). Clickstream
data available in the app economy seem to present similar challenges. We propose
a technique (SMOTE – Chawla et al. 2002) that augments imbalanced datasets in
a self-reliant manner and improves the selected methods’ prediction performance.
In particular, it increases deep-NNs’ ability to learn a ranking of users by future
premium demand from the dataset. When facing unbalanced data more broadly,
it appears worthwhile to explore the use of (synthetic) oversampling (Chawla et al.
2002). Oversampling can further only be applied to user segments that are deemed
particularly valuable. E.g., the firm may choose to only oversample users of very
high-value, say the top 20% of paying customers (that account for more than 80% of
revenue in the studied setting). This approach can enable learners to detect users in
this segment with higher accuracy and may prove to be a valuable avenue for future
studies and applications. Another viable avenue for future inquiry may present
itself in augmenting (mobile app) clickstream data with psychological measures,
e.g., personality-related information (Kosinski et al. 2013; Matz et al. 2017).
Over the years, marketing research has produced workhorse models for the pre-
diction of future demand that are routed in models of consumer choice processes,
e.g., “buy-’til-you-die” models (Schmittlein et al. 1987; Fader et al. 2005). It seems
promising to explore adaptations of such models to detailed digital footprints of con-
sumer behavior to improve predictive accuracy (Dew and Ansari 2018). Along these
lines, stochastic models could be extended to make predictions of future purchases
from “free” app use data to compare their performance to the learners presented in
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this study. An advantage of such an approach can be its ability to provide concep-
tual insight on consumer choice processes. Speaking to this, we wish to point to
methods to derive conceptual insight from machine learning methods. We use the
RF learner to create an overview of variable importance (see Figure 4.3). Such a
list of important predictors is useful as it can provide insight into consumer choice
processes: E.g., since user skill surfaces as a meaningful predictor of future premium
demand (see Figure 4.3), managers can devise in-app tutorials to help users develop
their skills, in turn possibly positively impacting their future premium demand. Im-
portant predictors can further be used to develop more granular models of consumer
choice processes that reach beyond purchase behavior. In this sense, there are av-
enues for machine learning methods and existing marketing models to beneficially
influence each other.
We further wish to note that the implementation of NNs presents challenges.
Choosing the right topology – e.g., number of hidden layers, activation function,
connectivity between layers – is not an easy feat and requires highly trained experts
to successfully leverage NNs’ potential. Special attention needs to be placed on
avoiding overfitting – as (deep) NNs can so flexibly accommodate diverse functions
mapping inputs to outputs, they can easily overfit to associations in the data that
do not generalize. Large samples and techniques to avoid such overfitting are hence
essential (see Section 4.3.4; Srivastava et al. 2014; Bishop 1995). The training and
maintenance of NNs is further computationally expensive. Vast improvements in
computational ability over the last decades however alleviate this challenge (LeCun
et al. 2015) and researchers can assist analysts in identifying NN topologies and
training modes that work well for particular problems. The present study attempts
to achieve this: The setup detailed in Section 4.3.4 can be a starting point for an-
alysts and researchers faced with diverse consumer behavior predictions in digital
settings. Further, challenges commonly associated with NNs, namely incomprehen-
siblity and incorporation of prior knowledge, are likely to be increasingly remedied
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as researchers are starting to put machine learning methods on more robust statis-
tical foundations and, e.g., enable their use for causal inference rather than mere
prediction (Wager and Athey 2018; Alaa et al. 2017).
Finally, it should be noted that data pre-processing can impact predictor per-
formance (Crone et al. 2006; Coussement et al. 2017). Extensive pre-processing can
capture non-linearities that a NN will be able to model independently through its
hidden layers, but a LR will not be. While the authors handcraft a wide range
of input features (see Section 4.3 and Table 4.1) that support algorithms in, e.g.,
capturing non-linearities, it can be worthwhile to explicitly explore the sensitivity of
results to different data pre-processing approaches (Crone et al. 2006; Coussement
et al. 2017). A further promising line of inquiry is the use of NNs for the automated
encoding of input data (Chamberlain et al. 2017) which can increase the predictive




A Practical Evaluation of Pricing
Tactics in a Mobile Game
Julian Runge
Abstract
Apps and app stores have become the dominant distribution channel for mobile content.
As marginal cost of production and distribution are virtually zero, most apps are priced
“freemium.” Due to this particular pricing structure and the ubiquitous availability of
mobile devices, gaming has seen an unparalleled increase in demand, with mobile gaming
now accounting for three quarters of $101 billion in-app purchase revenue and 60% of overall
gaming revenues. As users sample many gaming apps, often only spending minutes or days
before disengaging, firms seek to entice as many new app adopters as possible to make an
in-app purchase – making low-price approaches attractive. Indeed, anecdotal evidence
and a survey among mobile gaming managers corroborate that low-price approaches are
common. This study conjectures that this practice is not optimal despite strong conceptual
arguments in its favor. Using bandit-based experimentation in a mobile game, the study
develops its argumentation over several field experiments, ultimately showing that firms
can achieve higher profit using a personalized skimming tactic. Findings indicate that
personalization in freemium settings can be highly profitable, and that it has potential to
increase engagement with content through increased access to premium experiences. From
a public policy perspective, results highlight that the prohibition of low-price “gateway”
offers may not be an effective measure to counter spending sprees in mobile games.
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5.1 Introduction
Smartphones have become our constant and pervasive companions (Balasubraman
et al. 2002; Einav et al. 2014; De Haan et al. 2018). They connect us to people,
businesses, entertainment and media, they assist us in structuring and organizing our
life, they help us pass time, lose weight, meditate and take medication on schedule.
Most of this functionality is provided by mobile apps that can be downloaded on app
stores such as Google’s Playstore or Apple’s Appstore (Arora et al. 2017). While
many apps were historically only available against payment of a fee (Arora et al.
2017), this practice has been upended by the success of freemium pricing (Lambrecht
and Misra 2016; Gu et al. 2018): The vast majority of apps can be downloaded and
used for free and monetizes by means of premium upgrades offered through in-app
purchases.
Facilitated by this pricing structure, smartphones’ ubiquitous availability and
apps’ ability to spur the formation of strong habits (Block 2008; Pivetta et al. 2019;
Jo et al. 2020), the “app economy” has become a mainstay of economic activity.
Consumers downloaded apps 194 billion times in 2018 and spent $101 billion on
in-app purchases in the same time period (App Annie 2018). Accounting for almost
80% of that revenue, gaming in particular has seen an unparalleled expansion of
demand, additionally fueled by online social networks that facilitate viral sharing
and network effects (Alsén et al. 2016; Sensortower 2019a). It is estimated that
50% of mobile app users play games regularly and that a global total of 2.4 billion
people will play mobile games in 2019 (Kaplan 2019). This explosive growth has not
only given rise to a large mobile gaming industry that is estimated to drive 60% of
overall revenue in the gaming vertical in 2019 (App Annie 2018, p. 20), but to the
prevalence of new types of consumer-firm interactions (Einav et al. 2014; De Haan
et al. 2018; Tong et al. 2020). Many consumers only briefly sample a specific app
and the average session length in mobile games is around ten minutes (median: six
– Gameanalytics 2019).
5.1. INTRODUCTION 105
To entice consumers to make a purchase during their mostly short interactions
with a mobile game, many firms pursue low-price approaches. Most games offer
their smallest in-app purchase for $0.99 and the median price point offered is $4.99
(McGregor 2015). Firms additionally use promotional offers – colloquially called
“starter packs” or “beginner bundles,” see Figure 5.1 – shortly after users download
an app to increase the share of paying users. This practice seems reasonable as only
a very small percentage of users makes any purchase at all and many consumers may
initially be hesitant to spend money on virtual in-game goods, but literature offers
no guidance to managers in how far their current practice is optimal or could be
improved. This study draws on a longstanding stream of literature cautioning that
low-price approaches can harm longer-term revenue generation (Lattin and Bucklin
1989; Blattberg et al. 1995; Mela et al. 1997; Dekimpe et al. 1998; Jedidi et al. 1999;
Anderson and Simester 2004) and conjectures that current managerial practice may
not be optimal. The analysis is developed over six large-scale field experiments
in a popular mobile game and shows that pricing according to current managerial
guidance indeed does not lead to highest profit.
Results and the used experimentation approach provide direct guidance to man-
agers how they can more profitably price in-app purchase offers in mobile games.
The experimentation approach also promises to be applicable well beyond the fo-
cal setting, e.g., to learn price paths when a new product is launched or for a
subscription on a news website. The study further contributes to the literature by
empirically studying price personalization (Pigou 2017; Rossi et al. 1996) in a highly
connected online business-to-consumer (B2C) setting. To the authors’ best knowl-
edge, existing studies of the matter either work with model-based counterfactuals
(Acquisti and Varian 2005; Shiller 2020) or are situated in a business-to-business
(B2B) setting (Dubé et al. 2017a) where purchase decisions tend to be less emo-
tional (Odlyzko 2004; Chatterjee and McGinnis 2010) and customer backlash less
likely (Martinez 2014; Sinclair 2017). This paper further contributes to literature on
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pricing by adapting skimming to the setting of mobile apps and evaluating its mer-
its vis-a-vis a flat-price tactic in a fully randomized experiment (Shapiro 1983; Nair
2007). On the methodological front, the study speaks to recent advances in firm
experimentation, specifically the use of bandit methods to aid in the efficiency of
experimentation (Li et al. 2010; Schwartz et al. 2017; Sutton and Barto 2018; Misra
et al. 2019). Reports on the application of such methods to marketing problems are
rare but much needed. The current analysis is novel in concatenating several bandits
with different reward specifications to emulate a pricing manager who attempts to
implement a profitable skimming tactic.
The paper proceeds by providing conceptual background and background on
the empirical setting, before presenting the analysis. To facilitate presentation, the
analysis is structured into four studies that build on each other. Finally, the paper
discusses results – including results of a survey among managers corroborating the
widespread use of low-price approaches – and concludes.
5.2 Conceptual and Empirical Background
5.2.1 Pricing in-app purchases in mobile games
Similar to other freemium content, mobile games offer a basic version for free in
perpetuity and premium upgrades such as virtual currency, boosts and other game
enhancing virtual goods through in-app purchases and occasionally in subscriptions
(Levitt et al. 2016; Lehdonvirta 2009; Runge et al. 2019). This particular flavor of
freemium pricing is commonly called “free-to-play.”
For the purposes of illustration, I will compare and liken the experience of a
free-to-play gaming app with the experience at an amusement arcade. Consumers
can enter the arcade (download the app) anytime, and freely select how long they
stay. While arcades can charge an upfront fee, they often do not, similar to the
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Figure 5.1: “Beginner’s bundle” and in-app store in the mobile game Candy Crush
Saga
Notes: New user promotion (“beginner’s bundle”) and in-app store selling premium virtual currency
in the mobile game Candy Crush Saga.
download and start of most gaming apps. While the arcade will usually have opening
and closing times and consumers will have to travel there, the app is available
anytime and anywhere as people will commonly carry their mobile phone with them,
virtually eliminating access frictions. Consumers will often visit the arcade in a
group, but download the app by themselves – often at the recommendation of a
friend or family member (Trusov et al. 2009; Alsén et al. 2016) – to then connect
with other consumers (players) in the app if the app offers such functionality, and
in online forums and chat apps auxiliary to the app.
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Both the app and the store offer a number of complementary entertainment op-
tions, with gaming apps commonly offering a number of these completely for free
in perpetuity – spurring continued sampling, the creation of habit and user reten-
tion (Bawa and Shoemaker 2004; Li et al. 2018; Eisingerich et al. 2019). Further
(premium) entertainment options are available for a fee, through in-app purchases.
Prices in the arcade will be uniform across consumers and possibly seasonally ad-
justed, e.g., to be lower in periods of low demand. Prices for (premium) experiences
in the game app on the other hand can be controlled at the individual level as digital
surfaces can be flexibly customized. The firm could charge each user a custom price.
Further, while experiences in the arcade are a rival good and marginal cost of usage
is greater than zero, in the gaming app they are non-rival and have zero marginal
cost for the firm (Lambrecht et al. 2014). The price floors and supply mechanics
in both settings are hence different: Any price greater than zero is profitable for a
firm selling add-on experiences in a gaming app and it can sell infinitely much of
an experience. Theoretically, in the gaming app, the firm could hence engage in
first-degree price discrimination (Pigou 2017; Dubé and Misra 2017; Shiller 2020)
and profitably charge each user her willingness to pay for a given in-app purchase
as it does not incur marginal cost of production or distribution.
In reality, there are three main challenges to this approach: First, platform op-
erators provide price tiers that are geographically “optimized” and binding to app
publishers that hence cannot price continuously. Second, the firm does not know
individual users’ willingness-to-pay (Rothschild 1974). While platform operators
observe plentiful information on users (location, demographic, behavior across the
app ecosystem and mobile web, and even financial if offering a credit card such as
Apple) app publishers can only observe some device and geolocation information
and app use behavior of users in their app(s). This information allows a rough esti-
mation of users’ expected spending on in-app purchases and willingness-to-pay (Sifa
et al. 2018), and allows for third-degree price discrimination, i.e., within customer
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segments (Pigou 2017; Dubé and Misra 2017). Third, and most importantly: Mo-
bile app users and especially gamers are very well-connected and share in-depth and
ample information on forums and in chat apps (Cole and Griffiths 2007; Runge et al.
2019). Hence, there is a high degree of shared knowledge. Attempts to charge dif-
ferent prices for the same in-app purchase at the same time were historically quickly
reversed by companies due to customer backlash (Martinez 2014; Sinclair 2017).
In practice, gaming apps usually offer different amounts of in-game virtual cur-
rency through in-app purchases at the price tiers set by the platform operator (most
often Apple or Google). This in-game currency can then be used to buy in-game
premium experiences such as boosts to beat levels, new characters or outfits, or
other goods that enhance users’ experience (Lehdonvirta 2009; Levitt et al. 2016;
Gu et al. 2018; Li et al. 2018; Runge et al. 2019). Many publishers additionally offer
promotional bundles of in-game goods and currency to users very early after app
adoption (colloquially called “starter packs” or “beginner bundles”). These bundles
are usually priced rather low (e.g., between $0.99 to $4.99) and promoted through
in-app popups (e.g., see Figure 5.1) that often start appearing during first use of the
app. They are akin to premium samples that intend to get users “hooked” on pre-
mium experiences and in-app purchasing (Bawa and Shoemaker 2004; Alter 2017;
Eisingerich et al. 2019). The price of such a “starter pack” is the focal treatment
manipulated in this study. As I vary price, I vary the quantities of bundled in-game
goods to keep unit price fluctuations low, to ensure that users do not feel treated
unfairly should they discuss the different versions of the offer (Huang et al. 2005;
Chatterjee and McGinnis 2010; Li et al. 2019).
5.2.2 Research question
This study’s main research question is: How can firms marketing mobile games use
in-app purchase pricing and promotion to improve relevant economic outcomes, in
particular monetization and engagement among new app adopters? While the scope
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Figure 5.2: Word counts in customer reviews on Google’s Playstore
Notes: “Addictive” is the by far most used word when consumers describe mobile game experiences.
of this analysis focuses on the perspective of firms, I extend the discussion to the
perspectives of consumers and regulators in the final sections. In investigating this
question, I focus on the evaluation of different pricing tactics for a new user in-
app purchase promotion. Table 5.1 on page 121 gives an overview of the different
versions of this promotion used in experimentation. I choose this approach because
setting different (unit) prices for “normal” in-app purchases is practically infeasible as
discussed in Section 5.2.1 on page 106. A main challenge is the high connectedness of
users in this setting, making customer backlash very likely (Chatterjee and McGinnis
2010; Sinclair 2017). In the following, I will further develop the research question
vis-a-vis existing literature.
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5.2.2.1 Should the firm set a low or a high initial price?
Managerial practice seems to favor a low-price approach for starter offers as sup-
ported by a survey among 54 mobile game managers conducted by the authors:
25.9% of managers set a price lower than $3, 59.3% a price lower than $5 and 96.3%
a price lower than $10; excluding data scientists, these numbers are 27.5%, 65%
and 100% of managers (N=40; question 10 on page 158). Managers believe they
can sell users more after they have “hooked” them at an attractive lower price (Eyal
2014; Alter 2017). Risk aversion may be another reason leading managers to favor
a low-price approach – I discuss the survey and its results in Section 5.5.2 and in
Appendix A1 in more detail.
Four conceptual arguments support the choice of a low-price approach: First,
online play is considered strongly habit forming (Eyal 2014). Several sources assert
that mobile games spur strong habit formation and possibly addictive consumption
patterns (Chen and Leung 2016; Kwon et al. 2016; Nevskaya and Albuquerque 2019;
Jo et al. 2020). Figure 5.2 presents anecdotal evidence supporting this notion:
“Addictive” and “addicting” are the by far most used words when consumers review
popular mobile games. Kwon et al. (2016) analyze behavior in online social games
using a rational addiction framework and find similar addiction coefficients as for
alcohol or other substances. Jo et al. (2020) and Nevskaya and Albuquerque (2019)
investigate how usage restriction policies impact consumer behavior in this setting.
In this framing, a low-price approach for an initial “starter pack” seems optimal from
the firm’s perspective as it can serve as a gateway to more intense use and purchasing.
The literature asserts that low-price approaches can sustainably increase demand for
addictive goods (Becker and Murphy 1988; Becker et al. 1991; Katz and Lavack 2002;
Chen et al. 2009; Gordon and Sun 2015). In fact, the practical viability of such an
approach is the reason that some countries prohibit the sale of single cigarettes
(Schütze 2014) and the retail sale of alcoholic beverages after certain hours (Hahn
et al. 2010). Second, while freemium’s zero-price point effectively attracts users
112 CHAPTER 5. MONETIZING FREEMIUM PLAY
to adopt a product or service, here to download an app, it has been shown that
consumers exhibit strong inertia around a zero-price (Shampanier et al. 2007; also
termed “penny gap” Carter 2019). An attractive low-price offer is likely to be more
effective in removing users from free use of the app and enticing them to spend
money. Third, reduced time to process information and increased search cost in
mobile apps favor a low-price approach. The attention a product can garner is an
essential factor in consumers’ decision to purchase it (Bettman 1979; Chandon et al.
2009). Sessions in gaming apps are short; Gameanalytics (2019) reports that users
spend an average of ten minutes (median: six) in a mobile game before moving
on to another activity or app (Yeykelis et al. 2014, 2018; De Haan et al. 2018).
Additionally, mobile phone screens are small leading to increased search cost (Ghose
et al. 2013). This combination of short attention spans and small surfaces reduces
the ability to advertise in-app purchases, possibly making it harder to sell high-
price items (Bemmaor and Mouchoux 1991). Fourth, a low-price approach can help
alleviate uncertainty about quality. Virtual goods sold through in-app purchases are
a new category that may be unfamiliar to customers (Hamari and Keronen 2017).
A low-price approach can hence entice users to try out this new product category
and reduce their uncertainty about it (Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2016).
Based on these arguments, current managerial practice seems highly appropriate.
The firm should favor a low-price “penetration” approach to make in-app goods
attractive to as many customers as possible during the short interaction time and
small surface that are available, and to “hook” free users on premium experiences.
Such an approach is likely to work particularly well if consumers struggle to self-
regulate their consumption after an initial low-price purchase and then continue to
purchase without too much regard to price. Indeed, a recent study on inter-temporal
pricing in freemium games (Runge et al. 2019) suggests that a lack of consumption
regulation may help explain how regular low-price offers lead to an expansion of
primary demand in this setting.
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On the other hand, an extensive stream of literature cautions against the use
of low-price approaches due to adverse mid- and longer-term effects (Lattin and
Bucklin 1989; Blattberg et al. 1995; Mela et al. 1997; Dekimpe et al. 1998; Jedidi
et al. 1999; Anderson and Simester 2004). A main argument pertains to consumer
expectations: Lattin and Bucklin (1989) find that price promotions can dampen
consumers’ reference prices. Mela et al. (1997) find increased price sensitivity from
price promotions for both loyal and non-loyal customers in the long run. Anderson
and Simester (2004) find a negative long-run effect of price discounts on established
customers. They point at forward buying, customer learning, and increased deal
sensitivity as important longer term effects. In this framing, it could be argued that
the firm should start app users off on large higher-price “starter packs” to ensure it
does not adversely impact consumers’ (price and quality) expectations and to form
habits towards large premium purchases (Chen and Leung 2016). Regulators may
prefer such an approach to protect consumers from “gateway” purchases if addictive
potential of mobile games is high indeed (Schütze 2014).
Overall, there are arguments both in favor of a low- and a high-price tactic for
a new user in-app purchase promotion from a firm’s point-of-view, with managerial
practice favoring the former. To assess the differential impact of a low-, mid- and
high-price approach, Study 1 presents an analysis of an experiment randomly as-
signing 363,440 new app adopters to a $2.99 (low), a $4.99 (managerially preferred),
a $29.99 (high) in-app purchase promotion, or a control condition.
5.2.2.2 Can non-static pricing be of use to the firm?
So far, we have considered static price tactics, but the firm may opt to dynamically
adapt price over time. E.g., skimming promises to combine a low- and high-price
approach, by gradually lowering an initial higher price to sell the good to customers
with increasingly lower valuations (Shapiro 1983; Acquisti and Varian 2005; Nair
2007). Skimming has potential to work particularly well when consumers are unin-
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Figure 5.3: Conversion and retention in the studied app
Notes: Conversion, i.e., share of app adopters making an in-app purchase, and retention, i.e., share
of app adopters still logging into the app, over days after app download; data are from the app
used for analysis.
formed (Varian 1980) or myopic (Becker and Murphy 1988; Becker et al. 1991), i.e.,
when they do not actively seek out information on the market environment (from
other consumers on online forums, chat apps, etc.) or when they do not pay much
attention to what may happen in the future. It is unlikely that mobile game users
are uninformed as discussed in Section 5.3.1.1, but they may act myopically (Kwon
et al. 2016), possibly due to impaired consumption regulation (Kwon et al. 2016;
Runge et al. 2019). Consumers with high valuations will then buy at a high price
without regard to potential future price drops.
In this perspective, the firm will benefit from lowering the price and quantity of
the offered bundle over time. Especially, as it has full agency over users’ individual
experiences (Ansari and Mela 2003; Arora et al. 2008), it can make a lower offer only
to users who have not yet made a purchase in the app, after “locking in” users with
higher valuations at a high initial price. The success of such a tactic is predicated on
users with high expected spending (high valuation) making a purchase more quickly
than users with lower valuation; and on users with low valuations for premium
purchases retaining in the app beyond a few initial sessions, such that the firm can
observe their unwillingness to purchase at a higher price and still make them an
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offer at a lower price (which requires the users to still log into the app to see the
offer as app notifications tend to be largely ignored; see Nevskaya and Albuquerque
2019).
Addressing the former requirement, we can look at average spending for users
who convert on different days after app download: Users in the mobile game provid-
ing data for this study who make a first purchase on the first two days in the app
spend $4.01 on average within a month after app download; the same figure is at
$2.89 for users who make a first purchase between day three and seven after down-
load, and at $2.28 for users who make a first purchase in their second week after app
download.1 Speaking to the second requirement, Figure 5.3 shows conversion and
retention profiles for users in the mobile game studied here. As can be seen from
the conversion profile, about 2.5% of app downloaders make a purchase in the game
within 30 days after app download. The retention profile is shown separately for
users who make a purchase within 30 days versus for those who do not. Unsurpris-
ingly, purchasing users retain much more strongly with the app. In fact, only about
five percent of initial downloaders who do not make a purchase within a month are
still using the app two weeks after install. I use this insight in designing a simple
skimming approach that initially offers the (managerially preferred) $4.99 bundle to
users, a $2.99 bundle if they have not made a purchase a week after app download
(when about ten percent of non-paying app adopters are still active), and a $0.99
bundle if they have not made a purchase two weeks after app download (when about
five percent of non-payers are still active). I choose this approach to ensure that
the lower-price offers still have potential to reach meaningful shares of non-paying
users. To assess the merits of this skimming approach, study 2 randomizes 72,243
newly arriving users into a condition applying this simple skimming tactic and into
a control condition receiving the $4.99 bundle in a flat-price approach.
1The reported figures are adjusted for days available to make purchases for users who convert
later.
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Figure 5.4: GDP per capita and device memory for country and device tiers
Notes: GDP per capita (2017, most recent available world development indicators when analysis
was conducted (The World Bank 2018)) and device memory in mega byte across the device and
country tiers used by the industry collaborator. The different tiers are effective in distinguishing
device quality and price (as proxied with device memory) and levels of national wealth (as proxied
with per capita GDP). 95% confidence intervals are not visible as they are too narrow. Segment
size shown on lowest x-axis.
5.2.2.3 Can the firm use available data to personalize price?
In addition to lowering price over time for users who have not made a purchase,
the firm may choose to set different prices for different users (Pigou 2017; Dubé
and Misra 2017; Dubé et al. 2017a; Shiller 2020). The data available at app down-
load are device (processor, memory) and geolocation information (aggregated at the
country-level for privacy reasons); the data sponsor had generated device and coun-
try segments from these information for use in app marketing. Figure 5.4 depicts
average device memory – a strong correlate of device price2 and the strongest ob-
served user-level correlate of expected user spending3– and average per capita gross
2For an overview of mobile phone technical specifications and price, e.g., refer to https://ww
w.phonearena.com/phones/compare.
3A simple regression of revenue per user a month after app download on device memory as
shown in model M4 in Table 5.4 on page 133 confirms this: An additional giga byte (1000 mega
byte) of device memory results in almost an additional dollar of spend on premium in-app purchases
a month after app download for a user on average.
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domestic product (GDP) across user segments, substantiating that the segments
capture heterogeneity in users’ willingness-to-pay in highly complementary product
categories (device to use apps) and in country-level income and economic develop-
ment (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 2007; Du and Kamakura 2008). Building on
these insights, the three panels in Figure 5.5 on page 119 show that users in differ-
ent country and device tiers display very different in-app behavior, with premium
demand being substantially higher in “higher” country and device tiers, both mea-
sured by the share of app adopters making a purchase and by the average amount
spent on premium upgrades: While more than seven percent of app adopters make
a purchase by day 30 after app download in the top country-device tier combination
(N=36,866), the same number is close to zero in the lowest country-device tier com-
binations (N=20,304 and N=50,297 respectively). Many differences in conversion
and revenue across segments are statistically significant as indicated by the 95%
confidence intervals around the values one month after app download (top-most line
in each panel). Differences in engagement (as measured by minutes spent in the
app) are less severe, but still visible and partially statistically significant as shown
in the bottom panel of Figure 5.5. It seems plausible that users in a segment with
relatively higher expected spending will be more inclined to purchase a high-price
promotion than users in a segment with lower expected spending and purchase value
(Rossi et al. 1996; Acquisti and Varian 2005). Based on this proposition, it should
be possible for the firm to profitably personalize the promotion offered to users in
different segments. Study 3 takes this proposition to an empirical test by means
of offline evaluation on the data generated in studies 1 and 2, and by means of
bandit-based online learning. Study 4 builds on the findings of study 3 to propose a
heuristic personalization and an experiment design to learn a personalized skimming
tactic.
The viability of such personalized pricing of the promotional offer is further
predicated on users either not informing themselves about the fact that other users
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receive different promotions or users not feeling that the different promotional offers
provide drastically different value for their money, i.e., that they are being treated
unfairly (Chatterjee and McGinnis 2010; Li et al. 2019; also see free-form answers
to the survey shown in Table 5.9 in Appendix A1 on page 157). As discussed
in Section 5.2.1, (subsets of) users are likely to inform themselves and are well-
connected. In collaboration with managers at the data sponsoring firm, the authors
hence designed differently priced versions of the promotion such that they all offer an
attractive discount to users compared to prices in the normal in-app purchase shop
while keeping unit price differences small. Table 5.1 on page 121 shows the different
versions of the promotion. Each bundle contains the premium in-game currency,
another in-game currency and a few in-game goods. The content is awarded over a
14-day period during which the user has to log into the app to redeem her goods.
This approach, combined with the attractive discount, intends to incentivize users to
engage sustainably with the app and is widely adopted in the mobile game industry.
5.3 Method
5.3.1 Institutional details
5.3.1.1 In-app purchases in the game
The empirical setting for this study is a mobile gaming app that has been played
by more than ten million users as of early 2019 and was part of the top grossing
charts for all of 2018. Games as a category make up the absolute majority of app
downloads worldwide (Sensortower 2019b, p. 27 and 28) and account for close
to 80% of overall revenue from apps (App Annie 2018; Sensortower 2019a). The
gaming app studied here is available on both the Google Playstore and the Apple
Appstore. It uses the freemium/free-to-play model common in games and gamified
apps such as, e.g., Tinder, that combines non-contractual (one-off) and contractual
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Figure 5.5: Users’ in-app demand by contextual segments observed at app download
Notes: In-app demand for different user segments as identified by meta data available at app
download, showing behavioral slices after one day, seven days and 30 days after app download.
Revenue in $ and premium conversion, i.e., share of users that made an in-app purchase, in percent.
95% confidence interval is only plotted for the 30-day slices to avoid clutter. Revenue has been
winsorized at the 98th percentile among paying users to control for outliers. Segment size shown
on lowest x-axis.
(subscription) in-app purchases. As common in freemium games, premium in-app
purchases are offered in an in-app shop and comprise offers of in-game currencies that
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can in turn be used to purchase in-game goods that facilitate and enhance gameplay
(Lehdonvirta 2009; Levitt et al. 2016; Runge et al. 2019). The in-app shop offers
bundles of 250 to 12,500 units of a premium in-game currency with prices ranging
from $1.99 to $99.99. It further offers one bundle with the second in-game currency
at $19.99. The base price for one unit of the premium in-game currency is 0.796
$-cents (based on the $1.99 offer in the app shop) and 0.0113 $-cents per unit of
the second in-game currency. These values underlie the discount calculations in
Table 5.1 on page 121.
5.3.1.2 The treatment
In addition to the in-app shop, the app offers premium upgrades through in-app
promotional popups. The first and most frequent of these promotional popups that
a user receives after app download offers a 14-day schedule of currency and in-game
goods as outlined in Table 5.1. It comes in six variants with price points from $0.99
to $29.99. If a user purchases this offer, they are offered a step-up bundle at three
times the initial price (hence with price points between $2.99 and $89.99) and with
three times the initial content to spur repeat purchases. The ensemble of initial and
step-up offer establishes the treatment used for personalization.
Most online games have strong communities that communicate on dedicated
websites, chats, forums, and even in real-life meetups (Steinkuehler 2004; Cole and
Griffiths 2007). The game studied here is no exception, making severe customer
backlash a likely outcome of first degree price discrimination (Pigou 2017; Martinez
2014; Dubé and Misra 2017). Instead, I personalize the first and most important
in-app offer to facilitate users’ sampling of premium content and repeat purchasing
(Bawa and Shoemaker 2004; Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2016). This approach enables
the firm to serve different price points to different users while being fair in extending
a large discount to all users and keeping unit price differences small. In collaboration
with the firm, I monitored online forums and customer service communication while
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100 per day $11.14 2,000 per day $3.16 Daily good $1.74 $16.04 $0.99 93.8%
200 per day $22.29 5,000 per day $7.91 Same as above $1.74 $31.94 $2.99 90.6%
200 per day $22.29 10,000 per day $15.82 Same as above $1.74 $39.85 $4.99 87.5%
300 per day $33.43 15,000 per day $23.73 Same as above $1.74 $58.9 $9.99 83.0%
400 per day $44.58 20,000 per day $31.64 Same as above $1.74 $77.96 $19.99 74.4%
500 per day $55.72 25,000 per day $39.55 Same as above $1.74 $97.01 $29.99 69.1%
Notes: Promotion content and comparison of offer price to the value of content if priced at baseline
prices from the in-app store. Users have to log in for a consecutive 14 days to claim the content
of the promotion, managers use this approach to incentivize users’ regular engagement with the
app. I disregard discount rates in calculation of the discounts, they are likely high in this setting
(Kwon et al. 2016; Runge et al. 2019).
the personalization studies were active – they remained free from customer com-
plaints and mentions of the offer. On a methodological level, this approach permits
to assume single unit treatment value (SUTVA; Rubin 1978) which is necessary for
the causal inference approach I use.
Finally, it should be noted that the offered discounts shown in Table 5.1 may
seem very high. Readers should bear in mind that I calculate them based on unit
prices of one-off purchases that make the whole purchased content available to the
user immediately. The offer on the other hand requires the user to come back to
the app for 14 consecutive days to claim the whole content. It hence uses the high
discounts as an incentive to retain users with the app (Eisingerich et al. 2019; Appel
et al. 2019). Other reports from this institutional setting suggest that this order of
magnitude for discounts is common (Levitt et al. 2016; Runge et al. 2019).
5.3.2 The learning approach
The firm wants to identify the most profitable price policy for the in-app promotion
out of a set of candidates. Firms commonly run fully randomized experiments (col-
loquially called A/B or split tests) with their digital content offering (Baker et al.
2014; Schwartz et al. 2017; Misra et al. 2019) that randomize users into different
treatment conditions and can assist with this identification. The first two stud-
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ies use this approach. A/B tests are costly however as consumers are exposed to
non-optimal offerings for the whole duration of the test, especially when the test
randomizes equally across the set of available prices or designs. Simple forms of
reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto 1999) such as multi-armed bandits can
reduce the cost of experimentation by increasingly exposing users to the best per-
forming variant being tested (Schwartz et al. 2017; Misra et al. 2019; Du et al. 2019).
In their contextual form, bandits can choose the best performing variant per indi-
vidual user context where the context is defined by observable user data (Bertsimas
and Mersereau 2007; Li et al. 2010). In this study, I consider a contextual bandit
approach to assist with policy learning. In case observed contextual features are not
relevant to the association of treatment and reward, i.e., they are not relevant for
personalization of the treatment if the firm wants to impact the given reward/out-
come, this approach defaults to a simple bandit – in a way, A/B tests are “nested”
within bandits (by setting the bandit’s learning rate to full exploration) which are
in turn “nested” in a contextual bandit.
I use the contextual bandit module of Vowpal Wabbit,4 an open-source, fast, and
large-scale machine learning library developed at Yahoo Research and acquired by
Microsoft Research. I choose this implementation as it has been successfully applied
in the field before (Li et al. 2010), is well documented in existing research (Dudík
et al. 2011; Bietti et al. 2018), and is built for scale and production application.
5.3.2.1 Formalizing the decision problem
The firm’s decision problem can be formalized as a stochastic (i.i.d.) batched bandit
learning problem. I choose to use a simple epsilon-based learning strategy as it has
been shown to perform well (Bietti et al. 2018; Du et al. 2019), can emulate an A/B
test by setting epsilon to one, and to keep complexity low to allow for managerial
control and buy-in. Each period t, the bandit decides on the allocation of share 1−ε
4For additional information, https://github.com/VowpalWabbit/vowpal_wabbit – the li-
brary’s Github page – offers extensive documentation.
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of users arriving in this period to the different actions aj (different offer variants),
where users are defined by different contexts xi ∈ X, per its policy π. The remaining
share of users ε is allocated randomly across available actions aj for exploration.
Importantly, and in distinction to many applied bandit problems (Li et al. 2010;
Schwartz et al. 2017), the loss that each action produces in different contexts, l(aj, xi)
is not observed immediately but with a delay. A batch of users has time of period
length t− (t− 1) to make the decision to purchase the offer or not; these purchase
decisions form the basis for the bandit’s reward calculation. At the end of period
t + 1, the bandit reinforces its allocation policy based on its decisions up to period







is a set of policies π : xi → aj. For every policy, it holds that pt(aj) ∈ [0, 1].
Further, as long as ε > 0, it holds that pt(aj) > 0, ensuring the availability of data
for the bandit’s policy learning.
The bandit then uses the policy resulting from this reinforcement learning step in
period t+2, in addition to the specified learning with rate ε, and the reinforcement
loop is repeated. It should be noted that the problem is formulated in terms of loss
minimization to follow Vowpal Wabbit’s framing (Bietti et al. 2018). Alternatively,
it could be formulated in terms of reward maximization by multiplying the cost/loss
by −1. It should further be noted that, similar to the empirical approach in Dubé
and Misra (2017), this approach is inherently Bayesian as the learner updates its
beliefs about the best policy each period.
5.3.2.2 Policy estimation
I use an inverse propensity-weighted approach in policy estimation from randomized
data. This estimator is used both to evaluate policy candidates on fully randomized
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experimental (A/B test) data and by the bandit in estimating feedback across con-
texts from its random allocation of share of users ε to all available actions. Both
estimations are counterfactual in nature and require an accurate model of the pol-
icy used for allocation (Dudík et al. 2011; Bietti et al. 2018) to obtain unbiased
estimates using an inverse propensity-weighted estimators (Horvitz and Thompson




1{a = aj} (5.2)
This estimator is unbiased for any pt(aj) > 0, but can have large variance when
pt(a) is small. To lower said variance, Dudík et al. (2011) propose a combination of




1{a = aj}+ l̂(xt, a) (5.3)
This doubly robust estimator reduces variance if lt̂(xt, aj) is a good estimate as
the small numerator balances out a possibly small denominator. The second term
ensures that the estimator is unbiased. I use such a doubly robust estimator as
provided in Vowpal Wabbit (Dudík et al. 2011) for online bandit-based learning,
and use the simpler estimator described in (2) (also see Hitsch and Misra 2018) for
offline evaluation where I ensure that pt(a) is sufficiently large.
5.3.2.3 Priors relevant to learning
Ex ante, the firm does not know the demand function it faces (Rothschild 1974),
but valuable prior information may still be available. The firm first needs to make
the decision which offer to show to which user when users first start the app after
downloading it from the app store. At this point, information as to users’ geolocation
and device characteristics are available as discussed in Section 5.2.1 (also see Sifa
et al. 2018). Subsequently, the firm can observe how app users behave in the app,
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i.e., if and how they make in-app purchases, play the game, interact with other
players and consume advertising. This information can be used to update the initial
decision. Subsequent decisions are however managerially constrained: The offer
price can only be lowered or kept stable, not increased, to avoid upsetting customers.
Further, while the fully randomized experiments in studies 1 and 2 start “cold” from a
flat prior with equal exploration across treatments, reasonable managerial priors are
used as a starting point for online learning. Such priors derive, e.g., from a product
manager with expert knowledge on pricing strategies that can be used to “seed”
the bandit. An example of such a prior is the practice to give a higher-price offer
to a user segment that has historically seen higher spending per user as discussed
in Section 5.2.2.3 and supported by other studies (Rossi et al. 1996; Acquisti and
Varian 2005).
5.4 Studies
5.4.1 Study 1: Evaluating a high-, mid- and low-price tactic
Study 1 exposes app users to three different in-app offers and a control group reflect-
ing the state of the app prior to the introduction of the offer. In the latter group,
users received two one-off in-app promotional offers – one for the same premium
in-game currency, and one for in-game goods (both priced at $2.99) – instead of the
focal offer described in Table 5.1. A random 60% of 363,440 new adopters of the
app during the first half of 2018 received the new in-app offer, being split equally
across price points of $2.99, $4.99 and $29.99. The remaining 40% of users received
the control treatment which reflects the state of the app prior to introduction of the
offer.
In the analysis, I focus on intent-to-treat “slices” of user behavior as they ac-
cumulate until one day, one week and one month after initial app download. In
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this intent-to-treat analysis, the denominator of the reported user behavior averages
always is the number of users initially downloading the app (regardless if a user is
still actively using the app), accounting for endogenous non-compliance in the cal-
culation of averages. This approach is similar to Gordon et al. (2019) who present
a more detailed exposition for the interested reader.
Table 5.2 on page 128 shows treatment main effects on user behavior outcomes
such as demand for the focal promotional offer, wider demand for in-app premium
content (both in $), advertising consumption and app use. Results show that a
higher-price offer leads to lower conversion and a lower-price offer to higher conver-
sion, in line with an inverse price-demand relationship. The two lower-price offers
and the control condition all lead to a substantially higher offer and overall purchase
incidence5 (both well beyond 2% of the user base for the 30-day window) and also
more repeat purchases than in the treatment condition with the high-price offer.
This finding suggests that purchasing of premium content by more users leads to
increased repeat purchases of such content, possibly due to uncertainty reduction
(Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2016). It further confirms that the treatment has strong
main effects and is hence a capable candidate for personalization.
It should further be noted that the two lower-price offer conditions ($2.99 and
$4.99) that achieve higher free-to-pay conversion lead to statistically significant
higher retention and time spent in the app than in the control condition. And,
in a mean comparison, advertising consumption is highest in the condition with
lowest conversion (the $29.99 offer condition). Advertising consumption is signifi-
cantly higher in this condition than in the control condition which has significantly
higher premium conversion, but equivalent app use. App use can be seen as inde-
pendently driving advertising consumption: More time spent in the app means more
time to be exposed to advertising. These results suggest that the new in-app offer
is able to impact user engagement, possibly hand-in-hand with repeat purchasing;
5I use the terms premium purchase incidence and conversion (to premium) interchangeably.
Both quantify what share of users or app adopters has purchased a premium upgrade.
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and that higher premium conversion leads to reduced advertising consumption at
similar levels of user engagement.
Finally, while the different treatments lead to substantially different outcomes
in terms of users buying the offer, revenue generated by the offer and overall users
making a premium purchase, effects on overall in-app purchase revenue are not
significantly different between treatments. This result is sensible as the offer “only”
accounts for between 4.2 to 24.1% of overall revenue (one month-result for the $2.99
and one day-result for the $29.99 treatment in Table 5.2) and variance of overall
in-app purchase revenue is high as indicated by the large confidence intervals in
Table 5.2.
5.4.2 Study 2: Evaluating a simple skimming tactic
From Study 1 (Section 5.4.1), we know that a high-price offer lowers premium conver-
sion but increases per-user-revenue generated by the focal offer, and that a low-price
offer increases conversion but reduces revenue per user from the offer. This section
investigates if an increase in both offer conversion and offer revenue can be achieved
with a simple skimming policy that lowers the initial offer price. To do so, 72,243
new app adopters all receive the $4.99 offer and then the price is dropped for a
random 80% of users.6 In this 80% treatment condition, users who have not made a
purchase within the first week after app download, receive the $2.99 offer on day 8,
and if they have not made a purchase within another week, they receive the $0.99
offer (as shown in Table 5.1) on day 14 after app download. Table 5.3 on page 130
6All experiments at the exception of this one were implemented in the app version published
on the Google Playstore. There are two reasons for this approach: First, the app experienced
much higher numbers of new downloads on the Google Playstore. Second, device information on
Android devices (the ones accessing the Google Playstore) is much more granular and informative
of user characteristics as a much higher variety of devices is available with many different price
points. Apple, on the other hand, only releases a small number of new mobile devices once a year,
substantially lowering the variety of mobile phones and price points available. On average, Apple
devices have higher price points, suggesting that users with higher expected spending on premium
upgrades should self-select into purchasing these devices. Indeed, Table 5.3 shows that average
revenue on the Apple version of the app is much higher than on the Google version (see Table 5.2).
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































shows intent-to-treat effects of these policies on new app adopters seven, 14 and 30
days after app download. As can be gleaned from the first four result columns, the
skimming policy achieves a lift in both offer conversion and revenue. The first result
column in Table 5.5 on page 138 summarizes the percentage lift between the two
treatment groups and applies a Bayesian significance test on this difference: Offer
conversion significantly increases by 20.3% (prob(B>A) > 99.9%)7 as well as offer
revenue (+9.7%, prob(B>A) = 94.4%), with a significant positive effect on overall
conversion (+9.8%, prob(B>A) = 98.7%). Effects on other relevant outcomes are
directionally positive but not significant. While this simple skimming policy does
not increase overall monetization (overall revenue remains unaffected), it has poten-
tial in increasing paying users with mild positive effects on revenue. Importantly,
the firms’ customer service and chat forums remained free from consumer comments
or complaints that they would receive different offers over time, corroborating that
skimming approaches have potential in this setting.
5.4.3 Study 3: Treatment effect heterogeneity and algorithm
evaluation
5.4.3.1 Treatment effect heterogeneity
To investigate if the effects of differently priced offer variants tested in study 1 (Sec-
tion 5.4.1) are heterogeneous across observed user characterists, I resort to simple
linear models regressing longer-term (one month after app download) winsorized rev-
enue on treatment indicators and the device information discussed in Section 5.2.2.3
and 5.2.2.1:
Yi=b ∗ T2.99,i+c ∗ T4.99,i+d ∗ T29.99,i+e ∗DIi+f ∗ T2.99,i ∗DIi+g ∗ T4.99,i ∗DIi+h ∗ T29.99,i ∗DIi+a
(5.4)
7Prob(B>A) refers to the probability that the respective outcome is statistically significantly
higher in the treatment group than in the control group, as obtained from a Bayesian significance
test.
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Table 5.3: Effect of skimming on user behavior outcomes
Outcome window Seven days after app download 14 days after app download 30 days after app download
Skimming Flat-price Skimming Flat-price Skimming Flat-price
Treatment group (N=57,814) (N=14,429) (N=57,814) (N=14,429) (N=57,814) (N=14,429)
Offer conversion 3.04% 2.84% 3.54% 3.19% 4.17% 3.47%(0.014%) (0.027%) (0.015%) (0.029%) (0.016%) (0.030%)
Offer revenue
(in $)
0.279 0.253 0.332 0.298 0.381 0.347
(0.016) (0.030) (0.018) (0.033) (0.019) (0.037)
Overall paying
users
3.57% 3.35% 4.18% 3.81% 4.98% 4.54%
(0.015%) (0.029%) (0.016%) (0.031%) (0.018%) (0.034%)
Overall revenue 1.286 1.271 2.157 1.980 3.925 3.831(0.181) (0.440) (0.307) (0.647) (0.626) (1.234)
Overall revenue
(winsorized)
1.057 0.981 1.662 1.490 2.870 2.700
(0.087) (0.176) (0.135) (0.260) (0.235) (0.465)
Repeat
purchases
0.045 0.042 0.075 0.066 0.139 0.125
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.023)
Time spent in
app (in minutes)
103.7 101.7 143.2 139.4 208.6 203.1
(2.075) (4.098) (3.321) (6.518) (5.879) (11.44)
Game rounds
played
16.54 16.17 20.93 20.41 26.88 26.26
(0.271) (0.536) (0.375) (0.745) (0.548) (1.092)
Retention (% of
users active)
12.6% 12.1% 9.0% 8.6% 5.9% 6.1%
(0.27%) (0.53%) (0.02%) (0.05% (0.02%) (0.04%)
Ads viewed 0.894 0.860 0.948 0.911 0.993 0.973(0.022) (0.044) (0.023) (0.046) (0.024) (0.048)
Notes: Average outcomes per treatment group with 95% confidence interval in brackets. Overall
revenue has a very skewed distribution due to the presence of extremely high-value users (Sifa et al.
2018), I hence also show revenue winsorized at the across-group 98th percentile of revenue among
paying users.
where Yi is user i ’s winsorized revenue until a month after app download, Ti is a
binary indicator of the treatment the user was assigned to (the control condition
is excluded as a reference category), and DIi captures user i’s device information,
measured either as the firm’s pre-defined device tiers or as device memory. I focus
on device information as these present the strongest correlate of per-user expected
value (Sifa et al. 2018), in particular device memory provides a continuous indicator
of expected user value. I further opt for 98th percentile-winsorized revenue as the
outcome since a treatment priced between $2.99 and $29.99 is unlikely to meaning-
fully affect amounts of money spent that are in the thousands (a few users spend
several thousand USD until a month after app download). A small and random
difference in the number of these users allotted to randomized treatments can lead
to spurious differences in means while overshadowing actual treatment-induced dif-
ferences in the wider group of users. At the same time, it is important to include
such high-value users in the analysis as one of the key prior beliefs pertains to a
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high-price offer leading to better monetization outcomes among high-value users.
Hence, to not exclude these users altogether, I impute the 98th percentile of revenue
among paying users (approximately $342 for the one-month window) for the top 2%
of paying users; at the lower end of paying users the winsorization does not change
anything as as the 2nd percentile is virtually the same as observed values below it –
the distribution of revenue per paying user is essentially flat at the lower end. The
means and standard errors for revenue and winsorized revenue shown in Table 5.2
corroborate that this approach is able to reduce variance significantly.
Model M3.1 in Table 5.4 confirms the mean results shown in Table 5.2: The three
different offers randomized in the A/B test do not result in significantly different
revenue per user a month after app download. Further, model M3.2 substantiates
insights from the visual analysis in Section 5.2.2.3: Users in higher-quality device
segments spend significantly more on premium in-app purchases than users in lower-
quality device segments. A month after app download, a user in the highest-quality
segment “device tier 1” is expected to have spent $3.44 more than a user in the
lowest device tier (which is excluded as a reference category) on average. Speaking
to Section 5.2.2.3, Model M3.4 pinpoints device memory as the strongest exogenous
continuous measure of expected premium demand of users: A user downloading the
app to a device with 1,000 mega byte more memory is expected to spend $0.90 more
on in-app purchases within the first month.
When it comes to identification of heterogeneity in treatment effects, Model
M3.3 paints an interesting picture: Consistently across all segments, a higher-quality
device segment interacts negatively with the low-price offer, but positively with the
high-price offer, with the mid-price offer showing effects in both directions. These
results suggest that a high-price (low-price) offer is comparatively better (worse)
for generating revenue among high-value users. Results are, however, only partially
and marginally significant. Model M3.5 provides a more direct test in using device
memory instead of categorical device segments as an indicator for users’ expected
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spending on premium content. And indeed, the interaction of device memory with
the $2.99 offer is statistically significant (see last column of Table 5.4). To be precise,
a user on a device with 1,000 mega byte more memory will spend 20 $-cents less on
premium content until a month after app adoption when placed in the low-price offer
condition compared to in the control. This finding indicates that a low-price offer
harms longer term revenue from users with higher expected value. Overall, these
findings provide evidence confirming that a low-price offer has potential to decrease
(increase) longer term revenue from high- (low-) valuation users. This finding also
validates that a personalization of in-app offers has potential to be more profitable
than a non-personalized offering.
5.4.3.2 Offline evaluation of the bandit learner
As prefaced in Section 5.3.2, I use Vowpal Wabbit’s contextual bandit module.
Before applying the learning algorithm in the field, I test its properties through
offline evaluation similar to Dubé and Misra (2017) and Hitsch and Misra (2018).
In actual field runs, I use an epsilon-greedy learning approach where the learning
rate ε is set to simultaneously explore and exploit, and a batch is defined by 24-hour
periods containing all users arriving in this time period. For the offline evaluation
based on study 1’s data, I apply an epsilon-first learning approach and define a batch
by the sample available for learning.8 Concretely, I use the first N=100,000 arrivals
of study 1’s experiment for learning (exploration) and the remaining N=117,930 for
evaluation of the learned policy (exploitation) using 30 50% bootstraps. Device and
country segments introduced in Section 5.2.2.3 constitute available contexts xi ∈ X,
and the randomized offers at $2.99, $4.99 and $29.99 establish available actions aj.9
I evaluate two rewards (I transform them to the cost/loss that Vowpal Wab-
8Both approaches are applicable for a framing as a stochastic bandit problem which essentially
assumes stationarity of the data-generating process over time. This assumption seems reasonable
as all experimentation took place over a period of nine months during which the app experience
remained fundamentally unchanged.
9Two managerially set boundaries should be noted here: 1) Firm-defined device and country
segments are to be used as contextual data (and not, e.g., device memory and GDP per capita).
The reason for this requirement is managerially requested consistency of the user experience and
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Table 5.4: Regression of cumulative revenue a month after app download on treat-
ment indicators and device memory
Dependent variable Day 30 revenue (winsorized at 98th percentile)
M3.1 M3.2 M3.3 M3.4 M3.5
Treatment (Reference = Pre-offer state of the game)
$2.99 offer −0.112 (0.139) 0.065 (0.770) 0.0297 (0.156)
$4.99 offer 0.038 (0.616) −0.051 (0.821) −0.2149 (0.307)
$29.99 offer 0.021 (0.784) −0.227 (0.310) −0.2906 (0.167)
Device tiers (Reference = Device tier 5)
Device tier 1 3.437 *** (0.000) 3.258 *** (0.000)
Device tier 2 1.256 *** (0.000) 1.328 *** (0.000)
Device tier 3 0.386 *** (0.000) 0.347 ** (0.033)
Device tier 4 −0.034 (0.720) −0.071 (0.633)
Device memory
(in mega byte) 0.0009 *** (0.000) 0.0009 *** (0.000)
Interactions
Device tier 1 x $2.99 offer −0.286 (0.335)
Device tier 2 x $2.99 offer −0.528 * (0.056)
Device tier 3 x $2.99 offer −0.100 (0.723)
Device tier 4 x $2.99 offer −0.013 (0.959)
Device tier 1 x $4.99 offer 0.526 * (0.076)
Device tier 2 x $4.99 offer −0.002 (0.994)
Device tier 3 x $4.99 offer 0.100 (0.722)
Device tier 4 x $4.99 offer −0.027 (0.917)
Device tier 1 x $29.99 offer 0.657 ** (0.027)
Device tier 2 x $29.99 offer 0.170 (0.539)
Device tier 3 x $29.99 offer 0.193 (0.492)
Device tier 4 x $29.99 offer 0.228 (0.379)
Device memory x $2.99 offer −0.0002 ** (0.036)
Device memory x $4.99 offer 0.0001 (0.200)
Device memory x $29.99 offer 0.0001 (0.115)
Intercept 1.438 *** (0.000) 0.583 *** (0.000) 0.625 *** (0.000) −0.976 *** (0.000) −0.936 *** (0.000)
Notes: Results of a linear regression of winsorized revenue a month after app download on treatment
indicators and background data, plus interactions. The full sample of the historic random trial
was used, hence N = 363,440. * significant at the 10%-level, ** 5%-level, *** 1%-level.
bit prefers as an input through multiplication by −1), offer revenue (r1) and offer
conversion (r2)10 and the resulting policies πrevenue and πconversion, using an inverse
offer prices within the segments used for wider marketing activities. 2) The no-offer condition
is not available as a treatment for personalization due to high technical cost of simultaneously
maintaining it with the offer conditions. I hence exclude it from offline evaluation, reducing the
set of users from 365,440 to 217,930 users who were randomly allocated to one of the offers at a
price of $2.99, $4.99 or $29.99 (see Table 5.1).
10Rewards are derived from user behavior on the day of app download and the day after, i.e.,
users have 36 hours on average to contribute to the calculation of the conversion and revenue
reward. This reward formulation is delayed compared to rewards that are directly observed such
as ad clicks (Li et al. 2010; Schwartz et al. 2017).
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probability weighted profit estimator described in Section 5.3.2.2. To repeat the core
intuition: In essence, the “policy overlap” between the random assignment from the
experiment and the bandit policy’s assignment is used, i.e., the pool of users where
random and targeted policy make the same decision, to generate a counterfactual
estimate of outcomes in a world where all users would have been assigned based on
the policy learned by the bandit. Appendix A2 presents a detailed account of the
implementation by showing the Python code used for offline analysis.
I conduct this offline evaluation to confirm that (1) the bandit is able to learn
a policy different from random assignment and (2) the two different rewards lead
to meaningfully different price policies, concretely the conversion-reward leads to a
low-price and the revenue-reward to a high-price policy. Figure 5.6 summarizes key
results. The left column shows results when offer revenue (r1), the right column
when offer conversion (r2) is used as a reward. The conversion-reward leads to
a low-price policy with most users (approximately 28k) assigned to the $2.99 and
approximately 22k users assigned to the $4.99 offer. The bandit with revenue as
a reward assigns about 14k less users to these lower price points and assigns most
users (approximately 23k) to the $29.99 offer that the conversion-bandit only assigns
9k users to. A bandit with offer conversion as a reward hence leads to an average
price of about $8 while a bandit with offer revenue as a reward leads to an average
price that is almost twice as high. These results confirm that the chosen bandit
algorithm (1) is able to learn a policy different from random assignment for both
reward specifications, and (2) learns a high-price policy with revenue as a reward
and a low-price policy when conversion is used as a reward. This confirmation is
crucial to justify taking the bandit to online field runs. The next section describes
results from an online pilot that I use to assess if the bandit is able to learn a
personalization policy at app download, i.e., assigns users differently to price points
based on their available contextual data.
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Figure 5.6: Different rewards and resulting price policies
Notes: The upper panel shows price assignments performed by a bandit trained on data from Study
1, the lower panel shows policy-based lift in the respective reward over mean reward in the best
unpersonalized (the $4.99 offer) treatment. The right column shows results when offer conversion
(buy or not), the left column shows results when offer revenue (buy or not times the price point)
is used as a reward. The former leads to a low-price policy, the latter to a high-price policy – as
shown in the price assignments in the upper panel.
5.4.3.3 Online pilot
In close collaboration with the data sponsor’s engineering team, the authors built
an online reinforcement learning system with Vowpal Wabbit’s contextual bandit
module at its core that is able to make decisions based on country and device tier
contexts in real-time at app download and can then update these decisions based
on collected behavioral data during users’ use of the app. Appendix A3 outlines
how the system works in detail. To validate that this system performs in line with
expectations and to confirm the findings from the offline evaluation reported in
Section 5.4.3.2, I perform an exploratory online run of the contextual bandit for
the price decision at app download with offer conversion as a reward. This setting
reflects reward specification r2 in Section 5.4.3.2, and hence I expect the bandit to
136 CHAPTER 5. MONETIZING FREEMIUM PLAY
gear towards a low-price policy. While this approach can possibly harm longer term
value generation from high-valuation users (per Table 5.4 and Section 5.4.3.1), it is
expected to generate a larger number of paying customers than a high-price policy
which was favored by managers, rather than the algorithm (possibly drastically)
lowering the number of paying customers with a revenue reward.11
At app download, the device and country tiers used in marketing by the firm
are available as contextual features as shown in Figure 5.5. In the offline evaluation
in Section 5.4.3.2, I used 100,000 users to train the algorithm. To provide sufficient
sample size to the bandit before starting its reinforcement loop, I seed it with a prior
managerial policy (see Figure 5.7) and set the learning rate epsilon to 0.5, i.e., the
bandit is allowed to randomly explore on 50% of arriving users. Once this policy
has been executed on 200,000 arriving users (i.e., the bandit was able to explore on
more than 100k users), I activate reinforcement. The bandit then updates its policy
every day based on offer conversion within a day after app download as a reward,
i.e., if a user made a purchase of the offer offered to her, either on the day of app
download or the day after.
The offline evaluation results presented in Table 5.4 suggest that the bandit
cannot learn a personalization policy based on the given contextual features as
interaction effects between treatment and tiers are only marginally significant. And
indeed the online reinforcement learning run confirms this expectation: Figure 5.7
shows that the algorithm implements a largely uniform price policy in the contexts
with sufficient signal, and that the bandit seems to shift exploration with higher
prices to contexts with limited or no signal, i.e., contexts with very low premium
conversion among users. The right panel further shows that the bandit sells offers
at a significantly lower price than the prior managerial policy and hence makes use
of its agency in achieving a higher reward (=higher offer conversion).
11Creating consensus with and buy-in from managers proved crucial throughout the project as
managers had to give up agency over price of the first and most important offer in the game – one
of their key levers to exert managerial control over the game.
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Figure 5.7: Price decisions per context by managers and algorithm
Notes: Average offer price charged by a managerial policy (plus 50% exploration) and by a bandit
with offer conversion within a day after app download as reward. As expected, the bandit lowers
the price compared to the managerial policy. Interestingly it appears to shift exploration with
higher price points to lower country and device tiers. The reason for this behavior is the lack of
signal in these contexts: The blue line shows that offer conversion (the relevant signal) is dismally
low in these contexts, requiring more exploration with all available actions in these contexts.
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Table 5.5: Effect of different price (personalization) policies on user behavior out-
comes

































Offer conversion +20.3% −19.1% −7.6% +20.3% +44.7%(>99.9%) (<0.01%) (3.0%) (>99.9%) (>99.9%)
Offer revenue +9.7% +1.5% +3.2% +4.2% +15.9%(94.4%) (63.2%) (72.5%) (74.3%) (95.3%)
Overall paying
users
+9.8% −8.8% +1.7% +8.7% +26.4%
(98.7%) (0.2%) (66.4%) (97.5%) (>99.9%)
Overall revenue +2.4% −26.2% +13.9% +3.4% +20.8%(55.2%) (3.1%) (77.8%) (58.7%) (81.7%)
Overall revenue
(winsorized)
+6.3% −8.5% +12.2% −0.2% +23.2%
(73.7%) (12.1%) (91.6%) (49.4%) (96.1%)
Repeat purchases +11.4% −9.2% +10.9% +8.5% +12.9%(85.5%) (18.6%) (84.7%) (79.4%) (77.2%)
Time spent in
app (in minutes)
+2.7% −0.8% +1.6% +3.4% +5.1%
(80.2%) (34.0%) (76.5%) (87.9%) (93.9%)
Game rounds
played
+2.3% 0.4% +0.8% +2.6% +3.9%
(83.8%) (60.1%) (69.4%) (89.4%) (95.6%)
Retention (% of
users active)
−3% −0.5% +2.5% +1.4% +4.4%
(20.2%) (42.0%) (80.8%) (64.3%) (84.3%)
Ads viewed −2.7% 1.3% −1.4% +3.8% +2.5%(75.6%) (79.8%) (19.9%) (93.9%) (81.9%)
Notes: Effect of different policies on user behavior outcomes by day 30 after app download as
measured against a 20% randomized holdout group receiving the best-performing (in terms of
revenue impact) unpersonalized offer at $4.99. Probability that the policy performs better than
the holdout group as derived from Bayesian significance testing in brackets. The levels of the
outcome variables per treatment group are shown in Table 5.6. Minor differences in percentage lift
reported here versus as calculated on the values shown in Table 5.6 are due to rounding.
The second and third result columns of Table 5.5 show resulting user behavior
outcomes a month after app download for the seeding, i.e., managerial prior with
50% exploration, and learning phase, i.e., active reinforcement learning based on
conversion reward. To facilitate concise presentation and readability, results are
shown as the relative percentage difference in user behavior compared to a random-
ized holdout group receiving the most profitable non-personalized offer for $4.99 (see
“A/B test” results in Table 5.2).12 The levels of the outcome variables per treat-
12The $4.99 offer generates highest mean revenue in the A/B test compared to the $2.99 and the
$29.99 offers, and is hence most profitable due to zero marginal cost of the goods sold. Another
A/B test run by managers compared it to the $9.99 and $19.99 offers where it also surfaced as
causing the highest mean revenue. I do not use this A/B test in offline evaluation as the company
did not track device and country information when this test ran.
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ment group are reported in Table 5.6. Because the managerial prior policy charges
relatively high prices compared to the randomized holdout group, the seeding phase
leads to a statistically significant reduction in offer conversion by 19.1% (Prob(B<A)
> 99.9%) and in overall paying users by 8.8% (prob(B<A) = 99.8%). Impact of the
managerial policy combined with learning on repeat purchasing, overall revenue and
hence profitability appears to be negative compared to the best flat-price tactic, with
app usage and ad viewing remaining unchanged. During reinforcement learning, the
conversion-bandit then lowers price on average (see Figure 5.7) reducing the offer
conversion gap compared to the holdout group by a factor of 2.5, achieving a posi-
tive impact on profitability with marginal statistical significance (overall conversion,
revenue, repeat purchasing). Impact on app use and ad viewing are not significant,
but directionally in line with expectations (higher and lower respectively).
Overall, this online run confirms that the reinforcement learning system works
as intended, that a bandit with conversion as reward implements a directionally
profitable low-price policy, and that signal and treatment effect heterogeneity in the
available contextual features are too low for the bandit to learn a personalized policy
at app download.
5.4.4 Study 4: Personalized skimming
5.4.4.1 Devising a policy prior from managerial guidance and offline
evaluation
As the bandit is unable to learn a personalization policy using available contextual
features at app download, and offline evaluation on A/B test data is also underpow-
ered to devise a personalization, I resort to guidance by the indications presented
by offline evaluation: Higher price offers should be given to device and country tiers
with higher expected spending which aligns with foundational marketing practice
in purchase history- and geo location-based pricing (Rossi et al. 1996; Acquisti and
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Table 5.6: Levels of user behavior outcomes in treated and control group


















































































































































































































Notes: Average outcomes per treatment group with 95% confidence interval in brackets.
Varian 2005; Du and Kamakura 2008). Managerial guidance further requested to
not use the $29.99 offer (as it does not generate sufficient paying users) and to not
use the very cheap $0.99 offer at app download. In agreement with managers, the
authors hence devised a heuristic personalization policy that assigned offers ranging
in price from $2.99 to $19.99 to user segments based on expected one-month rev-
enue. The third column of Figure 5.9 on page 144 shows the resulting policy at app
download.13
13The heuristic policy is derived from a mapping of price points to contexts based on their ex-
pected spend. The second panel of Figure 5.5 shows expectations for mean spend until a month
after app download per context, as estimated from the A/B test data used in offline analysis. Es-
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As already outlined in Section 5.3.2.3 managers further requested that offer price
only be dropped and not increased to avoid customer backlash. As skimming proved
to be profitable in Study 5.4.2, it seems promising to explore how we can best lower
prices per user segment from the heuristically assigned prices at app download. To
assist with learning per-segment price paths, I devise a learning system as shown
in Figure 5.8 on page 142. I essentially concatenate contextual bandits to cover the
entire period from app download to 14 days later. Each bandit receives two days of
behavioral contextual data that are observed simultaneously with the reward of the
previous bandit. Based on this behavioral data and the decisions of the previous
bandit that are passed on, each bandit gets to decide to either drop the price or
keep it stable for all users who have not yet made a purchase. We know from offline
evaluation and the online pilot in Sections 5.4.3.2 and 5.4.3.3 that a conversion
reward leads to a low-price and a revenue reward to a high-price policy. To emulate
a skimming policy that initially sets rather high prices and then lowers prices, I set
the first three bandits to have a revenue reward and the later three bandits to have
a conversion reward. The idea is for the bandit system to first skim with high prices
and then penetrate with low prices.
5.4.4.2 Evaluating the prior in an online run of the sequential bandit
system
To take the system to an online run, I seed it with a prior to drop price at each
decision stage and set the learning rate epsilon to 50%. At each decision stage, on
a random 25% of users, price will hence be dropped and kept stable respectively (to
account for 50% learning rate), and the bandit gets to make its own decision per
user context (as defined by country tiers, device tiers and behavioral data) on the
remaining 50% – with a prior to drop price. Choosing this “prior seeding” approach
sentially, contexts with an expected mean spend above $4 receive the $19.99 offer at app download,
the $9.99 offer goes to contexts with an expected mean spend between $2.01 and $4, the $4.99
offer to contexts with an expected mean spend between $1.01 and $2.00, and the $2.99 offer to the
remaining contexts with expected spend of $1 or below.
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Figure 5.8: A schematic depiction of the firm’s sequential decision problem
Notes: Bandit-based system for online learning of price paths: At app download, a heuristic per-
sonalization policy is used and then six contextual bandits are concatenated with the same decision
space (drop price or keep it stable), but different reward specifications to emulate a pricing man-
agers that aims to implement a skimming policy. The three initial bandits have a revenue-reward
to implement a high-price policy to skim, the following three bandits have a conversion-reward to
implement a low-price policy to penetrate and convert users with lower willingness-to-pay.
avoids both the cold start problem (Li et al. 2010) and ensures that the action with
highest expected profit – which is to drop price here to implement a skimming policy
– is taken in lack of disconfirming evidence. The fourth result column in Table 5.5
shows results of this online run on user behavior outcomes as assessed on 104,052
new users who downloaded the app. While offer conversion and overall conversion
are significantly up (by 20.3% and 8.7% respectively), other monetization and usage
outcomes are not significantly impacted.
Importantly, the bandits do not take contextual information into account, but
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Table 5.7: Regression of reward on sequential price decisions
Model M5.1 M5.2 M5.3 M5.4 M5.5 M5.6
Decision point Day 2 Day 4 Day 6 Day 8 Day 10 Day 12
Reward (= y) Offer Offer Offer Offer Offer Offerrevenue revenue revenue conversion conversion conversion
Price decision
Keep price (1) −0.0027 0.0099 −0.0071 −0.0013 −0.0022 −0.0032(0.615) (0.046) (0.099) (0.085) (0.007) (0.015)
Intercept 0.0297 0.019 0.0173 0.0036 0.0032 0.0037(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 47,033 29,755 19,488 21,259 14,256 8,388
Notes: Results for a regression of the respective reward at each decision point on the price decision.
Evidence does not support the prior to lower the offer price at the Day 2 and Day 4 decision points,
but it does for the later decision points – leading to the skimming policy shown in Figure 5.9.
choose a uniform action across contexts. To verify that the bandits’ decisions are
reasonable, the authors conducted a more detailed analysis shown in Appendix A4.
Here, I want to focus on informing a uniform – as contextual data do not matter to
price paths in a consistent manner – skimming policy. To do so, I simply regress the
respective reward at the six price decision points (see Figure 5.8) on an indicator if
the offer price was lowered or not. Table 5.7 shows results; note that the sample size
decreases for later decision points as the bandit only makes a decision for users that
are active in the two days before the decision point and have not made a purchase
yet. Models M5.1 and M5.2 indicate that there is no evidence supporting price
drops at the Day 2 and Day 4 decision point. While the coefficient in model M5.1
is negative, it is far from significant. In model M5.2, the coefficient is positive –
indicating that price should be kept stable. The coefficients in models M5.3 to M5.6
are consistently negative, indicating that price should be lowered at these decision
points to achieve higher reward. These results hence support a price policy for the
offer as shown in Figure 5.9. The initial price at app download is set based on the
heuristic policy derived in 5.4.4.1 and then, at the first two decision points, offer
price is kept stable and at the following decision points it is lowered.
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Figure 5.9: The final personalization policy’s price path per user context
Notes: Offer prices of final personalized skimming policy, per country and device segments and
decision point along users’ experience in the app. The offer price shown here is the one made
available to users who have not yet made a purchase and log into the app. The corresponding
offers are shown in Table 5.1 on page 121.
5.4.4.3 Evaluation of the personalized skimming policy
The impact of the price personalization policy derived in the previous two sections on
user behavior outcomes is shown in the last column of Table 5.5, as evaluated against
the best flat-price tactic in a field run with 100,821 new users downloading the app.
I find statistically significant effects (>95% probability that the treatment value is
greater than the value in the non-personalized holdout group in a Bayesian signifi-
cance test with flat priors) on offer conversion (+44.4%, prob(B>A) > 99.9%), offer
revenue (+15.9%, prob(B>A) = 95.3%), overall paying users (+26.4%, prob(B>A)
> 99.9%), and game rounds played (+3.9%, prob(B>A) = 95.6%). Impact on over-
all revenue is positive (+20.8%, prob(B>A) = 81.7%), but only significant for 98th
percentile winsorized revenue (+23.2%, prob(B>A) = 96.1%). Other measures of
app engagement show positive directional effects: +4.4.%, prob(B>A) = 84.3%, for
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Table 5.8: Regression of monetization outcomes a month after app download on
policy indicator and continuous background characteristics
Model M6.1 M6.2 M6.3 M6.4 M6.5
Revenue
Dependent (winsorized at Offer Offer
variable Revenue 98th percentile) Conversion revenue conversion
Treatment (Reference = Flat-price holdout)
Personalized skimming −0.416 (0.355) −0.471 (0.033) 0.002 (0.384) −0.047 (0.086) 0.003 (0.133)
Purchase history / expected user spending based on device data
Device memory in giga
byte 0.493 *** (0.000) 0.324 *** (0.000) 0.008 *** (0.000) 0.057 *** (0.000) 0.005 *** (0.000)
Interactions
Personalized skimming
x device memory 0.195 (0.214) 0.217 *** (0.005) 0.000 (0.669) 0.021 ** (0.031) 0.000 (0.549)
Intercept −0.260 (0.502) −0.073 (0.703) −0.002 (0.236) −0.021 (0.377) −0.002 (0.332)
Model M6.6 M6.7 M6.8 M6.9 M6.10
Revenue
Dependent (winsorized at Offer Offer
variable Revenue 98th percentile) Conversion revenue conversion
Treatment (Reference = Flat-price holdout)
Personalized skimming −0.376 (0.290) −0.091 (0.604) 0.002 (0.175) −0.011 (0.620) 0.005 *** (0.004)
Country-based budget constraint / expected user spending based on geolocation data
GDP per capita 2017
(in $10k) 0.325 *** (0.001) 0.298 *** (0.000) 0.005 *** (0.000) 0.044 *** (0.000) 0.004 *** (0.000)
Interactions
Personalized skimming
x GDP per capita 2017 0.213 ** (0.048) 0.094 * (0.077) 0.001 (0.225) 0.011 (0.106) 0.000 (0.726)
Intercept 0.109 (0.730) −0.050 (0.751) −0.003 * (0.093) 0.005 (0.789) 0.001 (0.461)
Notes: Results of linear regressions of monetization outcomes a month after app download on policy
indicator, continuous background characteristics and interaction terms; N = 100,821; * significant
at the 10%-level, ** 5%-level, *** 1%-level.
retention, and +5.1%, prob(B>A) = 93.9%, for time spent in the app. The personal-
ized skimming approach is further able to mitigate any possible cannibalizing effect
of increased premium purchasing on the consumption of ads (ads viewed are not
impacted with +2.5% at prob(B>A) = 81.9%). Overall, this paints a very positive
picture for the effects of the identified personalization policy on app monetization
and engagement. As marginal cost of additional in-app purchases are zero for the
firm, the policy is profitable compared to a counterfactual where the firm offers the
most profitable non-personalized in-app offer at $4.99.
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5.4.4.4 Policy effects by country and device characteristics
To understand the relative effectiveness of the personalized skimming policy (as
shown in Figure 5.9) among users from different contexts, Figure 5.10 depicts mean
lift in monetization outcomes in the policy treatment compared to the randomized
$4.99 flat-price holdout group. As sample size is small within individual contexts,
the figure shows outcomes for country and device tiers separately. It highlights how
the skimming strategy drives down offer and overall purchases in high value device
and country tiers early after app download. As prices then drop, this gap closes and
ultimately results in a lift in purchases a month after app download. The strategy
further leads to a consistent lift in offer and overall revenue in high-value segments
compared to a flat-price strategy.
In lower-valuation segments (country tier 3 and 4, device tier 3 to 5), the lower
relative initial price ($2.99 versus $4.99 in the holdout) leads to a strong increase
in offer and overall purchases. This strong premium conversion lift is accompanied
by a decrease in relative revenue in the lowest country and device tier; this revenue
gap however closes over time after app download as purchasing lift remains strong
and consistent. A month after app download, the personalized skimming policy has
achieved a consistent high lift in the number of paying customers and mean revenue
compared to the best-flat-price strategy applied in the holdout group.
Table 5.8 presents a multivariate assessment of the policy’s effect on app mone-
tization. Regressions of key monetization outcomes a month after app download on
a treatment indicator and the continuous background variables device memory and
GDP per capita confirm the strong main effect of device quality and GDP on con-
sumers’ in-app purchasing. The positive interaction effects in models M6.2, M6.4,
M6.6 and M6.7 indicate that the policy’s effectiveness is in large part driven by
high-value users on higher quality devices and from higher-GDP countries.
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Figure 5.10: The policy’s effect on purchase behavior by segment
Notes: Effect of the personalized skimming policy shown in Figure 5.9 on page 144, by device and
country segments. The value shown is the lift in % in the respective outcome in the personalized
over the flat-price holdout condition.
5.5 Discussion
The present study investigates a problem currently faced by mobile marketers: How
can firms marketing mobile games use in-app purchase pricing and promotion to
improve relevant economic outcomes, in particular monetization and engagement
among new app adopters? Due to fairness considerations and the risk of customer
backlash, the study does not alter the prices charged to different users directly, but
devises differently priced “beginner bundles” that are targeted to new app adopters.
It develops an analysis of price setting for such in-app promotions in mobile games
over six large-scale field experiments showing that low price points can dampen
monetization of users with high expected spending (study 1 in Section 5.4.1), that
skimming has potential in this setting (study 2 in Section 5.4.2) and that price points
higher than the ones considered by current managerial practice have merit among
select users (study 4 in Section 5.4.4). Ultimately, the authors devise a heuristi-
cally personalized skimming tactic that achieves a 44.4% increase in demand for
the “starter pack” (prob(B>A) > 99.9%) and a 15.9% increase in revenue generated
from it (prob(B>A) = 95.3%) compared to a randomized control group that receives
the best performing non-personalized pack. This final personalization policy further
achieves a 26.4% lift in overall paying users (prob(B>A) > 99.9%), a 23.2% increase
in winsorized revenue (to control for outliers; prob(B>A) = 96.1%) and 3.9% more
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game rounds played (prob(B>A) = 95.6%) compared to the best flat-price tactic.
The authors want to use the discussion to highlight contributions to the literature
and further develop the following aspects of the study before addressing limitations
of this research: (1) 96.3% (100% if data scientists are excluded) of the 54 surveyed
managers set a price below $10 for an in-app purchase promotion to new adopters
(“starter pack” or “beginner’s bundle”) – the study shows that prices above $10 can
be profitably charged to select user segments. This finding begs the question why
managers seem to have such a strong “low-price bias.” (2) The proposed method
supports learning of a profitable personalization policy, but it ignores contextual
data (Li et al. 2010; Bietti et al. 2018) – warranting further discussion. (3) Results
show how personalization can increase firm profits, but what about implications
from a wider societal perspective?
5.5.1 Contributions to the literature
The present study is one of the first to empirically investigate the feasibility of price
personalization (Rossi et al. 1996) in an online business-to-consumer (B2C) setting.
Empirical applications in online B2C settings are rare due to the high connectedness
of users and related high risk of customer backlash (Chatterjee and McGinnis 2010;
Martinez 2014; Sinclair 2017). Dubé and Misra (2017) is a rare exception, but their
study is situated in a business-to-business setting (B2B), where implementations
of personalized prices tend to be more accepted, e.g., due to lower emotionality of
the purchase process and weaker fairness considerations (Odlyzko 2004; Chatterjee
and McGinnis 2010). Similarly, Acquisti and Varian (2005) and Shiller (2020) study
price discrimination in a B2C setting, but rely on model-based counterfactuals rather
than field experimentation. Speaking to this literature, the present study shows
that personalized promotion of in-app purchases (similar to coupon targeting in
Dubé et al. 2017a) can increase user engagement, overall realized premium demand
and app profitability, while not causing customer complaints and backlash. These
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findings suggest that price personalization in online B2C settings more generally
and in freemium settings more specifically can be highly profitable, and that it has
potential to increase engagement with content through increased access to premium
experiences. It however appears of paramount importance that firms take fairness
considerations seriously and do not charge different prices to different users at the
same time without good reason (Martinez 2014; Sinclair 2017). In digital settings,
reasons such as different cost of supply do commonly not apply as marginal cost
of production and distribution tend to be virtually zero. Extending on the study’s
contribution to literature on firms’ price setting, to the authors’ best knowledge, the
present study is the first to evaluate a skimming approach in the field by means of
actual randomization versus a flat-price control condition (Shapiro 1983; Nair 2007).
On the methodological front, the study speaks to recent advances in approaches
to field experimentation, specifically the use of bandit methods to lower the cost of
experimentation (Li et al. 2010; Schwartz et al. 2017; Sutton and Barto 2018; Misra
et al. 2019). Reports on the application of such methods to marketing problems are
rare but much needed. Furthermore, to the authors’ best knowledge, the current
analysis is the first to concatenate several bandits with different reward specifications
to mirror a pricing manager who attempts to implement a profitable skimming
policy. The suggested experimental design is applicable more widely, e.g., when a
firm wants to learn profitable price paths for the launch of a new durable product
or for a subscriptions on a news website.
Finally, the present study contributes evidence on the viability of price as a
policy measure to counter excessive consumption of mobile online content, comple-
menting a burgeoning literature on usage restrictions in this setting (Kwon et al.
2016; Nevskaya and Albuquerque 2019; Jo et al. 2020). Findings suggest that price
and the prohibition of “gateway” offers (Schütze 2014; Wang et al. 2016) are likely
not effective policy measures and that restrictions of usage and design elements such
as lottery-based rewards may be more promising levers towards curbing unhealthy
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consumption patterns (Koeder and Tanaka 2017; Nevskaya and Albuquerque 2019;
Jo et al. 2020). Section 5.5.4 will further address this perspective.
5.5.2 Why do managers have a “low-price bias?”
A survey that the authors conducted in 201914 found that 96.3% of managers believe
that extending a promotion to app adopters is essential to drive monetization in
this setting – which is in line with recent research on the topic (Runge et al. 2019).
85.2% of managers further “focus on making an attractive offer to get users to make
a purchase quickly,” while only 14.8% think they should “focus on making users an
offer at the highest possible price they are willing to pay” (question 7 on page 158).
This managerial practice may originate from an overconfident belief in the ability
to retain customers once they have made a purchase: The majority of respondents
(61.1%) believe that they can sell users more later on and are not worried about
potential adverse effects on consumer expectations (question 8 on page 158).
A further, and possibly most powerful, driver of the documented low-price bias
is risk aversion: A low-price approach leads to much larger numbers of paying users
but barely impacts overall spending of heavy users (see Section 5.4.1). It can hence
appear to be less risky as revenue generation seems to be more evenly spread among
users when only considering the mean and ignoring further moments of the distri-
bution. To check if this mechanism may underlie the observed low-price bias, the
authors included the following question in the survey (question 9 on page 158): “If
you had the choice, which monetization configuration would you prefer? (1) Average
lifetime value of users in the app is 10 USD; 1% of users spend 1000 USD each. (2)
Average lifetime value of users in the app is 10 USD; 10% of users spend 100 USD
each. (3) I’m indifferent between both options.” 81.5% of managers chose option
2, 13% chose option 3, and only 5.5% chose option 1 (the order of response options
14Please refer to Appendix A1 for details on the survey’s implementation and to Table 5.9 on
page 157 for survey responses.
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was randomized). Managers essentially can self-service their preference by choosing
a low-price approach that lowers average spend per payer, but creates many more
paying users as shown in Section 5.4.1.
As outlined in Section 5.2.2, the survey surfaced that 25.9% of managers set
a price smaller than $3, 59.3% a price smaller than $5 and 96.3% a price smaller
than $10 for an initial promotion in a mobile game (question 10 on page 158).
Excluding the 14 surveyed data scientists, these numbers are 27.5%, 65% and 100%
of managers. Within current managerial practice, the presented personalization
policy would hence be impossible to devise for lack of price points greater than or
equal to $10. Further, only about half of surveyed managers (53.7%) have used any
sort of price personalization (question 14 on page 159). It hence appears that the
presented personalization approach can have major impact on managerial practice
and provide direct guidance how to generate higher profits in this setting.
5.5.3 Effectiveness of learning algorithm
The authors chose a contextual bandit learner as it had been documented to be
effective in previous literature, both as a wider class of algorithm applied to mar-
keting problems (Schwartz et al. 2017; Misra et al. 2019) as well as the specific
implementation in Vowpal Wabbit (Li et al. 2010; Bietti et al. 2018). It was able
to assist with learning a profitable personalization policy, but ultimately defaulted
to the non-contextual version of a bandit in that available contextual data were not
effective towards learning of a personalized policy. This result is disappointing, but
does not take away from the essential premise that the presented learning system
can learn profitable skimming policies well beyond the setting studied here. To
the authors’ best knowledge, the concatentation of several bandits that pass their
decision on to their successor and have different rewards is novel and akin to build-
ing an “artificial pricing manager” who automatically adjusts offer price based on
observed demand characteristics (Rothschild 1974). When devising such a system,
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a few aspects should be considered: Bandits should be cleanly delineated in a new
bandit’s agency only beginning once the reward of the previous bandit has been fully
observed. Reward observation windows should further be sensible via-a-vis product
usage and purchase cycles. Rewards should also be chosen to mimic a substantively
sensible policy maker; in this study: a policy maker that skims high valuations by
aiming at high revenue generation and then penetrates with lower prices by focusing
on conversion. Finally, bandits should be able to adjust price as long as targetable
consumers are still available.
In lack of offline data that can be used for evaluation of targeting algorithms,
such a system is powerful in picking up on contextual data should these be relevant
(which we cannot know when we do not have relevant data from existing random
trials to evaluate the algorithm – such data were only available from the A/B test for
the app download decision point as shown in Section 5.4.3.2). The system presented
here could, e.g., also be applied to pricing decisions for a new durable product that
is launched globally where initial prices are set based on geolocation information
and then price is adjusted per geolocation based on newly arriving sales data. Also,
other data, e.g., on weather, news events and from social media such as Wikipedia
or Twitter, could be taken into account. If managers are unwilling to give up agency
on pricing decisions, their new “artificial colleague” can initially only provide recom-
mendations. Once these have proven themselves to be reasonable, the learner can
exert increasingly greater agency on price decisions.
Reports on applications of bandits and reinforcement learning more widely to
business decisions are rare (Misra et al. 2019; Schwartz et al. 2017). Most studies
focus on problems that lend themselves to automation and have not traditionally
been addressed by human decision makers at scale (Li et al. 2010). Pricing is an
area that tends to receive a lot of managerial attention. In this regard, this study
shows how managerial intuition and substantive knowledge can be valuable assets in
devising systems for data-driven optimization. Not only do they provide guidance,
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e.g., for how to overcome cold start issues (Bietti et al. 2018; Padilla and Ascarza
2019; Loupos et al. 2019, also see Sections 5.4.4.1 and 5.4.3.3), but taking them
into account is paramount in creating managerial acceptance for artificial intelligent
systems.
5.5.4 Policy implications
From a wider societal perspective, this study speaks to issues of data-driven opti-
mization and fairness: A main reason firms refrain from wider reaching price dis-
crimination and pay explicit attention to fairness considerations, may be consumers’
self-organization on forums and chat apps and the risk of customer protests and back-
lash should they feel treated unfairly (Odlyzko 2004; Chatterjee and McGinnis 2010;
Li et al. 2019) – also see free-form comments on the survey among managers shown
in Appendix A1, e.g., “the impact [of price personalization] was hugely negative
within the community” (question 15 on page 159). It could seem desirable for policy
makers not to rely on such self-organization, but to limit price discrimination and
dynamic pricing practices by legal regulatory means. Especially when consumers
face a monopolistic seller (Petro 2019), their self-organization and complaints may
become ineffective and intervention by policy makers may be necessary to achieve a
fair outcome.
It should be noted that such discriminatory practice does not solely benefit
the firm, but can also be advantageous to consumers. Price discrimination will
usually tend to charge higher prices to consumers with higher willingness-to-pay.
To the extent that such higher willingness-to-pay derives from higher income and
wealth, price discrimination can have a desirable redistributive effect. In the case of
online games, high willingness-to-pay may, however, sometimes derive from addictive
tendencies (Kwon et al. 2016; Nevskaya and Albuquerque 2019; Jo et al. 2020) rather
than be reflective of personal wealth. Proactive regulation could hence be well
advised in this setting.
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A further consideration are policy measures to ensure healthy habits in the con-
sumption of online games. Freemium pricing and mobile devices have given rise to
an unparalleled increase in demand for online content by lowering entry and access
barriers, bringing increased attention to issues of excessive use and online gaming
addiction (European Commission 2014; Kwon et al. 2016; Jo et al. 2020). This
study’s findings suggest that pricing of premium upgrades and in-app purchases
may not be an effective policy lever to impact spending sprees of heavy users in
mobile games. Along these lines, measures such as excise taxes that intend to in-
crease the price of addictive goods to curb their consumption may also be of mixed
effectiveness (Wang et al. 2016). Overall revenue generation appears largely driven
by design factors beyond pricing of in-app purchases or “gateway” offers (Schütze
2014). Usage limitations (Hahn et al. 2010; Nevskaya and Albuquerque 2019) and
prohibition of certain design elements such a “Gatcha” and lottery-based purchases
(Koeder and Tanaka 2017) may be more promising policy measures.
5.5.5 Limitations and future research
This study focuses on in-depth field experimentation in a popular game that is rep-
resentative of the mobile game category (Levitt et al. 2016), leading to both high
internal and external validity of the findings. External validity is further ensured
by providing robust theoretical foundation for experiments and findings. Generally,
a field experimentation approach entails high external validity, but evidence from
further games would be helpful in supporting generalizability. Data available for
analysis is representative of the situation of app developers. Platform operators
such as Google and Apple have much more in-depth data that would likely make
personalization of price and other treatments more effective. For good reason, espe-
cially to guard privacy and prevent discriminatory practice, this data is not available
more widely though.
Also speaking to privacy issues, the authors cannot make user-level data available
5.6. CONCLUSION 155
for public use. Replication is still possible, but interested researchers will need to
reach out to the corresponding author who can facilitate a data sharing and non-
disclosure agreement with the data sponsor. Such measures are necessary due to
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that applies to any company with
customers in the area of the European Union. While this is a limitation of desirable
and well intended research aims, such limitations on transparency are necessary if
consumer data protections is to be ensured.
A further limitation is that the bandit-based learning system did not use contex-
tual data in its decisions. While it was still helpful in devising a profitable skimming
policy based on the randomization it introduced to the data while still “exploiting”
based on a promising prior on 50% of users, applications of this system where con-
textual data matter and help to devise a further reaching personalization are a viable
avenue for future research. Generally, further applications of reinforcement learning
to marketing problems will be helpful in creating acceptance of such approaches
in practice. An interesting extension of the current research in freemium settings
could, e.g., personalize advertising load and content to different users based on their
contextual data.
Finally, the analysis in this paper disregards competitive effects. While these
may be low once a user downloaded an app and is “hooked” on its free version,
studying these can make for an interesting extension in the setting of mobile apps
and freemium software more generally, similar to recent work by Dubé et al. (2017a).
5.6 Conclusion
The present study is motivated from a substantive real-world problem that exist-
ing literature provides mixed guidance on: How should marketers set the price for
“starter packs” in mobile games? In light of a long stream of literature caution-
ing against the use of low-price approaches (Lattin and Bucklin 1989; Blattberg
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et al. 1995; Mela et al. 1997; Dekimpe et al. 1998; Jedidi et al. 1999; Anderson and
Simester 2004), current managerial practice appears possibly flawed despite strong
conceptual arguments in its favor; see 5.2.2.1 for an overview. Addressing this sub-
stantive issue, the study shows that managers in the $80 billion (2018 revenue)
mobile gaming market can achieve higher profits by initially charging prices for in-
app purchase promotions that are well beyond their comfort zone: (1) Only charge
high prices to select user segments with high expected spending, (2) drop prices
after a brief initial skimming period to entice users with lower willingness-to-pay to
make a purchase, and (3) do so before users with lower willingness-to-pay disengage.
These insights will similarly apply to pricing of other freemium digital content, e.g.,
subscriptions on a news website, in dating and networking apps and even in office
and collaboration software. The study further showcases how field experimentation
and a bandit-based online learning system can support the learning of profitable
skimming price paths. The presented learning system is akin to an artificial pricing
managers who aspires to implement a profitable skimming policy in concatenating
several bandit learners with different reward specifications (see Figure 5.8 and Sec-
tion 5.4.4.2). The authors believe that this learning system can inspire and inform
profitable applications well beyond mobile game and freemium settings, e.g., in pric-
ing news content, dating apps, other software-as-a-service solutions, or even during




Appendix A1: Survey among mobile game managers
The survey was implemented in Google Forms and distributed on Mobiledevmemo
(https://mobiledevmemo.com) – one of the largest mobile marketing blogs – and on
Deconstructor of Fun (https://www.deconstructoroffun.com) – the leading mobile
game design blog. Participation was incentivized with a lottery of a $30 Amazon
voucher. The order of response options on all questions was randomized. 54 man-
agers participated; 14 data scientists / analysts, 16 product managers / designers
and 14 marketing managers; 10 respondents chose “Other” as a response. The full
survey is available at https://forms.gle/P2CPuLe9TH4bhh9E8 for readers’ refer-
ence.
Table 5.9: Results of a survey among mobile game managers
Question 1: How many years have you worked with mobile apps?
Response: 6.9 years (median: 2.4)
Question 2: What types of apps have you worked on?
Response: 90.8% have worked in games; 66.7% have worked only in games. 9.3% have worked
on other apps (ride hailing, news, lifestyle, social media, traveling) only.
Question 3: Did the freemium apps that you worked on offer one-off purchases, subscriptions
or both?
Response: 53.7% of respondents worked on apps that combined one-off purchases and subscrip-
tion(s), 42.6% on apps that only offered one-off purchases, the rest on apps that only offered
subscriptions.
Question 4: How many years of professional marketing training do you have?
Response: 44.4% have zero years professional marketing training. The rest has an average of
3.2 years of such training (overall average 1.8 years).
Question 5: Which role did you work in most?
Response: 16 respondents worked mostly in product design or management, 14 worked mostly
in marketing, another 14 mostly in data science or analytics. 10 respondents did not provide an
answer.
Question 6: Monetizing and retaining app users can be challenging. In your opinion, to suc-
cessfully monetize a freemium app’s user base, you need to offer promotions and deals to users.
Response: 96.3% of respondents pick this over not using promotions and deals.
(continues on next page)
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Continue Table 5.9: Results of a survey among mobile game managers
Question 7: When new users download an app, do you think it is more important to. . .
Response: 85.2%: focus on making them an attractive offer to get them to make a purchase
quickly.
14.8%: focus on making them an offer at the highest possible price they are willing to pay.
Question 8: Building on the previous question, which of the following statements is more correct
in your opinion:
Response: 61.1%: It is safer to sell a premium upgrade at a price lower than what a user is
willing to pay – you can sell them more later.
38.9%: It is crucial to not set too low a price as a low price can impact what users are willing
to pay in the future.
Question 9: If you had the choice, which monetization configuration would you prefer in an
app (assuming advertising revenue is the same):
Response: 5.5%: Average lifetime value of users in the app is 10 USD; 1% of users spend 1000
USD each.
81.5%: Average lifetime value of users in the app is 10 USD; 10% of users spend 100 USD each.
13%: I’m indifferent between both options.
Question 10: Which price (after discounts) do you think is appropriate for an initial promotion,
i.e., an offer to new users, in the app?
Response: <= 3 USD: 25.9%
3.01 to 5 USD: 33.3%
5.01 to 10 USD: 37.1%
> 10 USD: 3.7%
Question 11: Retention and engagement are crucial to build an app’s user base. In your
opinion, when a user makes a purchase,. . .
Response: 18.5%: it is because they are engaged with the app.
81.5%: it is because they are engaged, and it increases their engagement with the app.
0%: it increases their engagement with the app.
Question 12: If you like, please share further thoughts how to best monetize a freemium app’s
user base:
Response:
– by introducing time-limited events/sales/offers.
– really depends on region, how is your purchase screen set and also what features are paid and
what are free.
– From a UA standpoint, I obviously prefer stronger early monetisation but it needs to be
balanced so it doesn’t cannibalise the overall LTV. One of the easiest monetisation tricks can
be to try to segment the users on a day 0 based on their early signals and user properties and
then adjust the starter packs and FTUE according to these segmentation.
– Through segmented promotions and personal offers based on segmentations. And a second
currency with lives/ energy mechanics and rewarded video to decrease the waiting time.
– Hook them with great free content so that they want more and purchase.
– In general by not focusing too much on monetization strictly. The biggest mistake game
teams make is focusing on the “supply” side: how you are selling the stuff you sell instead of
the “demand” side: how to make players want more of the stuff you sell. There are some wins
on the supply side sure, but big wins only come from big lifts in demand.
– create a perception of value for your target audience; communicate clearly the value (what’s
in it for them?) of what you have to sell; connect the items you sell with the player’s goal in
the game.
(continues on next page)
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Continue Table 5.9: Results of a survey among mobile game managers
– The first purchase *has* to be seen by the user as “worth it.” If you’re pushing too much or
things the user later realises are “not good enough,” then you’ve scarred them for the rest of
their app-lifetime.
– The cost of virtual goods is based on perception of value, and so before offering a user anything,
it is imperative that you first establish the value of the thing you want to sell them. This can
be in the form own utility or rarity or a combination of both. The power of the perceived
value determines the money you can make from the item.
– Define the chase based on user’s motivation (can be different by segment), the app will have
a compelling value proposition and price point eventually. Run experiments to optimize price
points.
– Spend more time thinking about what will make them enjoy the game, than how you can get
money out of them. If they love the game, they will pay for things happily.
– I think it’s important to have a healthy balance of free and premium users. Obviously we
want all our users to become premium, but that’s highly unlikely. Therefore, make sure that
the free tier is also attractive for users. So keep investing in the free tier as well.
– These are hard questions. I don’t feel confident about my answers to any of them.
Question 13: Many apps sell premium upgrades at different prices in different countries. Price
personalization is the practice of setting different prices for individual users based on further
characteristics, e.g., the device they downloaded the app on. In your opinion, such price per-
sonalization is. . .
Response: 70.3%: an essential tool in freemium apps to increase user monetization.
27.8%: more risky than useful in freemium apps.
1.9%: N/A
Question 14: Have you used price personalization beyond country-based pricing (either through




Question 15: If you like, please share further thoughts on price personalization:
Response:
– offer personalization – yes; price personalization – yes, but the impact was hugely negative
within the community.
– We use user behaviour to personalise the IAP prices during the special events.
– I think that it worth to an test price segments per country, even though on my experience it
wasn’t successful.
– At my previous job, we had a bigger user base on Android than on iOS. But they generated
roughly the same revenue. Therefore we experimented with lower prices (which wasn’t possible
anyway in the App Store with their fixed price tier system) and it increased the number of
buyers and later the total revenue as well.
– It can work well.
– Machine leaning can be used for classifying user types for price personalization as segmentation
based tools (mainly used for adjusting prices in the aviation industry as for the case of
discounters like Ryanair) might be unsuccessful in modeling the user’s preference.
– I have never seen country based pricing generate a higher average revenue per user. I don’t
deem it risky, I just don’t see the value in the extra work as you get the same return. However
it is a way to gain featuring, which then justifies the additional effort.
– Do not discriminate players based on weird selection, offer good value to everyone.
(continues on next page)
160 CHAPTER 5. MONETIZING FREEMIUM PLAY
Continue Table 5.9: Results of a survey among mobile game managers
– I think price personalization is essential. Some demographics have less to spend (think stu-
dents, 65+, families, etc) and tailoring prices to them helps retaining users. Most of these
concepts are already socially accepted, so people tend to accept them (think lower prices to
museums, public transportation, etc)
– We set prices uniformly for all users, in all countries.
– If you value growing a healthy community around your app (which is very important for
games), my bet is that you have more to lose than gain from price personalization, simply
due to the fact that players talk to each other and it’s (in my opinion rightly) perceived as
unfair.
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Appendix A2: Code for algorithm offline evaluation
This appendix presents an example of the code used for offline evaluation of Vow-
pal Wabbit’s (contextual) bandit algorithm. The online learning system described
in Section 5.7 uses the C++ implementation of Vowpal Wabbit. For this offline
evaluation, the Python wrapper of Vowpal Wabbit was used – see https://gith
ub.com/VowpalWabbit/vowpal_wabbit for extensive documentation. The full code
example also shows what other Python packages were used in this analysis and
is available at https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1ulPZHu2WkD2NwLTr
wAl5Vp3917aGQwm-?usp=sharing. The following code example shown here imple-
ments the policy estimation approach described in Section 5.3.2.2 and presented in
Hitsch and Misra (2018) in more detail; the same code was used to generate the
figures shown in Figure 5.6 on page 135:
# de f ine number o f a r r i v a l s to use f o r t r a i n in g
n = 100000
# se t cos t t ha t con t e x tua l band i t i s to minimize
df [ ’ c o s t ’ ] = df [ ’ d1_of fer_convers ion ’ ]∗(−1)
cost_kpi = ’ co s t ’
# use f i r s t N a r r i v a l s to l earn ( data i s sor t ed by user a r r i v a l time )
l earn_df = df . i l o c [ 0 : n , : ]
# use remainder f o r p o l i c y eva l ua t i on
deploy_df = df . i l o c [ n : len ( df ) , : ]
## add index to l earn d f
l earn_df [ ’ index ’ ] = range (0 , len ( learn_df ) )
learn_df = learn_df . set_index ( " index " )
## add index to dep loy d f
deploy_df [ ’ index ’ ] = range (0 , len ( deploy_df ) )
deploy_df = deploy_df . set_index ( " index " )
# crea te model − t h i s s t o r e s the model parameters in the python vowpal wabb i t
o b j e c t
## model i s s e t to cons ider th ree ac t i ons and be dep loyed with 0 l ea rn ing ra t e
vw = pyvw .vw( "−−cb_explore ␣3␣−−ep s i l o n ␣0" )
# use the l earn method to t r a in the vw model ( t r a in model row by row)
i=0
for i in l earn_df . index :
## prov ide data to cb in reques t ed format
ac t i on = learn_df . l o c [ i , " ac t i on " ]
co s t = learn_df . l o c [ i , " co s t " ]
p r obab i l i t y = learn_df . l o c [ i , " p r obab i l i t y " ]
f e a tu r e 1 = learn_df . l o c [ i , " country_groups" ]
f e a tu r e 2 = learn_df . l o c [ i , " device_groups " ]
## do the ac tua l l e a rn ing
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vw . l e a rn ( str ( ac t i on )+" : "+str ( co s t )+" : "+str ( p r obab i l i t y )+"␣ | ␣"+str ( f e a tu r e 1 )+"␣"+
str ( f e a tu r e 2 ) )
# eva lua t e on remaining a r r i v a l s us ing 30 50% boo t s t r ap s
## for 2.99 o f f e r = ac t ion 1 , 4.99 o f f e r = ac t ion 2 , 29.99 o f f e r = ac t ion 3
## with ac t ion 2 ( b e s t unpersona l i z ed o f f e r ) as comparison ba s e l i n e
# crea t e o b j e c t s to s t o r e r e s u l t s
reward_li ft_best_t = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
reward_li ft_best_t [ 0 ] = 99
cost_l i f t_best_t = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
cos t_l i f t_best_t [ 0 ] = 99
ass igned_act ion1 = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
ass igned_act ion1 [ 0 ] = 99
ass igned_act ion2 = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
ass igned_act ion2 [ 0 ] = 99
ass igned_act ion3 = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
ass igned_act ion3 [ 0 ] = 99
same_assignment = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
same_assignment [ 0 ] = 99
act ion_dev ice_t ie r1 = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r1 [ 0 ] = 99
act ion_dev ice_t ie r2 = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r2 [ 0 ] = 99
act ion_dev ice_t ie r3 = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r3 [ 0 ] = 99
act ion_dev ice_t ie r4 = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r4 [ 0 ] = 99
act ion_dev ice_t ie r5 = np . z e r o s ( ( 30 , 1 ) )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r5 [ 0 ] = 99
# s t a r t loop fo r 50 boo t s t rap i t e r a t i o n s
k=1
for k in range (0 , 30 ) :
# use t r a in t e s t s p l i t data to boo t s t rap r e s u l t s
from s k l e a rn import data s e t s
from s k l e a rn . mode l_se lect ion import t r a i n_te s t_sp l i t
# ge t random 50% as t e s t s e t
drop_df , test_df = t r a i n_te s t_sp l i t ( deploy_df , t e s t_s i z e =0.5 , random_state=k)
# add index to dep loy d f
test_df [ ’ index ’ ] = range (0 , len ( test_df ) )
test_df = test_df . set_index ( " index " )
# pred i c t row by row and output r e s u l t s
prob1_vec = np . z e r o s ( ( test_df . shape [ 0 ] , 1 ) )
prob1_vec [ 0 ] = 99
prob2_vec = np . z e r o s ( ( test_df . shape [ 0 ] , 1 ) )
prob2_vec [ 0 ] = 99
prob3_vec = np . z e r o s ( ( test_df . shape [ 0 ] , 1 ) )
prob3_vec [ 0 ] = 99
j=0
for j in test_df . index :
f e a tu r e 1 = test_df . l o c [ j , " country_groups" ]
f e a tu r e 2 = test_df . l o c [ j , " device_groups " ]
vw_predict = vw . p r ed i c t ( " | ␣"+str ( f e a tu r e 1 )+"␣"+str ( f e a tu r e 2 ) )
prob1_vec [ j ] = vw_predict [ 0 ]
prob2_vec [ j ] = vw_predict [ 1 ]
prob3_vec [ j ] = vw_predict [ 2 ]
prob1_df = pd . DataFrame ( prob1_vec )
prob2_df = pd . DataFrame ( prob2_vec )
prob3_df = pd . DataFrame ( prob3_vec )
r e su l t_df = test_df . j o i n ( prob1_df )
r e su l t_df . rename ( columns={re su l t_df . columns [ 5 7 ] : ’ prob_action1 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
r e su l t_df = re su l t_df . j o i n ( prob2_df )
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r e su l t_d f . rename ( columns={re su l t_d f . columns [ 5 8 ] : ’ prob_action2 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
r e su l t_d f = re su l t_df . j o i n ( prob3_df )
r e su l t_d f . rename ( columns={re su l t_d f . columns [ 5 9 ] : ’ prob_action3 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
r e su l t_d f
# r o l l d i ce based on vowpal wabb i t output p r o b a b i l i t i e s to choose ac t ion
def choose_action ( row ) :
c=np . random . cho i c e (
[ 1 , 2 , 3 ] ,
1 ,
p=[round( row [ ’ prob_action1 ’ ] , 1 0 ) , round( row [ ’ prob_action2 ’ ] , 1 0 ) , (1−round( row
[ ’ prob_action1 ’ ] , 1 0 )−round( row [ ’ prob_action2 ’ ] , 1 0 ) ) ] )
return c . astype ( int )
r e su l t_d f [ ’ chosen_action ’ ] = np . nan
re su l t_d f [ ’ chosen_action ’ ] = re su l t_d f . apply (lambda row : choose_action ( row ) , ax i s
=1)
# i d e n t i f y ove r l ap s between dec i s i on and ac tua l assignment f o r o f f l i n e eva l ua t i on
def l abe l_eva l ( row ) :
i f row [ ’ a c t i on ’ ] == row [ ’ chosen_action ’ ] :
return 1
return 0
re su l t_d f [ ’ eva l_ labe l ’ ] = re su l t_df . apply (lambda row : l abe l_eva l ( row ) , ax i s=1)
# ca l c u l a t e expec ted average po l i c y reward and cos t based on over l app ing
in s tance s
reward_policy = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ eva l_ labe l ’ ]==1][ reward_kpi ] . mean ( )
cos t_po l i cy = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ eva l_ labe l ’ ]==1][ cost_kpi ] . mean ( )
reward_actions = re su l t_df . groupby ( [ ’ a c t i on ’ ] ) [ reward_kpi ] . mean ( )
reward_best_t = reward_actions [ 2 ]
reward_li ft_best_t [ k ] = ( reward_policy−reward_best_t ) /reward_best_t
cos t_act ions = re su l t_df . groupby ( [ ’ a c t i on ’ ] ) [ cost_kpi ] . mean ( )
cost_best_t = cost_act ions [ 2 ]
cos t_l i f t_best_t [ k ] = ( cost_pol icy−cost_best_t ) / cost_best_t
# sto r e de c i s i on s and number o f over l app ing de c i s i on s
ass igned_act ion1 [ k ] = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ chosen_action ’ ]==1][ ’ chosen_action ’ ] .
count ( )
ass igned_act ion2 [ k ] = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ chosen_action ’ ]==2][ ’ chosen_action ’ ] .
count ( )
ass igned_act ion3 [ k ] = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ chosen_action ’ ]==3][ ’ chosen_action ’ ] .
count ( )
same_assignment [ k ] = re su l t_df [ ’ eva l_ labe l ’ ] . sum( )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r1 [ k ] = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ device_groups ’ ]== ’ Device ␣ t i e r ␣1 ’ ] [ ’
chosen_action ’ ] . mean ( )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r2 [ k ] = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ device_groups ’ ]== ’ Device ␣ t i e r ␣2 ’ ] [ ’
chosen_action ’ ] . mean ( )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r3 [ k ] = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ device_groups ’ ]== ’ Device ␣ t i e r ␣3 ’ ] [ ’
chosen_action ’ ] . mean ( )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r4 [ k ] = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ device_groups ’ ]== ’ Device ␣ t i e r ␣4 ’ ] [ ’
chosen_action ’ ] . mean ( )
act ion_dev ice_t ie r5 [ k ] = re su l t_df [ r e su l t_df [ ’ device_groups ’ ]== ’ Device ␣ t i e r ␣5 ’ ] [ ’
chosen_action ’ ] . mean ( )
# aggrega te r e s u l t s and prepare f o r v i s u a l i z a t i o n
reward_lift_best_t_df = pd . DataFrame ( reward_li ft_best_t )
reward_lift_best_t_df . rename ( columns={reward_lift_best_t_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’Over␣Of f e r
␣ 4 .99 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
reward_l i f t_df = reward_lift_best_t_df
cost_l i f t_best_t_df = pd . DataFrame ( cos t_l i f t_best_t )
cost_l i f t_best_t_df . rename ( columns={cost_l i f t_best_t_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’Over␣Of f e r ␣
4 .99 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
co s t_ l i f t_d f = cost_l i f t_best_t_df
ass igned_act ion1_df = pd . DataFrame ( ass igned_act ion1 )
ass igned_act ion1_df . rename ( columns={ass igned_act ion1_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’ Assigned ␣ to ␣
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Of fe r ␣ 2 .99 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
ass igned_act ion2_df = pd . DataFrame ( ass igned_act ion2 )
ass igned_act ion2_df . rename ( columns={ass igned_act ion2_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’ Assigned ␣ to ␣
Of f e r ␣ 4 .99 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
ass igned_act ion3_df = pd . DataFrame ( ass igned_act ion3 )
ass igned_act ion3_df . rename ( columns={ass igned_act ion3_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’ Assigned ␣ to ␣
Of f e r ␣ 29 .99 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
same_assignment_df = pd . DataFrame ( same_assignment )
same_assignment_df . rename ( columns={same_assignment_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’ Overlapping ␣
ass ignment ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
assignment_df = ass igned_act ion1_df . j o i n ( ass igned_act ion2_df )
assignment_df = assignment_df . j o i n ( ass igned_act ion3_df )
assignment_df = assignment_df . j o i n ( same_assignment_df )
act ion_device_tier1_df = pd . DataFrame ( act ion_dev ice_t ie r1 )
act ion_device_tier1_df . rename ( columns={act ion_device_tier1_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’ Device ␣
t i e r ␣1 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
act ion_device_tier2_df = pd . DataFrame ( act ion_dev ice_t ie r2 )
act ion_device_tier2_df . rename ( columns={act ion_device_tier2_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’ Device ␣
t i e r ␣2 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
act ion_device_tier3_df = pd . DataFrame ( act ion_dev ice_t ie r3 )
act ion_device_tier3_df . rename ( columns={act ion_device_tier3_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’ Device ␣
t i e r ␣3 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
act ion_device_tier4_df = pd . DataFrame ( act ion_dev ice_t ie r4 )
act ion_device_tier4_df . rename ( columns={act ion_device_tier4_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’ Device ␣
t i e r ␣4 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
act ion_device_tier5_df = pd . DataFrame ( act ion_dev ice_t ie r5 )
act ion_device_tier5_df . rename ( columns={act ion_device_tier5_df . columns [ 0 ] : ’ Device ␣
t i e r ␣5 ’ } , i np l a c e=True )
device_action_df = act ion_device_tier1_df . j o i n ( act ion_device_tier2_df )
device_action_df = device_action_df . j o i n ( act ion_device_tier3_df )
device_action_df = device_action_df . j o i n ( act ion_device_tier4_df )
device_action_df = device_action_df . j o i n ( act ion_device_tier5_df )
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Appendix A3: Technical implementation of the online learning
system
The online learning system used for field experimentation was built in collaboration
with the data sponsor’s engineering team. It consists of two sub-systems: (1) A real-
time system that can make decisions at app download based on a provided model
(either a trained contextual bandit or a heuristic); (2) a “downstream” learning
system that has access to all behavioral data recorded in the company’s logs and
can use these for making decisions using flexible models.
The first sub-system (1) covers real-time personalization of the “starter pack”
at app download. The left panel of Figure 5.11 shows a schematic depiction of
the related decision architecture. A user device downloads the app from an app
store. Upon the first launch of the app, the user device authenticates with the
app server (step 1 in Figure 5.11) that in turn asks the real-time personalization
service for a personalization decision, also sending relevant contextual data with the
request (step 2). Based on the stored model’s decision the app server then tells
the content configuration store what configuration the user should receive (step 3).
The configuration store continuously keeps the user device (=app client) appraised
of this configuration assignment. The app server also sends data describing the
personalization decision to a database (step 4) where the data are recorded in a
well-behaved form. Both the app client and server continuously send data to this
database to provide analysts and data scientists with users’ behavioral traces. These
are the base for model building by data scientists and for automated reinforcement
of the real-time decision model (step 5).
The previous example focused on app download as a decision point and provides
on-demand personalization in real-time. The right panel of Figure 5.11 shows how
the “downstream” (i.e., after app download) user experience can then be adjusted
by telling the config store to deliver a different configuration (e.g., with a different
“starter pack”) to a user device. App server and client keep sending behavioral traces
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Figure 5.11: Schematic depiction of the architecture of the online learning system
Notes: Sub-system (1) on the left uses a stored model (either a trained contextual bandit or a
heuristic) and device and country segments to make a decision in real-time when a new user
downloads the app. Sub-system (2) on the right has access to detailed tracking data, including
behavioral data, as stored in the company’s logs and can use flexible models trained on this data
to make decisions on the “downstream” user experience after app download.
to the database (step 1), generating a large pool of data. All this data can then be
used to train dynamic decision models that can call into the config store to tell it to
give a new configuration to a user device (step 3). As before, the config store remains
in a constant loop with the client device to deliver the appropriate configuration.
In the present study, this workflow is used to re-assign users to a different “starter
pack” based on Vowpal Wabbit’s bandit module or a different logic.
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Appendix A4: Additional analysis of online learning run
To better understand why the bandits chose uniform actions across contexts, I use
least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO – Santosa and Symes 1986;
Tibshirani 1996) regression to analyze the individual price decisions on different
days after app download (as shown in Figure 5.8) to see what explanatory variables
are retained and if meaningful patterns emerge.
I use LASSO regression as implemented in the R package glmnet for variable
selection and regularization. The regularization parameter Lambda is tuned using
grid search and five-fold cross-validation. Table 5.10 shows results of this analysis.
Models are underpowered in that the price decision variable is dropped from four
of them. For the two models where the price decision is retained (model M8.1 and
model M8.2), the recommended decision is largely in line with regression results in
Section 5.4.4.2. Coefficients on contextual variable main and interaction effects are
inconsistently retained and overall very small, explaining why the bandits ignored
contextual variables in their decisions. Note that the sample size decreases for later
decision points (in days after app download) as the bandit only makes a decision
for users that are active in the two days before the decision point (see Figure 5.8)
and have not made a purchase yet. While the result that contextual variables do
not matter to the reward-action distribution is disappointing, this online run of the
bandit system is successful in indicating a viable uniform skimming policy as laid
out in Section 5.4.4.2.
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Table 5.10: Regression analysis of reward on contextual variables
Model M8.1 M8.2 M8.3 M8.4 M8.5 M8.6
Decision point Day 2 Day 4 Day 6 Day 8 Day 10 Day 12
Reward (= y) Offer Offer Offer Offer Offer Offerrevenue revenue revenue conversion conversion conversion
Price decision
Keep price (1) −0.006 0.0282 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Device tier (Tier 5 excluded as reference category)
Tier 1 0.028 −0.0232 0.0056 Dropped Dropped Dropped
Tier 2 Dropped −0.0522 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Tier 3 −0.0003 −0.0532 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Tier 4 −0.0007 0.0055 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Country tier (Tier 4 excluded as reference category)
Tier 1 0.0169 −0.0091 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Tier 2 0.0136 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Tier 3 −0.0063 −0.0076 −0.0005 Dropped Dropped Dropped
Contextual variables
Sessions 0.0057 −0.0000 0.0041 Dropped 0.0004 0.0041
Rounds −0.0005 Dropped 0.0010 0.0006 Dropped Dropped
In-app transactions −0.0003 0.0017 0.0106 0.0005 Dropped Dropped
Gift claims 0.0033 0.0001 0.0008 Dropped 0.0002 Dropped
Gifts sent 0.0002 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped −0.0001
Ad views 0.002 −0.0006 0.0004 Dropped 0.0008 Dropped
Thanks to friends 0.0031 −0.0001 Dropped Dropped 0.0005 Dropped
Messages −0.0026 Dropped Dropped Dropped −0.0003 0.0004
Enemies beaten Dropped −0.0000 Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.0003
Interactions between price decision and contextual variables
Device tier 1 −0.0223 −0.0379 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Device tier 2 Dropped −0.003 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Device tier 3 Dropped −0.0196 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Device tier 4 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Country tier 1 −0.0017 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Country tier 2 Dropped 0.0024 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Country tier 3 −0.0001 −0.0148 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Sessions 0.0072 −0.0061 −0.0058 Dropped Dropped −0.0037
Rounds 0.0020 0.0027 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
In-app transactions −0.0011 Dropped Dropped Dropped −0.0016 Dropped
Gift claims −0.007 −0.0001 Dropped Dropped −0.0000 Dropped
Gifts sent −0.0004 Dropped Dropped Dropped −0.0000 Dropped
Ad views −0.0031 −0.0000 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Thanks to friends 0.0074 Dropped Dropped Dropped −0.0006 Dropped
Messages −0.0028 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped
Enemies beaten −0.0008 Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.0001
Intercept −0.0183 0.0611 0.0056 0.0021 0.0009 0.0008
Lambda 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001
N 47,033 29,755 19,488 21,259 14,256 8,388
Notes: Results for LASSO regressions of reward on decision indicator and contextual variables at
different decision points.
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